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Notes
The reader will notice that in this study I often refer generally to Jews 
although what is more specifically meant is “European Jews,” “Ashkenazi Jews,” 
or “American Jews.” This is shorthand, and should be construed as such, but it is 
not intended to imply that Jews that do not fall into these categories are any less 
Jewish. Nor is it claiming that what applies to the situation of an Ashkenazi Jew, 
for example, necessarily applies in the same way to a Mizrahi or Sephardic Jew, 
or that the modern American Jewish experience is the same as that of the modern 
Israeli Jew. The simple truth is that I come from an American Ashkenazi 
background, and this is the only aspect of the Jewish tradition about which I am 
prepared to make claims. 
ળ
The reader will also notice that I refer to the collective mass slaughtering 
of European Jews and other groups, facilitated by the German National Socialist 
regime between 1933 and 1945, as the Shoah rather than the more familiar term 
“Holocaust.” This is done deliberately. “Shoah” is a Hebrew word meaning 
“disaster” or “conflagration.” “Holocaust,” on the other hand, comes from the 
Greek word holo-kauston, meaning a sacrifice, a burnt offering completely 
consumed by fire. I reject the sense of sacrifice that attaches itself to the genocide 
when it is deemed a “Holocaust.” As we shall see, this is not simply a semantic 
difference but indicative of a difference in understanding of the nature of the 
event itself. The word “Holocaust” will only be employed here to make a specific 
point about this distinction, within the reproduction of a direct quotation, or to 
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vJewish messianic thought (according to certain commentators), suggests the 
relation between the event and its nonoccurrence. If the Messiah is at the gates of 
Rome among the beggars and lepers, one might think that his incognito protects 
or prevents him from coming, but, precisely, he is recognized: someone, obsessed 
with questioning and unable to leave off, asks him: “When will you come?” His 
being there is, then, not the coming. With the Messiah, who is there, the call must 
always resound: “Come, Come.” His presence is no guarantee. Both future and 
past (it is said at least once that the Messiah has already come), his coming does 
not correspond to any presence at all. Nor does the call suffice. There are 
conditions – the efforts of men, their virtue, their repentance – which are known; 
there are always other conditions which are not. And if it happens that to the 
question “When will you come?” the Messiah answers, “Today,” the answer is 
certainly impressive: so, it is today! It is now and always now. There is no need to 
wait, although to wait is an obligation. And when is it now? When the now which 
does not belong to ordinary time, which necessarily overturns it, does not 
maintain but destabilizes it? When? – especially if one remembers that this “now” 
which belongs to no text, but is the now of a severe, fictitious narrative, refers to 
texts that make it once more dependent upon realizable-unrealizable conditions: 
“Now, if only you heed me, or if you are willing to listen to my voice.” Finally, 
the Messiah – quite the opposite in this respect, from the Christian hypostasis – is
by no means divine. He is a comforter, the most just of the just, but it is not even 
sure that he is a person – that he is someone in particular. When one commentator 
says, The Messiah is perhaps I, he is not exalting himself. Anyone might be the 
Messiah – must be he, is not he. For it would be wrong to speak of the Messiah in 
Hegelian language – “the absolute intimacy of absolute exteriority” – all the more 
so because the coming of the Messiah does not yet signify the end of history, the 
suppression of time. It announces a time more future, as the following mysterious 
text conveys, than any prophecy could ever foretell: “All prophets – there is no 
exception – have prophesied only for the messianic time {l’epokhe?}. As for 
future time, what eye has seen it except Yours, Lord, who will act for him who is 
faithful to you and keeps waiting?”
[….]
And why the idea of the Messiah? Why the necessity of a just finish? Why can we 
not bear, why do we not desire that which is without end? The messianic hope –
hope which is dread as well – is inevitable when history appears politically only 
as an arbitrary hubbub, a process deprived of meaning or direction. But if political 
thinking becomes messianic in its turn, this confusion, which removes the 
seriousness from the search for reason (intelligibility) in history – and also from 
the requirement of messianic thought (the realization of morality) – simply attests 
to a time so frightful, so dangerous, that any recourse appears justified: can one 
maintain any distance at all when Auschwitz happens? How is it possible to say: 
Auschwitz has happened?
– Maurice Blanchot1
                                                          
1 Blanchot, Maurice. The Writing of Disaster. 142-143
Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press, 1986
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Tenebrae
We are near, Lord,
near and at hand.
Handled already, Lord,
clawed and clawing as though





Askew we went there,
went there to bend
down to the trough, to the crater.
To be watered we went there, Lord.
It was blood, it was
what you shed, Lord.
It gleamed.
It cast your image into our eyes, Lord.
Our eyes and our mouths are so open and empty, Lord.
We have drunk, Lord.




                                                          
2 Celan, Paul. Hamburger, Michael, translator. Poems of Paul Celan. 89
New York : Persea Books, 1989
1Introduction: 
A Destruction Without Adequate Precedent
It is not incumbent upon you to complete the work. But you are not free to evade 
it. 
– Rabbi Tarfon3
Evading and Confronting the Shoah
Given the sheer magnitude and horror of the Shoah, and the fact that it took place 
in the heart of the Western world, it is surprising how rarely the event is allowed a central 
role in our consciousness or any forms of public discourse. We have allowed ourselves to 
compartmentalize the Shoah into categories distinct from the mainstream of almost all 
realms of thought. Or perhaps we should say that we have forced ourselves to do so. 
“Holocaust Studies” has become a specialized, self-contained department of various 
academic fields, and very rarely are the individuals who devote their professional careers 
to this pursuit given integrated forums. Even the areas where the significance of the 
Shoah seems most important continue more or less as if it had never taken place. In terms 
of our ability to assess the possible relevance of the event to the world in which we live –
the very same world, it becomes necessary to say, that produced the Shoah – such 
evasions differ in degree but not in kind with the denial of the Shoah itself.
In another sense this development is not surprising at all. The consequences, if we 
were to take them seriously, to treat them in a manner corresponding to their significance, 
are profoundly unnerving. A closer look at the perpetrators, for example, reveals that they 
cannot be dismissed as ignorant or insane. Rather, we must confront the fact that the 
                                                          
3 Pirke Avot 2.16
2people who committed the crime, from the architects all the way down the chain of 
command, were educated, rational, and civilized men, and that there appears to be no 
unbridgeable gap between their thinking and our own. Perhaps for this among several 
reasons, the very question of whether the Shoah has something significant to say about 
our world is rarely permitted to even be asked. 
That these “were educated men of their time,” Raul Hilberg, historian of the 
Shoah, writes, is “the crux of the question whenever we ponder the meaning of Western 
Civilization after Auschwitz.” He suggests that “we can no longer assume that we have a 
full grasp of the workings of our social institutions, bureaucratic structures, or 
technology.”4 Such a reflection on the Shoah presents obvious critiques to many fields of 
study, including history, sociology, politics, philosophy, and theology. 
Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman broadens Hilberg’s critique, questioning the 
abilities of “all the other learned men and women who are professionally concerned with 
understanding and explaining.” He then extends the critique even further:
If Hilberg is right, and our most crucial social institutions elude our mental and 
practical grasp, then it is not just the professional academics who ought to be 
worried. True, the Holocaust occurred almost half a century ago [Bauman is 
writing in 1989]. True, its immediate results are fast receding into the past. The 
generation that experienced it at first hand has almost died out. But – and this is 
an awesome, sinister ‘but’ – these once-familiar features of our civilization, 
which the Holocaust had made mysterious again, are still very much part of our 
life. They have not gone away. Neither has, therefore, the possibility of the 
Holocaust. 5
Rather than address this fact our discussions of the Shoah have often revolved around 
various methods of evasion, ignoring or dismissing the relevance of the Shoah to 
anything not directly, tangibly related. We are familiar with many of the ways that the 
                                                          
4 Hilberg in Bauman, Zygmunt. Modernity and the Holocaust. 83
Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1989
5 Bauman, Zygmunt. Modernity and the Holocaust. 84
3relevance of the Shoah is brushed aside. Those who try to direct our eyes to these issues 
are disparaged as pessimists, unreasonable, or fanatical prophets of doom. In response to 
them we remind ourselves how civilized we are. We point to our democratic progress, 
our concern for social justice, and our cosmopolitan, modern sensibilities. We make 
sharp distinctions between ourselves and atrocities of the “barbaric” past or other parts of 
the world, overlooking the fact that the largest, most effective, and impersonal of these 
atrocities took place not in some exotic locale or distant time but in the very center of the 
modern world. Evasion has become so reflexive that it has become a rule of thumb in 
civil discourse that, a sure way to get people to stop listening to you is to simply mention 
the Shoah. The resulting effect is that the Shoah, while it remains a seminal event, has 
left our consciousness and awareness of the tendencies of our civilization unshaken.
Bauman describes the ways that such a result can be accomplished when the 
sociology of morality is confronted with “events of exceptional dramatic power” that 
threaten to “shatter the grip of the dominant paradigm and to start a feverish search for 
alternative groundings of ethical principles.” One way that such a shattering of the 
dominant paradigm can be ignored is through the “virtual identification of morality with 
social discipline,” a “programmatic relativism” that works as an “ultimate safety valve in 
case the observed norms do arouse instinctive moral revulsion.” In other words, events 
are explained away as deviant, as unrepresentative of the culture from which they sprang. 
A second way to avoid confronting such issues is to question the need for a search for 
“alternative groundings of ethical principles” in the first place. This involves attempting
to “narrate the dramatic experience” in a way that fits with the old scheme, either by 
casting the events as unique and therefore irrelevant to general morality or by 
4“dissolving” the events into a “wider and familiar category of unsavoury, yet regular and 
normal by-products” of our moral systems. Finally, if the above tactics prove 
unsuccessful, there is the “refusal to admit the evidence into the discursive universe of 
the discipline,” proceeding, effectively, as if the events never happened.6
Each of these strategies has been employed, in sociology and other fields, in 
response to the Shoah. Bauman notes two major problems that stem from our inability, or 
lack of willingness, to confront such implications. The first is that, since our 
understanding of the processes that produced the Shoah has not advanced, “we could be 
once more unprepared to notice and decode the warning signs – were they now, as they 
had been then, blatantly displayed all around.” His second, correlative point is that 
because of our inability to decode the signs there is no way to know whether the 
“products of history which in all probability contained the potentiality” of the Shoah have 
been rendered obsolete. Indeed, we have denied ourselves the tools with which to 
investigate such claims. “We can only suspect,” Bauman writes, “that the conditions… 
have not been radically transformed.”7
If we do seriously consider the lessons of the Shoah, however, the implications 
can be equally if not more terrifying. As Bauman has noted, there is a tendency to equate 
the moral with the social, to assume that our societal institutions – church, government, 
social justice groups, law – are sources of moral authority. What emerges from the case 
of the Shoah, though, is the exact opposite conclusion. Here it is these very institutions 
that were sources of moral repugnance, and here moral theory “faced the possibility that 
morality may manifest itself in insubordination toward socially upheld principles, and in 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 175-176
7 Ibid. 86
5an action openly defying social solidarity and consensus.” As Hannah Arendt noted, 
those individuals who acted morally in the face of an overarching, socially-determined 
immorality, “went really only by their own judgments, and they did so freely; there were 
no rules to be abided by, under which the particular cases with which they were 
confronted could be subsumed.”8
And with the downfall of the theory of a socially constructed morality that 
maintains moral authority to determine between good and evil, one can turn to no 
alternative society for moral grounding. Bauman suggests that “this relativism, however, 
does not apply to human ‘ability to tell right from wrong’. Such ability, then, must be 
grounded in something other than the conscious collective of society.” He concludes that 
“socialization,” rather than being thought to explain the processes by which morality is 
produced, must instead be understood as explaining the processes by which morality is 
manipulated. If morality is the object, but not the product, of these manipulating 
processes then “the factors responsible for the presence of moral capacity must be sought 
in the social, but not societal sphere.” We can search for moral behavior in the state of 
“‘being with others,’” in Bauman’s phrase, but not in the structures that enforce and 
attempt to codify this behavior.9
Bauman distinguishes this “‘being with others’” from notions of a human subject 
simply “being,” that is, an individual acting in freedom except when confronted by other 
individuals whose freedom limits her. He is not explicit here but I would suggest he sees 
in such “‘subjectivity,’” characterized by the “technical challenge” of neutralizing or 
“reaching mastery over the other,” the beginnings of a social contract that augurs more 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 177
9 Ibid. 178-179
6developed societal structures that manipulate but do not produce morality. Bauman’s 
‘being with others’ is a duty and not a limit and it is not defined by an appeal to an ideal 
outside of an encounter.10 He finds in the Nazis’ skillful manipulation of society the 
suppression of the effects of this ‘being with others,” this personal responsibility derived 
from the “elementary human condition which makes explicit the universality of human 
revulsion to murder, inhibition against inflicting suffering on another human being, and 
the urge to help those who suffer.”
Though it has been common among historians, especially soon after the fact, to 
explain the Shoah in terms of classic European anti-Semitism, perhaps one of the most 
misunderstood aspects of these events is that they “required the neutralization of 
ordinary [German] attitudes toward the Jews, not their mobilization.”11 In order to 
overcome the historically defined limits of aggression toward Jews, grassroots anti-
Semitism had to be replaced by impersonal, rational, and bureaucratic forces. Bauman 
writes:
The Holocaust could be accomplished only on the condition of neutralizing the 
impact of primeval moral drives, of isolating the machinery of murder from the 
sphere where such drives arise and apply, of rendering such drives marginal or 
altogether irrelevant to the task.12
ળ
Without Promise: Theodicy, Ethics, and Redemption after Auschwitz
As we attempt to better understand the significance of the Shoah another concern 
immediately follows on the heels of the first. Already alluded to by Bauman, this is the 




7problem of how we can heed these lessons, how we can begin to articulate ourselves 
morally in light of the events of the Shoah while somehow guarding ourselves against the 
tendencies which produced it. This would entail a major restructuring of our relationship 
to our societal institutions, and perhaps a restructuring of the institutions themselves. This 
project is as vast as it is important, and it would be impossible to address the full range of 
issues in a lifetime, let alone a single paper. The specific subject of this paper is infinitely 
smaller, and yet only the tiniest bit of that subject will be dealt with here. We will be 
investigating the implications of the Shoah as they pertain specifically to the Jewish 
people. While all of the concerns laid out above apply to Jews as they do to everyone, a 
specific host of problems apply more forcefully to the Jews and Judaism as the principal 
targets of the Shoah. Ours will be an attempt to more fully understand the specific and 
general problems as they concern Jews, and to offer tentative prescriptions with regard to 
ways in which Judaism can successfully move forward.
Corresponding endeavors with regard to Christians and Gentiles more broadly are 
certainly possible and necessary, and would assuredly contain their own sets of particular 
concerns. Nothing that will be written here is intended to preclude such projects. They are 
welcome complements to the task unfolding here. It must be acknowledged, of course, 
that to consider Jewish responses to the Shoah without at least implicit reference to a 
Jewish/Christian relationship would be absurd and unproductive. To that end, there will 
be many references to Christianity throughout this examination when they become 
necessary. Please note, however, that such references are not intended to represent a 
fully-formed characterization of Christian possibilities or realities.
8The concerns I have laid out above, along with other implications of the Shoah, 
present rather difficult problems for Jews and Judaism. It is my contention that many of 
these problems are related to concepts of redemption in Judaism. As we shall see as the
study progresses, “redemption” is not something that can be easily pinned down, 
although in our subsequent chapter we will try to come to a better understanding of its 
possibilities. It has meant different things to Jews in different ages and communities, and 
it does not necessarily mean the same thing from one individual to another. It is often 
expressed in connection with ideas concerning the coming of the messiah and the 
messianic era. In many ways it is an expression of Jewish hope, of the belief that 
suffering is temporary and that it will eventually give way to a reprieve from worldly 
injustice. Here we also find the beginning of an ethical component in that the framework 
of redemption, along with the imperative nature of the goal, suggests the possibility of 
human action that contributes to this end or detracts from it. Redemption is also 
intricately tied up with notions of theodicy, a term coined by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
to mean “justification of God,” which Zachary Braiterman expands to mean “any 
utterance whose source attempts to ‘justify,’ ‘explain,’ or ‘accept’ as ultimately 
meaningful the relationship between God and evil.”13
In much the same way that the Shoah has shaken our understanding of civilization 
more generally, it has also presented difficult obstacles for many traditional Jewish 
understandings of redemption. Just as others have ignored the problems of the Shoah, 
Jewish thinkers have often ignored the difficulties presented by the Shoah for redemptive 
thought. Perhaps the most readily apparent site of difficulty is the intersection between 
                                                          
13 Braiterman, Zachary. (God) After Auschwitz. 19
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1998
9redemption and theodicy. Much of Jewish tradition, both historical and mythical, can be 
viewed as attempts to understand events as part of a larger process, to imbue them with 
meaning and relation to morality. But how is it possible to place the Shoah within this 
context? Could the Shoah have been a lesson, a moment of collective clarity or 
revelation? If so, what did we learn? Could it have been punishment for wrongdoing? If 
so, what was the crime? What could have possibly justified murder on such a colossal 
scale? Could it be justified as a trial, a necessary purifying process which has prepared us 
for a new age, the messianic age perhaps? If so, we must ask ourselves what kind of 
reward could justify such atrocities. Moreover, we would be forced to entertain the
question: was this suffering so grievous as to be unjustifiable? And if it can be justified, 
what does that say about God? And if the answer is that the Shoah has no redeeming 
value at all, is that not infinitely worse?
Perhaps a better place to start is with this question: Can the Shoah be viewed in 
terms of past instances of Jewish suffering? Post-Shoah theologian Emil L. Fackenheim 
compares the Shoah to the martyrdom of Rabbi Akiba at the hands of the Roman emperor 
Hadrian. Akiba’s death is often considered to be the model of traditional martyrdom:
When Hadrian forbade the practice of Judaism on pain of death, Rabbi Akiba and 
the rest of the “ten martyrs” defied his edict, were caught and tortured, and died 
with the Sh’ma Yisrael on their lips: their martyrdom can be remembered on 
Yom Kippur, the most solemn of Jewish festivals, for it has renewed the Jewish 
faith – and administered Hadrian a posthumous defeat. In the most painful 
possible contrast, Hitler’s name could not be mentioned without the specter of 
posthumous victories for him. Hadrian’s edict gave the ten martyrs the choice 
between life and the risk of death. But the new Jewish crime was not an act – the 
practice of mitzvot, the study of Torah, the ordination of new rabbis – but birth; 
and with Teutonic consistency the Holocaust was engineered so as to give few 
would-be Akibas the choice of how to die, and none at all that between life and 
the risk of death. For Judaism, then, the Holocaust is a destruction without 
adequate precedent: it is new.14
                                                          
14 Fackenheim, Emil. L. To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought. Xviii
10
How can the Shoah be related to human choice when, as Fackenheim explains, 
“the most characteristic new victims were those robbed of choice altogether: the children 
too young to choose, and the Musselmänner unable to choose any longer”? If we are to 
accept that the Shoah is distinct from other Jewish moments of catastrophe, that it cannot 
simply be overcome through Jewish persistence and the passage of time, that it cannot be 
synthesized within the existing options of theodicy and redemption, we must ask with 
Fackenheim: “Has Hitler, then, succeeded where Hadrian failed?” Is Jewish faith, which 
has weathered the storms of so many catastrophes and emerged stronger on the other 
side, “destroyed by the screams of the children and the no less terrible silence of the 
Musselmänner?”15
Fackenheim proposes, or more correctly claims to have ascertained, a 614th
commandment that emerges after the Shoah. In addition to the 613 sanctified, as 
understood by mythical memory, with the Revelation at Sinai, he puts forward the
commandment: “forbidding Jews to give Hitler posthumous victories.” Fackenheim 
explains, furthermore, that this commandment has already been enshrined out of 
requirement by the Jewish population. He recognizes his audacity, and acknowledges that 
the 613 have until now satisfied “rabbis not insensitive to new challenges.” Still 
Fackenheim defends the necessity of the commandment, explaining his position in terms 
of the importance of the problem:
Yet to stay with the 613 now proved impossible. As honesty with the facts and 
fidelity to the victims was making something new – the naming of Hitler –
unavoidable, along with it emerged a new necessity. It was forbidden to allow the 
posthumous destruction of the Jewish faith in Man, God and – this even for the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
New York : Schocken Books, 1982
15 Ibid. xviii-xix
11
most secularist of Jews – that hope without which a Jew cannot live, the hope 
which is the gift of Judaism to all humanity. To deny Hitler the posthumous 
victory of destroying this faith was a moral-religious commandment.16
Two points that Fackenheim makes here are important enough to be emphasized 
again. The first point is that this is not a matter that pertains exclusively to what we may 
or may not speculate about the nature or existence of a deity, or even about the authorship 
of sacred texts. This is about whether or not, after the Shoah, “being Jewish,” in any 
conceivable variation of that condition, can bring anything viable to bear on hope and the 
promise of a better future. And if the answer is no, we must ask whether or not “being 
Jewish” is viable at all. Of course, if the answer is once again no, it would entail the 
ultimate posthumous victory for Hitler.
The second point, which is implicit in Fackenheim’s words above, is that his 614th
commandment, borne out of such exigency, is correspondingly a radical but necessary 
addition. “When all is said and done,” Fackenheim writes, “must not the Holocaust either 
cease to be a stumbling block for the Jewish faith, after all, in which case the 614th
commandment is unnecessary, or else be and remain a stumbling block, in which to obey 
that commandment is ‘humanly impossible’?”17 I submit that the only way to preserve 
Judaism while recognizing the stumbling block of the Shoah and respecting the 
commandment against posthumous victories for Hitler is to reject certain traditional 
understandings of redemption, hope, and theodicy, and to radically transform our 
conceptions of these ideas.
It would be valid to wonder how, if we were to do this, Judaism would remain 
recognizable to the Judaism of the past and therefore be Judaism in anything other than 




name. Fackenheim asks: “Must not Judaism either survive the Holocaust fundamentally 
as it was, or else, if not destroyed, at least be altered beyond recognition?” From what 
may seem an insurmountable obstacle emerges the very task we are then required to 
undertake: we must seek out ways that Judaism can be altered, that redemption can be re-
imagined, without forsaking classical Judaism fundamentally. Zachary Braiterman writes 
that we cannot “understand contemporary Jewish response to catastrophe without 
reflecting upon the shape of classical and modern Jewish thought. At the same time, 
Auschwitz represents a theological point of no return… this catastrophe and its memory 
have profoundly reshaped the given theodic and antitheodic contours of [the Jewish 
people’s] religious culture.”18
ળ
In order to decide whether or not we can alter Judaism in light of the Shoah while 
sufficiently maintaining a connection to the Jewish past, taking our cue from Emmanuel 
Levinas we will make use of “ethics” as the litmus test. Ethics, what Bauman called
“being with others,” must inform our decisions every step of the way. If the Shoah holds 
our conceptions of redemption, the framework within which we have traditionally acted 
ethically, up to scrutiny, then whether we can preserve an ethics that is conceptually 
continuous with classical understandings, as well as our modern imperatives after the 
Shoah, is a measure of our success or failure.
Levinas presents us with the same problems as Bauman and Fackenheim, but 
through the lens of morality:
                                                          
18 Braiterman, Zachary. (God) After Auschwitz. 5
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If there is an explicitly Jewish moment in my thought, it is the reference to 
Auschwitz, where God let the Nazis do what they wanted. Consequently, what 
remains? Either this means that there is no reason for morality and hence it can 
be concluded that everyone should act like the Nazis, or the moral law maintains 
its authority…19
Richard J. Bernstein, writing about Levinas, explains that the radical revision required by 
Auschwitz does not necessarily thwart the possibility of an “absolute commandment”20
that speaks to moral concerns. “It still cannot be concluded that after Auschwitz there is 
no longer a moral law, as if moral or ethical law were impossible, without promise,” 
Levinas writes in agreement with Bauman’s claims.21 Levinas’s argument is that there is, 
in fact, a source of moral law that survives the destruction of a redemption that is 
predicated on promise. In Levinasian terms, then, morality after Auschwitz must contain 
an ethical principle that straddles the abyss of the Shoah and does not require “promise” 
as it has previously been construed.
But what is such an ethical principle? Similar to Bauman’s “being with others,” it 
must summon an ethics that withstands the manipulations of socialization by appeal to 
direct relation, or encounter, with the Other. It is the infinite obligation, as in Bauman’s 
distinction between duty and limit, that arises out of sympathy and of the suffering we 
experience due to the suffering of another. The suffering is even more profound when, as 
in the case of the Shoah, the suffering of the other can only be characterized as “useless.” 
Levinas writes:
                                                          
19 Levinas, Emmanuel in Critchley, Simon and Bernasconi, Robert, editors. The Cambridge Companion to 
Levinas. 254
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2002
20 Bernstein, Richard J. in Critchley, Simon and Bernasconi, Robert, editors. The Cambridge Companion to 
Levinas. 254
21 Levinas, Emmanuel in Critchley, Simon and Bernasconi, Robert, editors. The Cambridge Companion to 
Levinas. 254
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…the suffering for the useless suffering of the other person, the just suffering in 
me for the unjustifiable suffering of the Other, opens upon the suffering the 
ethical perspective of the inter-human… It is this attention to the Other which, 
across the cruelties of our century – despite these cruelties, because of these 
cruelties – can be affirmed as the very bond of human subjectivity, even to the 
point of being raised to a supreme ethical principle – the only one which it is not 
possible to contest…22
For Levinas it is the suffering as a response to the suffering of the Other that 
provides for the possibility of ethical action that can overcome the moral relativism in the 
Nazi problem. Such ethical action rejects redemptive promise – the assertion that actions 
can be ethically pure and justified in a culminating sense – but it maintains the possibility 
of moral action. Several developments spring from such a stance, but one in particular 
that will prove important to our subsequent discussions is that the moral action prescribed 
by Levinas cannot be derived from sources of action that can be described as 
“triumphal.” In an essay entitled “The Virtues of Patience,” Levinas describes such
sources as “whatever is harsh and pitiless, adventurous and heroic, dangerous and 
intense.” He means by this that even ethical action that is inevitable and just must be 
simultaneously understood for what it also is: violent and unjust. Ethical action must 
preserve the pain from which it springs, it cannot discard injustice. “To anaesthetize this 
pain,” Levinas writes, “brings the revolutionary to the frontiers of fascism.”23
ળ
Overview
As noted several times previously, a Judaism that is transformed after the Shoah 
must also be recognizable in character to previous forms of Judaism. We must therefore 
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23 Levinas, Emmanuel. Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. 155
Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990
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establish whether there are in classical Judaism anti-redemptive elements, or even 
differently articulated expressions of redemptive meaning that rupture triumphal
redemptive narratives, and if we can continue to preserve an ethics that springs from such 
instances of rupture. Along Levinas’s understanding of ethics, other Levinasian concepts, 
more of which will be discussed as they become relevant, will remain in the background 
of our thoughts as we proceed. 
The next two chapters will be a survey of historical understandings and 
developments in redemptive thought in Jewish memory throughout history. In chapter 
two we will focus on selections from the Hebrew Bible, and in chapter three we will look 
at subsequent developments. Mythical and historical memory will be treated as one, not 
necessarily because they are equivalent but because they perform such similar functions 
in our consciousness. Underlying the survey will be the contention that redemptive 
thought in a given instance is never as straightforward as it may appear, and that even 
with redemption’s most triumphal, dominating, or culminating formulations strong 
criticisms and counter-trends embed themselves within these codified moments. I do not 
intend for these chapters to be a comprehensive study of either the options discussed or 
the sum of options that have been possible in Judaism. Rather, they should be construed 
as an attempt to provide for a better understanding of the context within which we will 
explore these themes at greater length in subsequent chapters. I have done my best here to 
emphasize connections in redemptive thought between different situations, but also to 
allow for an understanding that each situation is unique, and does not necessarily 
correspond directly to the categories of another.
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In the fourth chapter we will discuss previous Jewish responses to suffering and 
catastrophe through the prism of redemption, and compare them to our possibilities after 
the Shoah. Once again, we will make little distinction between the mythical and the 
historical. We will discuss what these previous instances might have to teach us, but also 
where we must perhaps acknowledge the limits of their usefulness. We will begin with a 
discussion of the Scroll of Esther, which relates another moment in our collective 
memory when the Jewish people were threatened on a monumental scale. From there we 
will explore a Talmudic discussion of messianic texts with Emmanuel Levinas as our 
exegetical guide. We will end with an exposition of a few songs of the contemporary 
poet/singer/songwriter Leonard Cohen. The task of this chapter will be to more fully 
understand the contours of the space in which we are working.
Chapter five will begin with problems posed by the post-Shoah theologian 
Richard L. Rubenstein. These will clarify some specific issues with which we must 
contend when articulating Judaism after the Shoah. From there we will compare the 
linguistic deconstructions, as well as the mystical and ethical practices of two medieval 
Jewish mystics, Abraham Abulafia and Bachya ben Asher, with aspects of Levinas’s
philosophy, and explore the relationship between their formulations and Levinasian
ethics. The goal here will be to learn from the insights of these mystics, and also to 
speculate as to which aspects of their practices continue to resonate with our current 
concerns.
In the final chapter I will revisit the themes we have explored thorughout, apply 
them more explicitly to the problems of the Shoah, and discuss specific responses to the 
Shoah less reservedly, including art and literature, holding them up to critiques based on
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the issues that have been explored throughout this project. It is incumbent upon me to 
stress here that everything stated in this chapter is intended to be tentative and in no way 
conclusive. By the time we reach this chapter, it should be clear from our previous 
investigations why the disclaimer is necessary. 
Finally, let me note that it is not my intention to pronounce that Judaism is, or 
must be, this or that thing, to catalogue, in William James’s terminology, “live” or “dead” 
options as they stand for other people. As much as I have striven here for ways of 
expression that resonate with other people, and as much as I have couched my ideas in 
terminology and language that hopefully lends them legitimacy, this project remains 
personal in many ways. Every concept I focus on, everything I quote, every editorial
nuance, is chosen by me because it resonates with my own understanding of these ideas. I 
am under no illusion that these inclinations will be shared. I invite you to formulate your 
own understandings and to hold everything I write up to suspicion. But keep in mind that 
there is no single realization or readjustment that “fixes the problem,” and that the work 
is not nearly complete, with so much more that remains to be done.
Zachary Braiterman ends his own study of “theodicy and antitheodicy” in post-
Shoah Jewish thought with an apology. Rather than try to devise a better one, let me 
leave you with his:
…even the best-informed attempts to remember and draw conclusions 
from the testimonies of this event will miss the mark. This includes my 
own study… For that I am sorry. I have tried my best to address insoluble 
theological problems created by the catastrophic suffering of other 
people.24
ળ
                                                          
24 Braiterman, Zachary. (God) After Auschwitz. 178
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Rupture and the Holy Ideal: 
Redemption in the Hebrew Bible
To acknowledge how literature acts upon men – this is perhaps the ultimate 
wisdom of the West; perhaps in this wisdom the people of the Bible will 
recognize itself.
- Emmanuel Levinas25
The Hebrew people gave Moses a crucial lesson in reading when they forced him 
to break the tablets of the law. Because they were not able to accept a word 
without origins, the word of God. It was necessary for Moses to break the book 
in order for the book to become human…. This gesture on the part of the Hebrew 
people was necessary before they could accept the book. This is exactly what we 
do so well. We destroy the book when we read it to make it into another book. 
The book is always born from a broken book. And the word, too, is born from a 
broken word…. (Auster, “Interview” 23)
- Edmond Jabès26
Narratives of Obligation and Power
From the earliest instances of Jewish identity formation, the concept of 
redemption has been a central feature of Jewish thought. “Redemption” is meant here in 
its broadest sense, encompassing all of its possible forms. It can be a deeply personal, 
individual experience or belief, or it can take place on a communal scale, however 
expansive. It can be a model for understanding the world, and for acting with reference to 
such an understanding. It takes many forms, but often it can be viewed as system that 
lends a degree of coherence and direction to time. It presents events as having meaning 
and value in relation to an ultimate end, which will elucidate the pattern and necessity of
these events. It is the larger framework that allows us to conceive of such themes as 
suffering, repentance, and justice. Our conceptions of redemption can permeate our 
thoughts at a level more deeply than everyday consciousness, and they remain 
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surprisingly persistent regardless of our relationships to God, scripture, or religious 
institutions.  
In this chapter and throughout the study, we will be discussing different 
understandings of redemption. What may make our study a bit confusing is that any 
“type” of redemption is not actually an isolated conception to which other redemptive 
understandings do not pertain. In some cases there will be so much overlap that a clear 
distinction between one or more types would be improper. In other cases, one or several 
types may apply while others clearly do not. We will at times, for example, talk about 
“triumphal” redemption – redemption characterized most explicitly by reference to an 
eventual victory, often a victory over evil. Other types of redemptive thought that we will 
discuss include “utopian,” in which a vision of a perfect world holds sway, and 
“progressive,” in which notions of progress in time play a big role. Later, a distinction 
will be made between “totalist” thinking and “totalizing” thinking in redemptive thought. 
The former is concerned with domination, envisioning the expanding capacity for power 
and control over others as the means by which redemption can be attained, the latter is 
focused instead on wholeness and coherence as the goal of redemption. Elsewhere we 
will simply discuss redemption generally, as the idea that entities, from an individual to 
the entire universe, can or will be redeemed – rescued, delivered, reborn, transformed, 
vindicated, or fulfilled in some ultimate sense. 
Each of these types, and others that we will also discuss, may or may not overlap 
with each other in particular instances. They will also be intertwined with other, related 
ideas such as hope, action, enthusiasm, politics, and suffering. At the same time, we will 
be emphasizing how, even when certain notions of redemption are strongly articulated, 
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there exist critiques of these notions within their articulation, elements that argue against 
different redemptive types or that counter notions of redemption with anti-redemptive 
ideas. Though we will be primarily focused on tracing the evolution of various
conceptions of redemption, and finding similarities in different situations, we should 
remain aware throughout our study that even when connections between situations can be 
made, the situations also remain distinct in significant ways.
While redemptive thought is often intimately connected with ideas of culmination 
it can often only be fully understood with reference to beginnings as well. For this reason 
we will look to our origins as laid out in the Bible in order to begin our explorations of 
the different forms that redemption can take. The Book of Genesis provides mythical 
descriptions of God’s creation of the world, the earliest encounters between human 
beings, early instances of divine retribution, and the eventual election by God of 
Abraham as the father of the Jewish people. Looked at from afar, Genesis has sometimes 
been thought of as overly harsh, domineering, and violent in its presentation of things. 
The first act of disobedience, which leads to separation from God and paradise, an ideal 
to which returning sometimes becomes the focus of redemptive promise, seems to take 
place through the deceptive actions of outside forces. The punishment therefore appears 
inordinate, and subsequent acts of retribution are even less merciful. The task of 
achieving God’s redemptive promise and returning to blissful pleasures appears, then, to 
consist in practice of acting out similar struggles of power and domination. Redemption 
then becomes an exercise in ruthlessness, in which the goal is absolute triumph over all 
impediments, that is, entities that are outside of our control. 
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A closer inspection of the textual material, however, provides a much more 
complex understanding of Genesis’ treatment of such issues. Certainly, motifs of 
domination appear again and again. But it is not so clear that they are endorsed 
uncritically. Perhaps they appear for another purpose. They most assuredly represent a 
very real option for understanding the world and acting in it, a very accessible model of 
redemption, but is this model the only one? As a description of the nature of humanity,
Genesis would be remiss if it did not include such common urges – urges to control and 
dominate – but, I submit, these urges are presented as one possibility amongst several, 
and the question of where Genesis stands, if indeed it stands anywhere definitively, is 
much more nuanced. To explore this assertion, let us look at Genesis’ depiction of the 
first brothers, the first human beings who encountered each other with opposing interests. 
Genesis 4.8-12 describes the encounter:
8: Kayin said to Hevel his brother… But then it was, when they were out in the 
field that Kayin rose up against Hevel his brother and killed him. 9: YHWH said 
to Kayin: Where is Hevel your brother? He said: I do not know. Am I the 
watcher of my brother? 10: He said: What have you done! A sound – your 
brother’s blood cries out to me from the soil! 11: And now, damned be you from 
the soil, which opened up its mouth to receive your brother’s blood from your 
hand. 12: When you wish to work the soil it will not henceforth give its strength 
to you; wavering and wandering must you be on earth!27
First we should note the importance of the word “brother” in this passage, a word 
that continues to echo even after the bloody act. We have literal brotherhood, but also an 
                                                          
27 Fox, Everett. The Five Books of Moses. 27. 
New York : Schocken Books, c1995
Whenever possible, translations of the Torah will come from Everett Fox’s The Five Books of 
Moses. Fox’s project is unique in the English language, as far as I am aware, in its attempt to preserve the 
nuance of the Hebrew, rather than “smoothing over” the prose to please the ears of English speakers. Fox 
makes up for some degree of grammatical awkwardness by presenting a text indispensable to our task in 
terms of the connections and specificity of words and sentences. In direct quotations I will preserve Fox’s 
renderings of places, names, and other proper nouns in Hebrew transliteration, but in my own writing, for 
ease of recognition for the English-speaking reader, I will employ the standardized English versions of 
biblical names. Thus, Fox’s Kayin and Hevel will become the more familiar Cain and Abel, etc.
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implied relationality with respect to the text’s consideration of the act: Cain said to Abel 
his brother… rose up against Abel his brother… Am I the watcher of my brother… your 
brother’s blood cries out… receive your brother’s blood from your hand. The ringing 
repetitions of “brother,” which in Hebrew are declensions of the noun “brother” (that is, 
my-brother or your-brother is a single word) become the implied accusation in itself. 
Even before the crime, the inseparability of “your” and “brother,” “my” and “brother,” 
implies a relationship that bespeaks something different than two entities in disconnected 
spheres, one confronting the other. There is already an implicit obligation, a 
responsibility toward the other whose being is literally presented as a being-in-relation to 
Cain. It is the context within which we must interpret the questions: “What have you 
done!" and “Am I the watcher of my brother?”
We find this relationality again in the opening formulation, in which “Kayin said 
to Hevel his brother…,” a seeming fragment or non sequitur. We are not told what Cain 
said. It could not be that it was deemed so irrelevant and inconsequential that it merited 
no inclusion. The seeming omission must be more purposeful than it might appear. 
Would not the completion of the fragment in any form render its meaning too specific? 
Leaving the confrontation ambiguous allows us pursue an exegetical path that would 
have been muted by any particularity in the completion of the sentence. By maintaining 
the fragment, Genesis leads us toward a clarification of the nature of encounter that 
critiques the dominating aspects of redemptive models. 
The question of the relationship between Cain’s actions and his missing speech is 
a difficult one. But there most certainly is a relationship, which is not surprising because 
speech has already played a major role in Genesis. Some of the significant ways that 
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speech has appeared include God’s forming of the world, pronouncing creation “good,” 
issuing early instructions and warnings to humans, and demarcating what is permissible 
and what is not. Speech was also the special privilege of Adam, formed in the image of 
God, who is accorded the opportunity to name the beasts. All of these uses of speech 
demostrate subtle forms of dominance and control, but they are used for positive ends. 
Now we find themes of rage and jealousy, of murder, associated somehow with speech. 
The lack of clarity about what the speech consists of gives us a sense that perhaps speech 
is fundamentally related to power and action. The alternative interpretation, that Cain’s 
actions are related to a lack of speech, suggests that while speech is related to power, so 
is the lack of speech. In other words, the privilege of speech entails an obligation that 
cannot be avoided by speaking or by keeping quiet. As beings capable of speech and 
action we are already responsible even before the choice to speak and act. Both speech 
and silence, as aspects of the ability to speak, are domination because they represent 
choices that come from a place of power over others. This power has both creative and 
destructive aspects, and the choice must be made one way or the other – there is no 
avoidance.
If speech contains both creative and destructive aspects then as human beings 
endowed with free will we have the ability to use our speech, like God, in either way. 
With speech as power, we find ourselves with an almost divine responsibility to use it 
wisely. But even more than that, we have an obligation to use speech with the 
acknowledgment of its dominating drive, and of our own urges in this regard. As we have 
seen, this is not a question of refraining from speech on the one hand, or exercising our 
power indiscriminately on the other. Tales like that of Cain and Abel force us to confront 
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these problematic themes, but give us no clear, easy way around the problems. We are 
given guides and clues, often in the form of more questions or self-referential 
commentary, but it remains for us to navigate through problematic circumstance after 
problematic circumstance. These caveats do not negate the possibility of redemptive 
narrative but they do raise a strong, possibly insurmountable criticism of an unchecked 
redemption focuses on models of domination.
While it is true that not all domineering urges should be understood in terms of 
redemptive narratives, redemption is implicit whenever such actions are justified, either 
in hindsight or before the act. In order to respond to the accusation of murder, for 
example, Cain must offer a conception of himself and the world in which his action is 
justified. He does so with his question, “Am I the watcher of my brother?” It should not 
be dismissed as a crude retort or an attempt to hide his crime. Cain is trying to challenge 
the notion that he has some sort of responsibility toward his brother. It has little to do 
with whether Cain has kept tabs on Abel. If Cain has no responsibility toward Abel, if 
Abel is simply in the way of Cain’s own goals to curry God’s favor, then his act is not a 
crime at all. In this way domination intertwines itself with redemptive schemes.
Before moving on, we should note that even here the text is not content with a 
simple critique. It is not just the case that different trends in viewing redemption, speech, 
and dominance are juxtaposed in Genesis and elsewhere. They are intertwined with one 
another, often in the same narrative, so that they are not so much opposed as engaged in 
conversation with each other. For example, Cain responds to his fate as a wanderer with 
fear that, without the protection of property or God’s presence, he will be subject to the 
domineering, perhaps murderous, whims of anyone he encounters. This is a peculiar 
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concern given that his parents, Adam and Eve, have not borne any other children, or at 
least it has not yet been mentioned. Cain is surely aware that the experiment of the human 
race will not end with him, and he is all too aware of crimes that a human being is 
capable of, having pioneered that route. 
God’s response to this fear, in Genesis 4.15, is a promise of protection, a 
pragmatic recognition of the reality of human action, which is itself a dominating threat. 
It warns of a “sevenfold” vengeance,28 which is purposefully reminiscent of the seven 
days of creation. What we have then is a narrative that, while it seeks to counter the 
notion of redemption based on domination and triumph, emphasizing instead the 
obligatory nature of relationship, still falls back on itself in acknowledgment that people 
do not play by the rules, as it were. Which precept, which conception of redemption, 
then, is the text espousing? What I am trying to show here is not that it is one or the other, 
but that the answer is not simple, and that the text only points us toward the questions that
deserve our attention, not the answers.
ળ
Let us turn now from discussions of personal, individual encounters to issues of 
collective redemption, which present somewhat different, albeit related, concerns. The 
central narrative of redemption, upon which the covenant between God and Israel and the 
revelation of the Torah – traditionally understood as both the oral and textual word of 
God – are predicated, is a communal experience: the exodus from Egypt. The narrative of 
slavery-to-freedom is the Bible’s ultimate reference point, containing persuasive power 
for everything that follows. The Bible abounds with logical, and perhaps more 
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importantly, emotional, references to the redemptive moment. Hebrew Bible scholar 
Everett Fox writes that “at every stage of biblical literature, that experience is invoked for 
the purpose of directing behavior (see especially Judg. 2, I Sam. 8, II Sam. 7, II Kings 17, 
Neh. 9, and Ps. 78; and most of Deuteronomy is rhetorically grounded in it).”29
But to what end is the persuasive power employed? To what sort of behavior, if 
any, does the event direct us? A cursory account of the story presents a rather formulaic, 
triumphal trajectory. The Hebrews are enslaved and abused, and through the help of God 
and strategically placed intermediaries they escape to form their own nation, causing their 
oppressors to be punished in the process. But the purpose of the Hebrews’ liberation is 
explicitly not that they can form an equal, rival nation that stands on a par with the 
Egyptian nation or any other. They are admonished time and again for actions associated 
with the goyim (literally: the nations) – for desiring kings, tangible objects of worship, 
and other symbols of worldly power. Freedom for the Hebrews is not to be a freedom to 
oppress, but a freedom that is intimately linked to obligation. Theirs is to be a freedom 
that refuses to cut the cord from its birth. The slavery-to-freedom trajectory does not lose 
its memory of slavery. Instead, slavery will decisively inform that which follows.
As Emmanuel Levinas writes with respect to the Exodus, “Man’s freedom is that 
of an emancipated man remembering his servitude and feeling solidarity for all enslaved 
people.”30 How might this work in practice? Let us turn to perhaps the most obvious, 
most direct lesson of the redemption, in Exodus 23.9, which is striking in its easy 
syllogism: “A sojourner, you are not to oppress: you yourselves know (well) the feelings 
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of the sojourner, for sojourners were you in the land of Egypt.”31 The responsibility we 
found emerging on the individual level with Cain is extrapolated here on a far more 
ambitious scale. An ethics is beginning to be inscribed and codified, experientially, as a 
clear “preferential option for the poor,” to borrow a phrase from modern liberation 
theologies; it is an ethics based on lopsided, unequal encounters that engender 
responsibility. The emphasis of obedience on right treatment of the widow, orphan, and 
stranger, and the prohibitions against placing stumbling blocks before the blind and 
cursing the deaf, all refer back to the redemption from slavery in Egypt, and all point 
toward an emerging pattern of ethical obligation.
If the redemption in Exodus is a model for a future redemption then we can make 
further assertions about the nature of the future redemption to which Exodus points. Such 
redemption will not inaugurate the end of worldly conflict, and it will not give its chosen 
people a secret wisdom that places them morally above others – the rest of the Book of 
Exodus makes it amply clear that the Hebrews do not enjoy an inherent moral 
transcendence. Rather than consign the conflicts and problems of the past to oblivion, it 
makes them more important than ever, raising them as the basis upon which future action 
might be ethically performed. In this model, redemption can only be understood in light 
of the suffering that precedes it.
That the capstone of the redemption is the revelation of the Torah, a distillation of 
the word of God yet also a set of rigorous guidelines for ethical behavior, once again 
alludes to a relationship between text or speech, and power, on the one hand, and ethical 
obligation on the other. Torah is a solace, the reward after tribulation, but its power can 
only be employed through the very mollification of its power, which is itself grounded in 
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the experience of suffering from which the Hebrews emerged to claim the Torah. Speech, 
and the actions which spring from it, can only be ethical if it retains its constant reference 
to the dangers of speech, and to the memory of suffering at the hands of dominating 
forces that employ speech and action indiscriminately.
Once again, this is not to say that narratives of dominance and triumphal 
redemption are not also at work here. Rather, I am highlighting within the triumphal 
narrative the embedded countertrends that rupture the overarching dominance, pointing 
back toward the furnace of suffering from which the redemption took form, refusing to be 
justified – that is, rendered irrelevant – in the face of triumphal redemption. These 
counter-trends are just as much a part of the redemptive model that informs revelation 
and ethics as the triumphal aspects, and it is the inextricable entanglement of the two that 
forms the legacy we inherit.
ળ
Rebellion and Utopia in Korach
For a closer examination of these intertwined trends in dialogue we turn to the 
account of the rebellion of Korach in the wilderness in Numbers 16. On the surface this is 
a mere power struggle. Korach the Levite, a first cousin of Moses, seizes upon a 
mutinous opportunity, and conflict begins. It seems that Korach and his co-conspirators, 
the Reubenites Datan and Aviram, argue for a sort of egalitarianism they find lacking 
under Moses’ leadership. The accusation presented before Moses and Aaron by the two 
hundred and fifty “men-of-stature” who join with Korach in Numbers 16:3 is not easily 
dismissed: “They assembled against Moshe and against Aharon and said to them: Too 
much (is) yours! Indeed, the entire community, the entirety of them, are holy, and in their 
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midst is YHWH! Why then do you exalt yourselves over the assembly of YHWH?” This 
is not simply a power grab. It is a political conflict, and it merits our attention due to its 
inclusion in the Bible, the fact that it comes from a Levite backed by so many followers, 
and particularly that “when Moshe heard, he flung himself on his face.”32 This gesture 
represents humility and humanity, and is a form of ardent prostration.33
What makes Korach’s complaint so striking is that it is valid, to an extent. But we 
must take a broader glimpse at the context within which the accusation is uttered. Korach 
is a Levite, already a member of the elite, the distinct. We would also do well to heed the 
point that the men with Korach are referred to as “men-of-stature” or, elsewhere, “men of 
name.” (Similar swipes are taken at Moses as well, as he is accused of “play[ing]-the-
prince over us,” a possible pejorative reference to Moses’ youth as a prince in Egypt.34)
Both sides come from “aristocratic” backgrounds, which does not necessarily undermine 
their arguments, but does remind the reader that a so-called people’s revolution is never 
entirely such. This is an interesting piece of social and political commentary, but is not 
the focus of our concern.
The conflict between Korach and Moses is not simply political, social, or even 
spiritual. It pertains more fundamentally to a disagreement about redemption, and the 
ramifications that stem from the disagreement. Korach claims that because each member 
of Israel is holy, and that YHWH is in their midst, Moshe has no right to lead them. The 
text’s position here is decidedly that Korach is wrong. This seems odd at first, as Israel 
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has been promised before, for example, in Exodus 19.6, that it will be made a holy 
nation. If we look more closely, however, we can see that Korach’s claim is somewhat 
different from the promise, and that the difference is dangerous. 
Korach is proposing that holiness is innate, something a person has by birth or by 
nature. The position of the Bible, over and over again, is that holiness must be acquired, 
and can be gained and lost. The purpose of the Torah is to provide a rubric, or a method, 
by which one can prepare to better serve God, who alone can be described as innately 
holy. Innate holiness means that one is above reproach and cannot be held to account. It 
means also, in the sense that justification precedes any action, that one can do no wrong, 
that decisions need not be held to review. In this sense it is related to all conceptions of 
redemption in which the ends justify the means. But Korach has it wrong: YHWH is in 
the midst of the people not because they are innately holy, the people are holy and
therefore YHWH is in their midst because of their covenant with God and the ethical 
obligations it entails. The reason that God is manifesting to the people at this time is 
because of their growing understanding of holiness as something achieved with difficulty, 
with reference to their past suffering, and as something all too easily lost if not carefully 
preserved through ethics that refer to their suffering and the suffering of others. It is 
precisely the sort of proposition made by Korach, that a people can be holy because of 
some special plan, and not their ethical actions, that jeopardizes God’s presence.
With this in mind, let us look more closely at Moses’ responses to the uprising. 
He pleads his innocence after he is accused of misleading Israel: “Not (even) one donkey 
of theirs have I carried off, I have not done ill to (even) one of them!”35 His words to 
YHWH show his concern for the community. He is, in fact, not pleading for himself. He 
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is afraid that Israel will be punished along with the leaders of the uprising, and he warns 
them to keep away from the demonstrations planned to prove “who is holy.”36 He and 
Aharon again fling their faces to the ground, this time in order to beseech YHWH’s 
mercy toward the community. And finally, he takes great pains to distinguish himself 
from God in the punishment that will follow:
28: Moshe said: By this you shall know that (it is) YHWH (who) sent me to do 
all these deeds, that (it was) not from my own heart: 29: if like the death of all 
humans these-men die, and the calling-to-account of all humans is accounted 
upon them, (it is) not YHWH (who) has sent me. 30: But if YHWH creates a 
new-creation, and the ground opens its mouth, and swallows up them and all that 
is theirs, and they go down alive into Sheol, then you will know that these men 
have scorned YHWH.37
Moses, who in the past has not hesitated to take matters into his own hands, is reluctant to 
do so here. He goes out of his way to make the distinction between himself and God. 
Perhaps it is because the accusation has shaken him so personally, or perhaps he 
understands the stakes of the debate and that the response cannot be construed as just 
another episode of human domination. We can also view Moses’ actions as a model for 
holiness – a different sort of holiness than that expressed by Korach. This holiness does 
not proclaim itself, it humbles itself. It is visibly shaken when presented with legitimate 
accusations. Moses’ holiness expresses itself through active concern for others, not 
through utopian pronouncements. 
For Moses, if Korach, Datan, and Aviram die as humans die, that is, if they are 
killed by another human or die a normal death, it will have undermined the entire 
enterprise of a redemption that is grounded in something other than dominance. This 




makes what happens next even more significant. The ground indeed splits open beneath 
the leaders of the rebellion, swallowing them up with their households and property: “33: 
So they went down, they and all theirs, alive, into Sheol; the earth covered them, and they 
perished from the midst of the assembly.”38
While the two hundred and fifty men-of-stature who had kindled an incense-
offering on behalf of the rebellion are consumed by a fire from YHWH, the leaders are 
separated, and are swallowed into the underworld alive. We may consider this a 
punishment of sorts, but it is not the one we might have expected. We can view their 
separation and life-in-death as a commentary on their argument. 
Separation has been a point of contention, a metaphor for holiness, throughout the
narrative. We can speculate that Korach’s accusation implies a critique of all hierarchies 
of inequality. His choice of surrounding himself with other “men-of-stature” dilutes the 
purity of his claim to represent a fulfillment of such a non-hierarchical scheme, however.
In fact, what he would have inaugurated is an attempt to overturn the authority of God, a 
situation where actions could be committed with impunity by an entitled, “holy” mob. 
His vision of redemption has no room for relationship, for the acknowledgment of
obligation grounded in real differences in power. His death, then, is a reminder that these 
differences do exist, and they are significant.
The message of Korach is very attractive, and its staying power lies in its kernel 
of truth, and the positive, albeit misguided, urges it exploits. Korach’s message is not the 
only example of an appealing, somewhat legitimate, alternative vision of redemption –
this phenomenon shall become more central in the next chapter as we discuss the 
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Haskalah, the Jewish response to the European Enlightenment. Korach’s is a message of 
uplift, in line with God’s pronouncements of potential holiness for all, and it taps into an 
understanding that God is to some degree accessible to everyone. 
Korach’s vision follows the redemption model of the Exodus, but it smoothes 
over distinction and difficulty with its utopian eagerness. It follows a single line of 
thought blindly, with little consideration of all the implications or the intricacies that 
envelop it. To the extent that Moses represents an alternative model of redemption here;
his is more tentative, more explicitly concerned with others, and less inclined to reach for 
a future by leaving behind the realities of the present or past. It lies in a promise that is to 
some extent predicated upon an ideal future, but it does not let go of separation, 
distinctiveness, and hierarchy, and it attempts to achieve its ends through tentative steps, 
through persuasion as opposed to oversimplification or heroic arousal.
Korach’s accusation – “too much is yours” – provides us with the crux of his own 
redemptive model, and points to why it is so hazardous. Korach understands the world in 
terms of dominance and control. His solution is to overturn the state of affairs, to remove 
Moses from power. If he is trying to assume control, to take what is Moses’, then he is no 
better than what he is describing and his understanding of redemption is no better than 
Cain’s. But the argument that he makes, that all of Israel is holy, suggests an even more 
worrying redemptive model. Not only is his utopian vision naïve, but his willful dismissal 
of separation and difference offers a view of redemption that embraces unity and 
wholeness that would ignore any criticism just as it would justify any action decided 
upon by the “innately holy” community. 
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The redemptive conception of Moses, however, which remains linked to a 
promise, is capable of responding to criticism with complete humility. Rather than 
reminding Korach that he, Moses, has been picked by God to lead Israel, Moses instead 
emphasizes the distinction between himself and God. And even in crisis he does not lose 
sight of ethical requirements and concern for others. While his redemption does 
inherently involve domination, it emphasizes discretion despite the ability to control (eg. 
“not (even) one donkey of theirs have I carried off”) rather than taking whatever one is 
capable of taking. And Moses’ (or God’s) response, while it entails violence, goes out of 
its way to emphasize difference even in punishment.
Korach is no straw man, however. His story would not be relevant, and it would 
not merit inclusion in the Torah, if it did not also contain a truth to be reckoned with. 
Korach is right to challenge Moses’ dominance, and since Moses himself makes the 
distinction between a human punishment and a divine one, we can say that Korach is 
right to challenge God’s dominance. There is perhaps recognition of this in the 
supernatural deaths of Korach and his followers. The Korach narrative points out that 
there is dominance even in the process of articulating a redemption and an ethics that 
pierces the overarching framework of dominance. 
If Korach can teach us anything it is that there is no moment, if we try to reject 
dominance, where we can rest in comfort and not be required to mount a critique once 
again. There is no redemption that severs itself completely from narratives of domination, 
and thus there is no redemption, however ruptured it presents itself to be, that does not 
also contain a grain of dominating triumphalism. But while the conflict between these 
trends cannot be won, neither is it in deadlock. To acknowledge this fact is not to call for 
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resignation in the face of dominating urges; it is to call for a renewal of the struggle, and 
insofar as Korach renews the struggle his contribution is an important one.
ળ
Judgment Emerges Deformed: Ethical Ritual in the Prophets
So far we have confined our discussions to the Torah. To look at how redemptive 
trends develop further, we will turn to Nevi’im, the prophetic literature, the centrally 
located texts of the Tanak – the Hebrew Bible, which is comprised of Torah (Law or 
Instruction), Nevi’im (Prophets), and Ketuvim (Writings). Marvin Sweeney discusses the 
role of the prophetic literature within the larger biblical context:
Overall, [the books of the Former and Latter Prophets] are concerned with the 
disruption of the holy ideal for Israel articulated in the Torah and the possibility 
of the reconstruction of that holy ideal. Because the Prophets appear at the center 
of the Tanak, they do not point beyond the Bible itself, but to the next segment of 
the Bible, the Ketuvim, “Writings,” which express the reconstitution of that 
ideal.39
The prophetic writings become situated, then, within a moment of rupture of the ideal. 
Though this is a rupture that, assuredly, is meant to be reconstituted – the ways in which 
it is reconstituted will be discussed below – it remains significant that the rupture exists. 
In terms of literary structure, but also in terms of redemptive narratives more generally, 
the prophetic rupture can be seen as a sort of focal point in the larger text of the Tanak. 
This period of rupture is brought about by a clear failure of the ideals of the Torah, a 
failure that manifests itself physically as the failure of the nation of Israel. 
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The question that the prophets must grapple with is twofold: (1) Why did they 
arrive at this state of affairs (destruction of the Temple, Babylonian exile, etc.) and (2) 
How can our situation be understood within a larger context? The overall question is one 
of how we can relate to redemption of any sort in light of calamitous realities that defy 
such hope. We may be tempted to assume that the solutions offered by the prophets 
present a linear, comic trajectory of redemption, but, as Sweeney explains, the situation is 
not as clear:
Altogether, the Tanak’s presentation of the holy ideal for Israel in the world, its 
disruption, and its restoration, represents a combination of linear and cyclical 
understandings of the course of human history and Israel’s relationship with 
G-d… Such an understanding has enabled Judaism both to weather periods of 
challenge and persecution and to develop progressively through the course of 
human history into modern times.40
In other words, the vision is not simply progressive and straightforward. The experience 
of disruption of the holy ideal lends the prophets a more complex view of redemption in 
the main. That their conception is both linear and cyclical means that redemption cannot 
simply follow the trajectory of a straight line. It always maintains the possibility of 
falling back upon itself, of being disrupted again. Any future restoration of the ideal is 
subject to the sort of rupture experienced in the time of the prophets. It is from this 
perspective that we must view what the prophets have to tell us.
In line with the twofold question contended with by the prophets, their response is 
also twofold: (1) Though we may not see it, there is a reason for suffering, and (2) 
suffering will not be endured forever. We find the prophets utilizing every conceivable 
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model for a relationship with God in order to explain these positions. Take, for example, 
Isaiah 49:14-16:
14: Zion says, 
“The Lord has forsaken me, 
My Lord has forgotten me.” 
15: Can a woman forget her baby, 
Or disown the child of her womb?
Though she might forget,
I never could forget you.
16: See, I have engraved you
On the palms of My hands,
Your walls are ever before Me.41
Here we have a comparison of God with a mother, and the pronouncement that God’s 
remembrance and care exceeds even motherly care. Other models include God as a 
woman in labor (Isaiah 42:14), and God as a cuckolded husband (Hosea) among many 
others. The common thread in all of these examples, though, is that whatever Israel might 
have done wrong, her relationship with God is intimate enough that any punishment will 
be temporary, that God’s compassion will win out eventually.
The reasons for Israel’s suffering are made fairly explicit throughout the prophetic 
writings. One famous example of an explanation for Israel’s punishment is found in 
Amos 5:21-24, in which it is explained that Israel has ignored the most fundamental 
requirement of God:
21: I loathe, I spurn your festivals,
I am not appeased by your solemn assemblies.
22: If you offer Me burnt offerings – or your 
meal offerings –
I will not accept them;
I will pay no heed
To your gifts of fatlings.
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23: Spare Me the sound of your hymns.
And let Me not hear the music of your lutes.
24: But let justice well up like water,
Righteousness like an unfailing stream.42
The emphasis on ethical action that we found in parts of the Torah is here emphasized to 
such an extreme that ritual becomes suspect if it is not coupled with justice and 
righteousness. Justice is now explicitly the focal point, refiguring the other forms of 
worship and channeling traditional ritual through a differently oriented mode. Abraham 
Joshua Heschel points to Isaiah’s simple plea, which is directed toward every member of 
Israel, in Isaiah 1:17: “Seek justice, / Undo oppression; / Defend the fatherless, / Plead for 
the widow,”43 to explain the essential requirement in Isaiah. 
Heschel finds an extrapolation of this position in Jeremiah 22:3: “Thus says the 
Lord: Do justice and righteousness, and deliver from the hand of the oppressor him who 
has been robbed. Do no wrong or violence to the alien, the fatherless, and the widow, nor 
shed innocent blood in this place.”44 Worship of God is here equated with emulating 
God-as-liberator and the slavery-to-freedom redemption model, breaking bonds of 
slavery, upending economic and social stagnation, and tearing down existing structures of 
oppression. Even though such models are presented with the best of intentions such a 
view of upheaval risks becoming like that of Korach, overly triumphal and dominating, 
ignoring difference and suffering in its vision of the future. Therefore it is important to 
look not only at the promise of prophetic ethics, but at the prophetic understanding of 
suffering and how it informs the promise.
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We should point out that while newly emphasized and somewhat newly 
articulated, there is actually little that is novel in the prophetic position from the 
perspective of the Torah. The tradition that it is predicated upon goes back, as we have 
seen, to the salvation narrative in Exodus, which grounds an ethics in collective, 
redemptive experience. But amid all this talk of justice and righteousness, a newer, more 
difficult problem begins to emerge – one that is tied up with conceptions of justice, but 
which cannot be fit neatly within a linear redemptive motif. The problem is expressed in 
the beginning of Habakkuk’s prophecy, 1:2-4:
2: How long, O Lord, shall I cry out
And You not listen,
Shall I shout to You, “Violence!”
And You not save?
3: Why do You make me see iniquity
[Why] do You look upon wrong? –
Raiding and violence are before me,
Strife continues and contention goes on.
4: That is why decision fails
And justice never emerges;
For the villain hedges in the just man –
Therefore judgment emerges deformed.45
It is in passages like this that we can see how the prophets’ experience of rupture informs 
their redemption narratives, allowing them to defy simplistic progressions of domination 
that ignore the realities of suffering. Even if suffering is temporary and the oppressed will 
eventually be redeemed it does not discount the suffering that is taking place in the 
present. Suffering is not nullified by the emergence of justice. In fact, Habakkuk seems to 
suggest that the injustice that persists as we anticipate justice can alter the very character 
of the justice that follows.
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The text of Habakkuk, which is only three chapters, presents a very difficult 
picture of redemption. Following the lamentations presented above, a dialogue takes 
place between Habakkuk and YHWH. Sweeney writes that after Habakkuk’s initial plea 
for God “to act against the wicked who surround the righteous,” YHWH’s response 
“includes the surprising disclosure that YHWH is the party responsible” for raising up the 
forces against Judah. Furthermore, Sweeney explains, “YHWH never defines the reason 
for bringing the Babylonians, but simply describes their appearance as evidence of a great 
work that is being done,” and refers to “their fearsome and impious character.”46 In 
response to Habakkuk’s plea for justice, God does not only refuse, but claims 
responsibility for the injustice. 
After the prophet expresses his astonishment at the disclosure, YHWH’s answer 
focuses on the fact that Babylon will also fall eventually, due to his “greed and gluttony 
in swallowing up that which does not belong to him.” This is claimed despite the fact that 
Babylon is an instrument of YHWH against Judah. “Again,” Sweeney writes, “no reason 
for the appearance of the oppressor emerges other than YHWH’s great deeds.” Habakkuk 
3 is a prayer, and there is no response from God again. The prayer “constitutes a petition 
that YHWH act against the oppressor,” “a portrayal of YHWH’s anticipated action,” “an 
expression of the prophet’s confidence in YHWH,” and the prayer itself ends 
“instructions to the choirmaster… with an indication that it was to be performed as part 
of a liturgical ritual.”47
Habakkuk defies any simple redemptive reading, and its only solace comes in 
YHWH’s assurance that the oppressors, even though they are tools of God, will 
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eventually be punished for their domination. There is no clear response on the part of 
YHWH to the problem of a justice that emerges deformed. Not only is there never a clear 
explanation for the punishment, “indeed, YHWH emerges in the book of Habakkuk as a 
potentially culpable figure.” Even the liturgical composition in Habakkuk 3, which 
expresses the prophet’s confidence, is not enough to stem the tide of impending 
destruction. “In the end,” Sweeney writes, “the book of Habakkuk emerges as the 
prophet’s plea to YHWH to end the threat leveled against Judah by the Babylonians, who 
would ultimately destroy Jerusalem and Judah in the early sixth century B.C.E.” There is 
“no substantive action on YHWH’s part.”48
Given all of these clear problems, we can rightly wonder why the text was 
written at all, what its intended purpose was, and why it was canonized. The intended 
audience is certainly expected to be aware of the hollowness of Habakkuk’s confidence 
in light of the historical results: Judah will be destroyed, and the Jewish people will 
experience even more devastation. One possible answer, or an inkling of an answer, 
might come if we view not only Habakkuk 3 as ritual liturgy, but Habakkuk in its entirety 
as a ritual process that portrays an ethics of rupture. First, difficult questions of theodicy 
are posed. We ask not only whether our suffering will be justified but whether such 
suffering can be fully justified, not only whether we will be redeemed but what such 
redemption can possibly look like. The semblance of an answer we receive leaves these 
questions inadequately addressed as it raises new issues of God’s complicity in suffering. 
Finally, we reaffirm our faith in God’s ability to redeem, to reconstitute the holy ideal, 
despite, or perhaps because of, all evidence to the contrary. Even when redemption
eventually comes there is a lingering unease. Our confidence that God will “smash the 
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roof of the villain’s house” and “crack [his] skull with Your bludgeon” those “whose 
delight is to crush me suddenly, / To devour a poor man in ambush” 49 (Habakkuk 3.13-
14), is informed also by anxiety:
16: I heard and my bowels quaked,
My lips quivered at the sound;
Rot entered into my bone,
I trembled where I stood.
Yet I wait calmly for the day of distress,
For a people to come to attack us.
17: Though the fig tree does not bud
And no yield is on the vine,
Though the olive crop has failed
And the fields produce no grain,
Though sheep have vanished from the fold
And no cattle are in the pen,
18: Yet will I rejoice in the Lord,
Exult in the God who delivers me. 
(Habakkuk 3.16-18)50
ળ
As we have seen, even those narratives in biblical literature which would seem to 
adhere to problematic narratives of redemption contain elements that continually rupture 
and criticize these overarching narratives. These elements do not divorce themselves 
from redemption; they embed critiques within the redemptive narratives themselves. 
Another important aspect of these narratives that we have yet to elaborate upon is their
relationship to notions of reward and retribution. This is expressed in many sections of 
scripture, for example in Deuteronomy 8.5: “You are to know in your heart that just as a 
man disciplines his child, (so) YHWH your God disciplines you.”51 This is presented as 
an ideal to follow on the path toward redemption. Here, as elsewhere, the counter 
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elements do not reject such thinking as such – they seem to understand their necessity 
and import – but they work within and around them to add layers of more complex 
meaning that can be accessed along with the retributive meaning. Neither do these 
elements offer distinct alternatives, ways of definitively rejecting linear redemptive 
trajectories that can turn retribution against ethics. Rather, they force us to confront the 
complexities, and in doing so they point to a more nuanced approach. 
Marvin Sweeney writes that “even among those books or writings in the Hebrew 
Bible that articulate traditional viewpoints of reward for righteousness and punishment 
for wrongdoing, problems emerge in their respective presentation of this issue.” Some of 
the unresolved questions that Sweeney notes include, “Does G-d always act responsibility
in the world? Are acts deemed as sinful in the Hebrew Bible actually sinful?” and “What 
role must human beings assume when G-d fails to act or when G-d acts sinfully?”52
These critical, problematic, and highly volatile questions are some of the many that the 
bible seem to be urging, tempting, and even challenging us to confront, and in doing so to 
also reconsider straightforward models of redemption. They become, in effect, the 
alternative model, by presenting us with a ruptured triumphalism, a striving toward a holy 
ideal that not only runs the risk of being disrupted but whose very reconstitution is 
predicated upon speaking from within these disrupted moments.
None of this is to say that such passages cannot ignore the rupture or mount a 
counterattack by smoothing over rupture and difference while justifying non-ethical 
action (as we have defined it) with triumphal promise, domination, or other 
comprehensive, coherent narratives. The desire to do this is perhaps a fundamental aspect 
of human nature, made all the more easier when this sort of expediency supports a 
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decidedly righteous goal. Such interpretations, and the actions they justify, are perhaps 
more common than the more difficult alternative of grappling with such questions as 
Sweeney presents. And even when one does consider them it is tempting to look for ways 
to overcome these ruptures rather than treat them as integral parts of the narrative. I have 
taken pains to highlight these aspects precisely because they are so easily discarded. 
These moments of rupture are what we must look to as we forge a link between our 
scriptural traditions and how we must begin to shape Judaism after the Shoah. 
Each of the texts that we have considered here, along with so many others, offers
indispensable guidance for us as we begin the task of articulating a post-Shoah Judaism. 
And while the Shoah places some of the issues Sweeney describes in starker terms than 
ever before, we must keep in mind that they do not necessarily constitute a rejection of
our traditions. Rather, they necessitate dramatic reorganizations and differently focused 
emphases. Such projects are, of course, hardly foreign to Jewish exegetical possibility. In 
the next chapter we will consider the ongoing evolution of redemptive themes 
historically, and we will also note the precedents for transformation that already exist 
within our traditional frameworks. In this way we will develop a better understanding of 





The Rise of Commentary
The fact that nothing great can emerge in the world without changing, that a 
Kingdom of God that is not of this world takes advantage of men, was the great 
lesson of Judaism, the one best understood by the political people. But it made 
them violent with messianism. They renounced their reason and sought it in the 
events that bore a messianic meaning and in which intelligence was born from 
bloody confrontation of our human follies and of the gentleness, as in the enigma 
of Samson, of a cruel and devouring force. Cruelty is taken to be the rigour of 
logic, and crimes to be works of justice. This was the tragic error of an 
interrupted lesson – the master was too hastily given leave for rambling on 
aimlessly. He taught action in history but, for the Jews, men can live nineteen 
centuries against it.
- Emmanuel Levinas53
A Great Yeshiva on High: Catastrophe and the Age of the Rabbis
In the previous chapter we discussed some of the instances in which different 
models of redemption engage with each other in the Tanak. Despite my attempts to tease 
out some of the more complicated aspects of redemptive narrative in the text, there 
remain decidedly triumphal, dominating overtones. Nonetheless, we find strongly critical 
and thought-provoking counter-trends that focus on the disruption of these triumphal 
narratives, accentuating the importance of suffering. It is arguably the counter-melody to 
the main harmony that lends these texts their continued relevance. 
Though such discussions could conceivably continue forever, brevity requires that 
we move on to discuss the ways Judaism has developed through subsequent 
interpretations of these and other texts. We shall skip ahead, then, to the start of the 
rabbinic era, which inaugurates what is perhaps the most significant transformation in 
redemptive thinking. We are overlooking, for now, many texts and events that are 
significant for our discussion. We will return to the Tanak, looking at Kethuvim, or 
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writings – notably the Book of Esther – in subsequent chapters. There is, however, too 
much relevant material, and much of it will be overlooked in this discussion.
There is one historical point which we must discuss before we can understand the 
impetus for the rabbinic re-imagination of redemptive themes. Subsequent evolutions 
cannot be fully understood if we do not first understand that by the first century AD a 
certain kind of triumphal redemptive narrative had run into a brick wall. This was an 
exile unlike any previously experienced, and it followed two huge catastrophes for the 
Jewish people: the failure of a rebellion against Rome in 70 AD that led to the destruction 
of the Second Temple, and the failure of the Bar Kochba rebellion around sixty years 
later, which resulted in a high death count and complete loss of political autonomy. These 
crises understandably instigated a reevaluation of the ideas that led to the rebellions. 
The Bar Kochba rebellion particularly was overtly messianic in its orientation, 
and its messianic understandings were informed by a triumphal redemptive conception. 
Simon Bar Kochba was considered by many to be a Messiah who had come to restore 
Jewish sovereignty, and he led an all-out war against the vastly superior Roman forces. 
The rabbis, sages who had become more prominent in the community due to the vacuum 
in separate political leadership, reworked much of the failed redemptive paradigm that
was less threatening to the political rulers of the lands they inhabited, and thus served to 
insulate the community against the sort of folly that had led to the Diaspora in the first 
place.
The transformation was truly an epic and consequential undertaking, and it was a 
process that took centuries. Its origins can be traced back long before the events 
described above, but it was only able to reach its full prominence after the loss of the 
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Temple and any semblance of Jewish self-governance. Susan Handelman provides us 
with a closer look at the mechanisms of this evolution in redemptive thought. She traces 
the roots of the rabbinic tradition, and it’s differently oriented redemptive emphases, to 
Ezra’s restoration of Israel in the fifth century BC, which more directly established the 
Torah as the religious and political center of the nation – a position that had been 
previously occupied by the First Temple. 
This event, in which Ezra publicly read the Torah while others stood by and “gave 
the sense” (Nehemiah 8.8), Handelman writes, is “often cited as the beginning[…] of the 
exegetical tradition of midrash.”54 Midrash (literally: to investigate, to study) is the 
practice of delving more deeply into the text, finding hidden meanings, and providing 
more comprehensive explanations than the text itself may provide. The previous chapter, 
for example, could be considered my own attempt at midrash. We should note that the 
moment that inaugurated midrashic exegetical interpretation as a central Jewish practice
is tied to the reconstitution of Jewish life, and that it reaffirmed the prominence of the 
Torah as a means for the survival of the Jewish nation. As with the prophetic literature, 
Ezra’s midrashic spectacle reoriented worship and communal uplift away from ritual and 
toward Torah, the written and oral tradition and the locus of commandment and ethics. 
As distinct from some later forms of commentary, Handelman reminds us that “an 
important characteristic of midrash is that its interpretations are always tied to the 
Biblical texts itself.”55
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We are about to explore what might appear to be radical deviations from strict 
biblical tradition, but we would do well to remind ourselves that these novelties claim 
their legitimacy through their grounding in tradition, be it written law or oral law. The 
latter refers to the unwritten Torah received by Moses, which is said to illuminate the 
hidden and subtle meanings of the written Torah. While the rabbis maintained that the 
Torah was their initial inspiration they allowed for a surprising amount of innovation in 
the reconfiguration of redemptive thought and other pertinent themes. 
After the midrashic period proper, in the second and first centuries BC, the 
Mishnah, or code of oral law, was composed. The distinctive characteristic of mishnah, in 
distinction to midrash, Handelman explains, is that “the Mishnah is concerned with the 
oral law apart from its ties to the written text.”56 Louis Finkelstein lays out how the 
rabbinic understanding of Torah allows for such innovative elaboration on the written 
word:
That the text is at once perfect and perpetually incomplete; that like the universe 
itself it was created to be a process rather than a system – a method of inquiry 
into the right, rather than a codified collection of answers; that to discover 
possible situations with which it might deal and to analyze their moral 
implications in the light of its teachings is to share the labour of Divinity – these 
are inherent elements of Rabbinic thought, dominating the manner of life it 
recommends.57
Such a position, we should note, is not foreign to the Torah or other biblical 
writings. In fact, it is related to the redemptive position that I have highlighted throughout 
the previous chapter. In order to make the case for a ruptured vision of redemption, we 
have been emphasizing precisely those points in the text that speak to a sense of 
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incompleteness, or rupture, in order to show how they relate to the “perfect,” complete 
aspects of the text to create a process. If text and word is the locus of power, and if we 
use these tools to express non-dominating modes of redemption, then the same 
understandings of redemption must apply to the text itself. 
It is the vision of the text as a process that allows us to understand its 
complexities, how it enshrines questions, debates, and commentaries, not “a codified 
collection of answers.” It is no surprise, then, that when the Rabbis wanted to access 
these ideas of a non-triumphal, disruptive redemption they extended the notion of process 
even beyond the text itself, analyzing the “moral implications” and even preserving in 
text their own commentaries and debates about previous texts. 
These additions, Handelman notes, are nothing less than “the elevation of later 
commentary to the status of earlier primary text,” which, she reminds us, “is one of the 
extraordinary characteristics of rabbinic interpretation, and involves a not so subtle power 
struggle.”58 Even so, the Judaism with which we are familiar today is incomprehensible 
without the rabbinic transformation as its midwife. Handelman explains that it is the
audacious exegetical framework described above, along with the additional commentary 
of the Gemara and the completion of the Talmud in the fifth century AD, that paved the 
way for such concepts as “building a fence around the Torah” and that understood the 
famous “eye for an eye” as monetary recompense.59 It is the same exegetical tradition 
that allowed Hillel the Elder (c. 1st century BC) to circumvent the literal meaning of the 
Jubilee year, providing an incentive to give loans to the poor by invoking the spirit of 
                                                          




tikkun olam.60 It laid the groundwork for later exegeses like that of R. Shlomo Yitzhaki of 
Troyes (1040-1105 AD), for much that the Kabbalistic tradition takes for granted, and for 
such interpretive techniques as pilpul, which Handelman describes as “a method of 
complex dialectics attempting to create harmony between incongruent matters, often in 
the form of question, answer, and retort between two sages.”61
To further delve into the intricacies surrounding these newly oriented redemptive 
motifs, we must take a step back to look at Jewish development from a more sociological 
perspective. As mentioned earlier, it is not until the events of the first and second 
centuries AD that we can correctly speak of a rabbinic mainstream tradition. With 
hindsight we can describe the more politically aggressive aspects of redemptive thinking 
up until this point as significantly less restricted than they would later be. Redemptive 
thought often encouraged a more overt activism, lending legitimacy to the rebellion of the 
day, be it against the Romans or others. It is precisely the sort of activist zeal that 
informed the events leading to the destruction of the Second Temple, the Bar Kochba 
rebellion, and ultimately the Diaspora. These events resulted, in Jewish consciousness, in 
a sort of moratorium on such overtly political, activist thinking, and they defined, through 
this negative association, the newly acceptable parameters of the redemption narratives 
that followed. Among other changes redemption would now constantly stand alongside a 
nagging sense of threat and danger. 
ળ
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The new reality of the Diaspora also presented an alteration in Jews’ 
understanding of their relationship to other nations. For the first time all Jewish 
encounters with non-Jews took place not in terms of one nation encountering another, but 
in terms of Jewish minorities living within Gentile nations.  For our discussion we are 
focusing specifically on the Jewish presence within Christian nations. Judaism was 
directly threatened by assimilation or agitation of the Gentiles. The best way to avoid 
both of these threats was to remain separate.
Jewish identity began to coalesce, then, in direct opposition to Gentile thought. As 
time went on Gentile thought, for Jews, became more and more synonymous with 
Christian thought, specifically in its Greek philosophical grounding. This oppositional 
development took place on the plane of Jewish self-awareness as well as in reaction to 
Christian understandings of Jews and Judaism. Certain elements of rabbinic Jewish 
thought became hostile to correspondingly emergent Christian trends precisely because of 
their incompatibility with Christian conceptions of redemption that too neatly and 
comfortably defined narratives of redemption and theodicy.
Jewish redemptive thought therefore developed to a significant degree along the
lines of what we might label “anti-Greek.” This can be understood in terms of Susan 
Handelman’s insight that “for the Greeks, the culmination of theology was a wordless 
vision of divine being; for the Jews it was commentary on the divine word, deeper 
immersion in the text, further interpretation of Scripture.”62
Due to the shifts in redemptive thought outlined above, and the addition of a more 
triumphal redemption against which the Jews could compare their own, Jewish thinking
deviated more firmly from culmination and embraced commentary more fully as its
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primary mode of redemptive understanding. Jews rejected not only the figure of Jesus 
who fulfills the word but the very notion of an end to biblical and Talmudic juxtaposition 
that “resolves all opposites, stabilizes all meaning, provides ultimate identity, and 
collapses differentiation.”63 This development was made possible by appeal to the doubts 
about redemption, critical countertrends and disruptions we discussed in the previous 
chapter, but here they coalesced more explicitly within narratives of redemption, which 
established doubt, criticism, and rupture in a more prominent role.
As mentioned before, rabbinic understandings of text have become inseparable 
from Jewish thought as we know it today. Handelman writes that the view of the text as 
incomplete, in perpetual rupture
expresses an attitude toward the text and its interpretation which is fundamental 
to Jewish thought. The Rabbinic world is, to use a contemporary term, one of 
intertextuality. Texts echo, interact, and interpenetrate. In the world of the text, 
rigid temporal and spatial distinctions collapse… There is no linear chronology 
in the Talmud.64
The emphasis on intertextuality is certainly indicative of a shift in redemptive 
understanding. It would be inappropriate, however, to point to the rise of the rabbinic 
perspective as signaling the termination of redemptive narratives of domination. While it 
is easy to talk about opposing views of redemption we must remind ourselves that these 
do not signify isolated modes of thought. Redemption based purely on disruption is
difficult, but perhaps not impossible, to conceive. Regardless, it was not the case that 
redemptive thought in the rabbinic age somehow transcended the more perilous aspects 
of redemptive thinking. As with earlier formulations of the trends within redemptive 




thought it is the nuance of the conflict that provides us with the entire picture. It would be 
completely wrong to suggest that, with the rise of the Talmudic perspective, the Jewish 
people no longer hoped for a better future, for victory over the forces of oppression, and 
for complete transformation on both the individual and the global level. Such notions 
continued to loom large in both the mind of the populace and in the words of the sages. 
They were now simply differently oriented, differently articulated, and contained
different emphases. 
It is the very unending nature of rabbinic exegesis and commentary that allows for 
a concept of eternity that eclipses even redemptive culmination. But this does not 
necessarily reduce messianic expectation or theodic innovation. In fact, one could argue 
that it is the rabbinic tradition, with its grander scope of redemptive promise in a time of 
more precarious Jewish existence, which lends redemptive thought an even greater level 
of eagerness for an ultimate justification. Fantasies of overturning the world order, of 
regaining political sovereignty, continued to bubble under the surface, but even these 
were tempered by the cyclical and more unending nature of normative redemptive 
thought.
Hope remains, along with redemptive narratives that express the desire for victory 
and the urge to dominate. The most notable difference in the rabbinic era is that such 
redemptive thought remains more explicitly unfulfilled even in its most totalizing 
expressions. The shift is reflected in the supplemental literature, the commentaries on the 
Tanak (and commentaries upon these commentaries), perhaps more unambiguously than 
in the Tanak itself, though it continues to be unyieldingly expressed with reference to 
biblical tradition and Torah. “All begins with the text of the Torah given to Moses, and 
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consummates with the text of the Torah that the redeeming messiah will teach,” 
Handelman explains, “and what is the world to come, but a great yeshiva on high, where 
one studies Torah on deeper and deeper levels. Indeed, the Talmud is never completed.”65
In this way the marriage of the redemptive trends of dominance and rupture remains 
intact, even as its orientation is radically transformed.
ળ
Kabbalah: The Spirit and its Sheath
For a variety of reasons, as we have seen, overtly triumphal and culminating 
redemptive thought that did not leave room for rupture was delegitimized with the rise of 
rabbinically dominated, diasporic Judaism. But we would be remiss if we did not look 
more carefully and further explore some of the ways that triumphal redemptive thinking 
manifested. Gershom Scholem warns against the tendency of scholars “to dissociate 
apocalyptic from rabbinic Judaism,” and argues that “Jewish experience during the 
thousand years following the destruction of the Temple could only intensify the 
catastrophic traits of the eschatological picture.”66 His point is that, as we have discussed 
in other terms, rabbinic reorientation did not so much overcome culminating thinking as 
suppress it and discourage its expression in normative discourse. Furthermore, what 
Scholem means by “catastrophic traits” is that the rabbinic shift, and the realities of the 
Diaspora, led to a more nuanced take on traditional triumphal motifs that emphasized the 
suffering that was to precede redemption. 
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Scholem’s primary example of the newfound emphasis on the suffering that 
precedes redemption is the midrashic mythology of the messiah of the House of Joseph, 
preceding that of the House of David. This messiah “would fall at the gates of Jerusalem 
fighting against the gentiles, constitut[ing] a new mythological trait whose function it was 
to differentiate between the messiah of catastrophe and that of utopia.”67 This lent 
redemptive thought a way to overcome the progressive necessities of a more simplistic 
triumphal perspective by codifying a built-in element of rupture, and, quite simply, it was 
a method of explaining the incongruity between utopian hopes and the reality of Jewish 
existence. 
The messianic tensions Scholem is describing did not necessarily conflict with 
rabbinic authority in theory, but, he notes, “whenever messianic hopes assumed actuality, 
the tension with regard to rabbinic tradition became manifest.”68 Thus, Scholem points to 
various instances of antinomianism, most fantastically the messianic movements begun 
or inspired by Nathan of Gaza (1643-1680 AD) and Sabbatai Sevi (1626 – 1676 AD) in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as outbursts of revolutionary redemptive feeling 
that subsumed both the catastrophic and triumphal. Scholem credits Kabbalah, medieval 
Jewish mysticism, with providing an outlet for the antinomian messianic tendencies 
suppressed by rabbinic authorities and such towering figures as Maimonides.69 He argues 
that Kabbalah both preserved and developed these tendencies, specifically through the 
Zohar and Lurianic systems, fanning the flames of messianic sentiment and laying the 
groundwork for the Sabbatians, the Dönmeh, the Frankists, and other antinomian 
movements. 





While he acknowledges that early Kabbalah focused more on individual 
experience and the mysteries of creation and the “divine chariot,”70 he finds the seeds of 
eschatological thought in the very nature of the kabbalistic endeavor and its ideal of 
communion with the divine. According to Scholem the focus on creation, and the 
emanations of God dispersed throughout the world, eventually led to a greater emphasis 
on the notion that “‘all proceeds from the One and returns to the One,” and that the task
of the kabbalist was to redeem the world through spiritual and worldly action.71
While Scholem’s picture of the relationship between Kabbalah and messianism is 
certainly insightful and helpful, some modern scholars, notably Moshe Idel, have argued 
that he has overemphasized certain aspects of Kabbalah and ignored others. If we take 
these suggested corrections into account, a somewhat different picture begins to emerge 
that, I believe, presents a more nuanced view of the interlocking developments of
mysticism and the Jewish mainstream. Two important elements of the relationship that 
Scholem does not fully account for are the importance of esotericism embedded within 
early kabbalistic thought, and the corresponding degree to which seemingly radical 
deviations from mainstream Judaism remained normative in the eyes of the Jewish 
communities and the kabbalistic practitioners.
The level of esotericism in the early formulations of this tradition is astounding 
even for mysticism. Moshe Idel writes that “unlike philosophy, [early Kabbalah] was 
studied within families and limited groups, making no attempt to disseminate its tenets to 
larger audiences.”72 He explains that “Kabbalah is by definition an esoteric body of 
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speculation; whether in its theosophic-theurgical explanation of the rationales for the 
commandments, or in the ecstatic trend dealing with techniques of using divine names, 
esotericism is deeply built into this lore.” He cites R. Isaac the Blind (1160-1235 AD), 
who claimed that his teachers would never write down matters of Kabbalah. Even as 
esoteric kabbalistic ideas were expanded upon in the thirteenth century, Idel writes, 
scholars such as 
Rabad [1125-1198 AD], Nahmanides [1194-1270 AD], and R. Solomon ben 
Adret (Rashba) [1235-1310 AD], although Kabbalists and, in the case of the 
latter two, even known as teachers of Kabbalah, were faithful to the halakhic 
interdiction against public transmission of topics related to the “Account of the 
Creation” and the “Account of the Chariot,” and refrained from dealing with such 
issues either in writing or in public speech.73
Despite these restrictions, in the wake of the Maimonidean controversy in the 
twelfth and early thirteenth century, which proposed a “reinterpretion of Judaism in 
Aristotelian terms” and challenged earlier mystical texts like Shi’ur Komah and Sefer 
Yetzirah, Kabbalah emerged in a newly innovative and exoteric form.74 Idel argues that 
this came about as “part of a restructuring of those aspects of rabbinic thought that were 
denied authenticity by Maimonides’ system.”75 Regardless of the reasons there is a 
definite trend in the thirteenth century onwards toward a more exoteric understanding of 
Kabbalah exemplified by the “voluminous treatises of such Kabbalists as Abraham 
Abulafia [1240-1291 AD], Moses de Leon [1250-1305 AD], Joseph Gikatilla [1248-1305 
AD], and Joseph of Hamadan [14th century AD],”76 perhaps reaching an apex after the 






expulsion from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century and during the rise of the 
Safedian school in the sixteenth.77
How little controversy or outrage resulted from this development, even as the 
followers of the Cordoverian and Lurianic schools (16th century AD) published details of 
mystical techniques, outlined ethical and psychological mystical systems, and propagated 
mystical interpretations of the commandments, is a testament to the unique marriage of 
the mystical tradition and the mainstream of rabbinic thought. “It is a striking fact,” 
Moshe Idel points out, “that the emergence of major Kabbalistic schools did not stir 
significant controversies in the Jewish milieus in which they arose.”78 This is true to a 
large extent because of the fact that many of the major Kabbalists were also highly 
respected rabbinic authorities. This fact, along with the safeguards and esotericism that 
still remained, resulted in a mystical tradition that was palatable, or at least tolerable, to 
the normative tradition. Kabbalah did not transgress the everyday halachic life of the 
observant Jew, and therefore posed very little direct threat. In fact, Kabbalah, more often 
than not, affirmed the primacy of halachic practice by imbuing it with spiritual 
dimensions of which the rabbinic tradition was incapable, and by referring in its own 
practice to halachic observance.
ળ
It should also be noted that Kabbalah, even in its exoteric forms, did not 
necessarily follow a pattern of unrestricted triumphal thinking. Even where it posited
direct communion with God as its ideal there was room for disruption. In fact, kabbalistic 
systems of rupture have at times gone hand in hand with unitive practice. Even spiritual 




encounter or cosmic melding, perhaps even temporary annihilation, at times allowed for 
the possibility of a final act in which the mystic breaks with the union, reconstitutes 
separation, and attaches even more thoroughly to the world. While such techniques 
certainly prescribe unitive experience as part of a process, they insist that the world of the 
senses is the ultimate concern, and the primary realm in which mystical life is acted. And 
so we have the conclusion of a description of the kabbalistic technique of Abraham 
Abulafia: 
And then wishing to honour the glorious Name by serving it with the life of body 
and soul, veil thy face and be afraid to look at God. Then return to the matters of 
the body, rise and eat and drink a little, or refresh thyself with a pleasant odor, 
and restore thy spirit to its sheath until another time, and rejoice at thy lot and 
know that God loveth thee!79
We find here that after the height of ecstatic experience the way to truly act in 
accordance with divine requirements is to recognize, respect, and re-establish the 
separation between creature and Creator. After the mystical experience proper, or perhaps 
as the concluding act of the mystical experience, one is instructed to “return to the 
matters of the body” and “restore thy spirit to its sheath.” Even the most ecstatic spiritual 
experience can culminate by reconstituting distinction from God and orienting one back 
toward the world. As with rabbinic transformations of narratives of dominance, unitive 
mystical experience can also incorporate rupture in a way that tempers desires for 
completeness and redirects them back toward the incompleteness of the world.
We can see the possibility in Kabbalah, then, even when its techniques are 
published, for providing a channel through which one can have spiritual, divine, and 
messianic insights in a highly personal way while simultaneously containing these very 
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tendencies or channeling them back toward the rupture of the world. This dynamic 
siphons the messianic urge away from the communal, activist, and political toward more 
controlled and regulated expressions. This is not to say that redemption or messianic 
feeling does not exist here, even in its most astonishingly triumphal and dominating
forms. Rather, it provides an outlet for such expression, or a way to direct such urges in 
more contemplative directions.80
The final issue that must be addressed is Scholem’s assertion that Sabbatianism 
was more or less a direct result of a public reception of Lurianic thinking. Idel points to 
three major flaws in Scholem’s argument. First, even in its propagation, “the knowledge 
of Lurianic Kabbalah was, roughly speaking, limited to the elite.” In fact, part of the 
reason for this was a resurgence of esotericism in Lurianic circles, and, Idel notes, the 
bulk of the Lurianic corpus, which was possessed by Hayyim Vital, “remained unknown 
to the wider public for several decades” after the supposed dissemination of Lurianic 
Kabbalah.81 It is therefore somewhat misleading to suggest that Sabbatianism, which so 
indiscriminately aroused the Jewish masses, could have uniformly found its impetus in 
Lurianic teaching. 
Second, the few who “could be considered to have really mastered this 
complicated type of theosophy… did not perceive it as a messianic ideology.” In 
adopting Lurianic thought they “attenuated the mythical, demonical, theurgical, and 
eschatological facets of Kabbalah to various extents.” Third, “to the extent that Lurianic 
Kabbalah had a messianic message, it was not greater than the messianic burden of 
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earlier Kabbalah.” 82  There is simply not enough evidence, Idel argues, to say 
definitively that the messianic elements of Lurianic Kabbalah were disseminated widely
at the time, let alone to make the case for a direct causal relationship between this 
esoteric system and the immensely popular grassroots messianic movement that followed 
it.
And even where its orientation was messianic there were significant differences 
between Lurianic messianism and Sabbatian messianism. Lurianic Kabbalah, Idel 
explains, like the Zohar, “perceived human activity to be capable of restoring primeval 
harmony to the divine world,” and “envisioned the achievement of a perfect state in the 
divine world as a cumulative process requiring collective theurgical activity.” As such, 
both Lurianic and zoharic Kabbalah that preceded it understood the coming of the 
Messiah to be a product of human theurgical activity. In contrast, Sabbatianism was 
focused on the specific personage of Sabbatai Sevi as a messiah whose own redemptive 
actions, “not those of the people of Israel, would initiate the eschaton.”83 This represents 
a fundamental difference between Sabbatianism and Lurianic Kabbalah, enough to 
consider a causal relationship from the latter to the former highly suspect. Thus, while 
Sevi’s prophet, Nathan of Gaza, did skillfully employ Lurianic terminology and jargon, it 
would be misguided to assume that the teachings of Luria incited the enthusiastic 
reception that Sevi received throughout the Diaspora. 
Idel proposes that we consider the reasons for the messianic outburst on the 
sociological level. The Sabbatian phenomenon must be viewed as representative of a 
desire within Jewish communities that was not exclusive to their susceptibility to 




kabbalistic doctrines. While it was conveniently expressed in Lurianic terms, it is perhaps 
indicative of a deeper longing for a kind of redemptive fulfillment that could not be 
provided either by halachic practice, or even by mystical theurgical speculation for those
few for whom such speculation was significant. Perhaps this movement, and others like 
it, ultimately indicates a failure on the part of the rabbinic-kabbalistic relationship to 
channel triumphal tendencies and dominating redemptive urges into benign and lasting 
modes of thought and action. Such a conclusion would seem to be supported by 
subsequent developments, which we will discuss below.
ળ
May You Be Cursed: The Mithnagdic Critique
As we have seen before, the Diaspora inaugurated a new understanding of Jewish 
distinction and separation within Western culture. The sense of difference became, over 
time, intimately connected to Jewish self-identification, and with it Jewish redemptive 
understanding. The extent to which the arrangement of Jewish religious life was oriented 
away from unmitigated messianic actions and pronouncements must, as has already been 
suggested, be viewed at least in part as a conscious preservation of culture against the 
most influential trends of Christian thought and expression. This difference weathered 
every stage of historical anti-Semitic violence against European Jewry, leaving Jewish 
identity very much intact. Overall, such episodes only strengthened Jewish resolve and 
sense of distinction. And, ironically, it was an olive branch of sorts that placed Jewish 
identity in a greater existential flux in the eighteenth century than any form of hostility 
ever had. Perhaps this was in part a result of the unfulfilled redemptive urges we 
speculated about at the end of the previous section.
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The ideals that emerged alongside the European Enlightenment represented a new 
chapter in Jewish-Christian relations. While not necessarily novel in terms of a break 
with the larger philosophical trends that defined Europe, the Enlightenment was a 
significant reworking of concepts in favor of a more inclusive premise. It became an 
invitation for Jews to join in a universalist fraternity that transcended the traditional 
squabbles of religion and sect in favor of such lofty and unifying concepts as reason, 
liberty, and equality. The implications for Jews were profound. It directly prefigured 
Jewish emancipation – the abolishment of discriminatory laws – and inaugurated the 
Haskalah, or Jewish Enlightenment, as a response to the Gentile invitation to engage with 
the European conversation as equal citizens.
The issues that formed around the Enlightenment and Haskalah had social, 
philosophical, spiritual, and, most importantly for us, redemptive implications. This was a 
call to “come out of the ghetto,” physically, emotionally, and intellectually. It marked the 
first time that a Jew could rightly think of herself as a German, a Frenchman, or a Pole, 
and it was the first time that Jews could adopt the Western philosophical traditions with 
little or no sense of apostasy. Not surprisingly, there were valiant attempts by Jewish 
thinkers in this era to present overarching systems that coherently articulated a mutually 
beneficial relationship between Jews and Christians, and between Jewish and Christian 
modes of thinking, often appealing to the commonalities of reason and intellect. The 
evolution of these attempts can be traced from figures like Moses Mendelssohn (1729-
1786 AD) through to Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1925 AD).
The influence of this period is far-reaching, and we can look back and find here 
the roots of Jewish denominationalism, Zionism as a form of national self-determination, 
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and notions of “secular” or “cultural” Judaism. But there was plenty of skepticism 
amongst Jews, and responses to the Enlightenment were by no means uniform. We can 
trace resonances of Jewish notions of distinctiveness and difference, in critical distinction 
to the egalitarianism that the Enlightenment presented, as early as the story of Egyptian 
bondage. In fact, some Jews rejected the Gentile invitation. Others were intrigued by the 
message of the Enlightenment and embraced the Haskalah in various forms, for a variety 
of reasons, both conscious and otherwise. 
As denominations formed, most prominently Reform, Conservative, and
Orthodox, affiliations along the so-called spectrum seemed to more or less correspond 
with the extent that a Jew, or Jewish community, embraced the Gentile invitation to 
become a European: the Reform end of the spectrum being the most embracing and 
Orthodox being the most skeptical. The adoption of this overall scheme, for better or 
worse, has led to the notion that the closer one affiliates herself with the Orthodox side of 
the spectrum, the more legitimately one can call herself a traditional, “religious” Jew. 
While the various ways in which the Reform movement embraced the Haskalah 
are more obvious – dress, custom, social mores, etc. – the situation was far from being 
that simple, especially in terms of redemptive understanding. Setting aside the complex 
issues surrounding Reform movements, but by no means discounting them, we shall now 
focus on how the debates within the Orthodox community began to shape new 
understandings of redemption in response to the Enlightenment. While the debates within 
the Orthodox movement do not necessarily parallel those of the Reform and other 
movements, they will provide enough of a glimpse into how complex and problematic the 
Haskalah was for all of Jewish thinking.
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Allan Nadler, in his book, The Faith of the Mithnagdim, dispels the 
misconception that Jewish Orthodoxy maintained a homogenous position with regard to 
the major questions of the day. The Hasidim, proponents of more ecstatic, rapturous 
expressions of faith, actually represented a radical departure from traditional modes of 
religious expression that the opposing Mithnagdim sought to protect and preserve. Nadler 
explains that, while at first glance the Hasidic and Mithnagdic positions might seem 
rather similar, their differences lie in their ideas about how kabbalistic speculations 
should or should not be applied, rather than in any real disagreement about the 
speculations themselves. And their disagreements concerning the application of these 
ideas, we shall see, fall in line precisely with differing emphases in their respective 
understandings of redemptive thought. The Mithnagdic argument, then, will give us a 
clearer picture of the issues surrounding the developments in redemptive thought after the 
Enlightenment.
On the question of divine presence in the world, for example, Nadler tells us that 
“there was virtually no substantive theological difference between Hasidim and 
Mithnagdim in their respective theoretical understandings of the nature of divine 
immanence. Where they did differ was on the place and application of this belief in 
religious life and the propriety of propagating it to the Jewish masses.”84 The Mithnagdic 
critique of Hasidism, then, was not that Hasidism misunderstood or even distorted 
Kabbalistic notions of divine presence, but, as Gershom Scholem explains, “that the 
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secrets of the divine realm are presented in the guise of mystical psychology.”85 It was 
the transformation of Kabbalistic ideas into a readily accessible terminology that so 
terrified the Gaon of Vilna (1720-1797 AD), R. Hayyim of Volozhin (1749-1821 AD), R. 
Phinehas of Polotsk (1746-1823 AD), and other prominent Mithnagdim. And it was such 
audacity that prompted their vigorous opposition to Hasidic teachings. “What the 
Mithnagdim apparently feared most,” Nadler writes, 
was the psychoreligious consequences of the popularization and personalization 
of the theory of divine immanence.
The crucial difference between the Hasidim and the Mithnagdim on this 
issue, then, was less one of theosophy than one of religious anthropology. All 
agreed that in theory the Eyn Sof [God; literally “without end”] fills all worlds 
and all spaces. However, for the Hasidim, who maintained a supremely 
optimistic view of man’s spiritual and psychoreligious capacities, this truth must 
not remain a matter of esoteric theory but must become the object of extensive 
human contemplation, enriching the religious life of all Jews and ultimately 
allowing them to achieve mystical union with God in and through the created 
world. For the Mithnagdim, on the other hand, who harbored a deeply pessimistic
view of man’s spiritual capabilities, the truth of God’s immanence must remain 
in the realm of mystical speculation, reserved for a small, select and well-guarded 
spiritual elite. The average Jew, they insisted, must conduct his life in this world 
as if estranged from a distant, transcendent, unknowable God.86
As with the issue of divine immanence, the Mithnagdim maintained that all of the 
secrets of Kabbalah should remain hidden, only to be disseminated to a select few. When 
their warnings did not stem the propagation of Hasidic teaching, however, they 
sometimes rejected mystical speculation altogether, at least publicly. They believed that 
for the majority of Jewry, goals should be much more modest, mystical speculation and 
theurgical action should be avoided, and that “the way to attain piety was assiduously to 
study conventional rabbinic texts and faithfully to obey the commandments of the Torah; 
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in other words, to heed the basic requirements of the faith, without any heroic attempts at 
acquiring a profound knowledge of God or understanding the mysteries of creation.”87
This humility extended to realms beyond mysticism, to such issues as the relative 
merits of study and prayer. The Mithnagdim were appalled at the Hasidic emphasis on 
prayer as more important than study and their attempts to imbue prayer with cosmic 
significance through theurgical or pragmatic kavana, or intention. Once again, the dispute 
was not about the possibilities of prayer, but about appropriateness. It was not that the 
Mithnagdim believed that one could not affect the world through prayer – without 
question they believed that one could – but they maintained that one should not do so. 
Like the Talmudic rabbis before them, they tried to reorient religious practice back 
toward a deeper immersion in the text, and away from outward expressions of devotion. 
Nadler explains that “the Mithnagdic approach to prayer is thus rooted in a deep sense of 
historical decline, religious alienation, and personal spiritual inadequacy,” in contrast to 
the Hasidic approach to prayer as “a joyful experience entered into with the most strident 
confidence and optimism…”88 The Mithnagdim found in Hasidic prayer an attitude of 
confidence that they viewed as dangerous.
At the heart of the divide, then, are two competing conceptions of history and the 
role of the human being, corresponding to the triumphal and disruptive trends in 
redemptive thought that we have traced throughout this study. Each movement was 
responding to the issues posed by the Enlightenment, one embracing its philosophy of 
progress and the other rejecting it as perilous. Hasidic conceptions embrace an 
unabashedly optimistic view of the world while the Mithnagdic perspective is decidedly 




misanthropic, wary of the dominating undertones of progressive discourse, and therefore 
purposefully small-scale and limited in scope. 
But the Mithnagdic critique, aware of the larger forces affecting Jewish thought, 
extended well beyond the spiritualist optimism of the Hasidic movement. Many of the 
same convictions that put the Mithnagdim in hostile opposition to Hasidic thought, 
Nadler writes, made them “as fundamentally hostile to the Haskalah as to Hasidism.”89
Though sometimes considered to be early advocates of the Haskalah because of their 
interest in secular disciplines, Mithnagdic thinkers, R. Phinehas of Polotsk most 
explicitly, rejected the more overarching goals of assimilation that the Haskalah 
represented, be it the possibilities of spiritual attainment as articulated by the Hasidism or 
the promise of social and economic advancement that enticed other self-proclaimed 
Maskilim, or advocates of the Haskalah. The Mithnagdim, in line with rabbinic tradition, 
remained dutifully dismissive of ideas such as human theurgical practice affecting God’s 
action in history, and they remained fundamentally wary of activism, self-betterment, and 
the vocabulary of human perfection in its religious and secular forms. Nadler writes that
although Hasidism’s and the Haskalah’s respective notions of the precise nature 
of human perfection in this life differed radically, and although their shared 
optimism did not constitute a basis for any genuine agreement between them, in 
the eyes of the Mithnagdim their deviances from tradition were at least 
phenomenologically the same… The ideologies of both Hasidism and Haskalah 
produced a self-indulgent activism that must have appeared deeply unorthodox to 
the conservative, religiously passive Mithnagdim.90
So profound to the Mithnagdim was the threat of the confident redemptive 
rhetoric disseminated by both the Hasidim and the Maskilim that many Mithnagdic 




responses cannot conceal the frightened forcefulness of their polemics. Consider, for 
example, this excerpt from Phinehas of Polotsk’s “Death Poem”:
So consider, you son of man, by what right did you ever swagger upon the earth? 
Therefore, may you be cursed upon this earth, may thorns and thistles grow 
underneath you, and may they become as barbs in your eyes and prickles in your 
side, You thought that you were a wise man, and now look how you lie 
despondently, rusting and rotting away from your wounds and your pain… Oh, 
how you – such a precious cache – have fallen into abject desolation! You, lowly 
man, have deluded yourself into falsely believing that you could soar above the 
tops of clouds, whereas in fact it was Sheol below that was awaiting you in order 
to bring your empty arrogance down to hell…91
The Mithnagdim were wary of the results of the “empty arrogance” to such a degree that 
Phinehas of Polotsk and others thought it better to deprive people of the very hope of 
spiritual or worldly betterment than to allow for the unrestricted consequences of such 
thinking. The Mithnagdim argued that rhetoric such as Phinehas of Polotsk’s “Death 
Poem” was necessary to stem the tide of overly optimistic redemptive thought. While 
instances of Mithnagdic thought seemed to suggest that there may in fact have been a
valid sort of hope, this sort of frankness was rarely if ever disseminated publicly.92 So
great were the stakes, and so perilous was the alternative, that the Mithnagdim could not 
abide even an inkling of advocacy of progressive possibility.
In response to the philosophical threat of the Haskalah, Nadler writes, the 
Mithnagdim “fortified to an unprecedented degree the limits of spiritual attainment and 
the boundaries of acceptable religious conduct.” Convinced that the spiritual alienation 
and degradation of the human predicament rendered nearly any progressive endeavor an 
exercise in treacherous arrogance, “they offered the individual Jew no path of redemption 
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from his estranged, shattered existence in this world and no remedy for his divided nature 
and afflicted spirit.”93 In what we could argue to be the most strongly articulated case 
against progress in Jewish history, the Mithnagdim publicly denied the very possibility of 
redemption through human agency.
ળ
Assimilation and Distinction after the Haskalah
Despite the vigorousness of the Mithnagdic critique it would be fair to say that the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries saw a marked trend, particularly in 
Western Europe, toward Jewish assimilation in all realms. Though the debate within the 
emerging Orthodox movement, which characterized itself as anti-assimilationist, was
actually more complex if we consider assimilation in terms of redemptive thinking, some 
of the most interesting and innovative engagements with the new redemptive possibilities 
during this period took place among the increasingly “modern” Jewry. Rather than 
simply erasing the distinction of Jew and Christian through the anonymity of reason and 
equal citizenship, Jewish adoption of a more secular perspective, and with it the 
vocabulary of European academia, led to a new dialectic for Jewish self-understanding as 
distinct from the larger culture. 
For figures like Gershom Scholem (1897-1982 AD), who wrote much about the 
developments of the preceding centuries, the mechanics of Jewish assimilation allowed 
Jews to maintain a thorough, albeit complementary, distinctiveness. As with the Hasids, 
Kabbalah played an important role in his discourses, and much of his own work can be 
seen as stemming from his understandings of the categories of medieval Kabbalah. 
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Scholem’s contributions to the academic study of Kabbalah remain unrivalled, so much 
so that, as Moshe Idel points out, many scholars “working in the field of Judaica or in 
comparative religion, have tended to the notion that his views on Kabbalah are 
tantamount to Kabbalah itself.”94 One of the troubling aspects of this situation for Idel 
and other Kabbalah scholars in more recent times is the extent to which Scholem 
presented historical Kabbalah through the lens of his own agenda and prejudices, which, 
Susan Handelman tells us, included his “stated theological anarchism, his antipathy to 
Jewish law, and to rational Enlightenment utopianism…”95
While sharing the Mithnagdic skepticism of Enlightenment redemption, Scholem 
rejected what he saw as the political impotence of the Orthodoxy which he found in both 
the rabbinic and the mystical realms. Handelman explains that he reworked notions of 
redemptive thought so as to discard the spiritual deferment of the here and now in which 
“nothing can be done definitively, nothing can be irrevocably accomplished… there is 
nothing concrete that can be accomplished by the unredeemed,”96 replacing such 
deferment with the concreteness of political power. He attempted to salvage what he saw 
as the action-oriented thrust of certain forms of redemption, advocating “‘utopian’ but not 
apocalyptic”97 modes. Scholem’s task was intimately connected to his Zionism, which for 
him was of a piece with his unease with diasporic culture and its passivity.
Where Scholem rejected what he saw as the restrictive nature of halachah, others 
saw in traditional Jewish law the possibility of constructing an ethical bridge between 
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political activism and redemptive thought. Thinkers like Franz Rosenzweig pointed to the 
ethics of halachah, not, in Handelman’s words, “as a set of dry and constraining rules, but 
as something much deeper.”98 “For me, too, God is not a Law-giver,” Rosenzweig wrote, 
“but He commands. It is only by the manner of observance that a man in his inertia 
changes the commandments into Law.”99 In this way Rosenzweig pointed to an ethics 
that could perhaps successfully speak to the triumphal redemptive narratives of the 
modern age and temper its dominating zeal.
Rosenzweig, in his Star of Redemption and elsewhere, reinterpreted the categories 
of creation, revelation, and redemption, elaborating a scheme that placed the ethics of 
encounter, relationality, and speech in a central role as never before. Even Scholem 
recognized the significance of Rosenzweig’s contribution, lamenting the lack of critical 
engagement with his ideas and suggesting that “in the long run this work will need ever 
increasing critical attention.”100 Such a scheme could perhaps no longer rightly be called 
a theology, but it contained, by way of Rosenzweig’s God-who-commands, a seemingly 
more fundamental point at which to commence ethical thought within a redemptive 
framework.
In their decidedly modern approaches, Rosenzweig, Scholem, and other thinkers 
attempted to reinterpret the categories of redemption, suffering, and individual and 
political action in a way that placed human obligation more explicitly at the fulcrum. 
Like the Mithnagdim, they recognized something disastrous in the unchecked progressive 
thinking that informed assimilationist urges, and they attempted to counter such trends 
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with their own proposals. As such, regardless of their disputes and disagreements with 
each other or with their Orthodox counterparts, they placed themselves directly within
trends of redemptive thought that, I have argued, has always been at the heart of Jewish 
tradition, ceaselessly working and reworking textual material to address the issues of a
particular time and place. 
ળ
Looming over our discussion of these projects is the distressing fact that, despite 
valiant efforts to construct a viable Jewish identity in the modern age and to establish a 
new basis for Jewish-Christian relations in post-Enlightenment Europe, the Shoah 
revealed Jewish hopes for assimilation or equal citizenship to be a fantasy. Furthermore, 
we must confront that it was in part physical and philosophical assimilation and trust in 
Western notions of progress, guided by linear narratives of redemption and triumph in 
both secular and religious guises, that facilitated the Shoah’s horrors and increased its 
effectiveness. With hindsight, in light of their failure, we might consider the Shoah a 
referendum on all previous articulations of redemption. The event and its implications 
cannot be circumscribed if we are to continue to talk about redemption in Judaism. The 
Shoah becomes a stumbling block that raises questions never before thought possible. 
How can we continue to talk about justice and suffering? How can we continue to talk 
about redemption, within history or otherwise, when our history now includes a rupture 
so great as to render it irredeemable? 
Judaism has certainly experienced great instances of rupture before – horrific 
events which seemed to put the Jewish people, and sometimes the entire enterprise of 
Judaism, in jeopardy. Some previous instances of trauma, such as the Babylonian exile, 
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were confronted and eventually served to enrich Jewish redemptive vocabulary, 
providing for more explicitly disrupted understandings of redemption. Others, for 
example the Maccabean revolt against the Seleucids, were more problematic and 
purposefully avoided as redemptive allegories. In all cases, though, suffering was either 
given a purpose within a meaningful redemptive framework or stripped of its redemptive 
meaning. But never before has the magnitude and sheer inconceivability of an event 
shaken the very foundation of Jewish faith as has the Shoah, which can neither be 
incorporated nor ignored.
While Franz Rosenzweig did not live long enough to respond to the Shoah, 
Gershom Scholem’s career spanned this period, and his awareness of the Shoah’s 
implications seems to have influenced his subsequent thinking. Scholem ends his 1959 
essay, “Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism,” with a disclaimer 
that “modern Jewish readiness for irrevocable action in the concrete realm,” for example, 
in the “utopian return to Zion,” “is a readiness which no longer allows itself to be fed on 
hopes.”101 “Born out of the horror and destruction that was Jewish history in our 
generation,” modern Jewish utopianism concerns itself much more explicitly with direct 
political action in history rather than messianic deferment.
While Scholem does not speculate here about what this says about modern 
Jewry’s reckoning with the Shoah, or lack thereof, I would ask whether such emphasis on 
political action and progress does not speak more to desire to evade the gravity of the 
Shoah, ignore the disruption it presents, and continue down an uncritical assimilationist 
path where redemption can only be understood in terms of political triumph. Scholem 
does, however, leave us with a final, skeptical remark:
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Whether or not Jewish history will be able to endure this entry into the concrete 
realm without perishing in the crisis of the Messianic claim which has virtually 
been conjured up – that is the question which out of his great and dangerous past 
the Jew of this age poses to his present and to his future.
Throughout the rest of this study we will be asking this question as well. But we 
will also be asking some related and more difficult questions: what if Jewish 
history is not able to endure in this mode? If not, is there a way to reformulate 
issues of redemption so that it can, indeed, endure? And finally, what might this 
alternative conception of redemption look like in practice, and what would it




Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the 
Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called history. We live in and of 
difference, that is, in hypocrisy, about which Levinas so profoundly says that it is 
“not only a base contingent defect of man, but the underlying rending of a world 
attached to both the philosophers and the prophets” (TI, p. 24).
– Jacques Derrida102
Anxious Triumph: Esther and the Hidden God
When considering how the wisdom literature of the Tanak might speak to the 
concerns we face after the Shoah, the Book of Esther seems an obvious point of 
engagement. There is much overlap between the themes and situations in each case. This 
is true even though Esther is a stylized, mythical event and the Shoah is a documented 
historical event. In fact, the Scroll of Esther’s function as a model of redemption makes it 
even better to compare to historical events. Despite the differences in function, 
similarities are apparent. Each of these events takes place within a diasporic context, 
when issues of assimilation, lack of sovereignty, and preservation of Jewish distinction 
represent a pertinent threat. 
Both events force us to struggle with questions brought about by a seemingly 
absent or hidden God, and with the way human beings should comport themselves in 
such circumstances. And each deals with the worry of Jewish destruction, both physical 
and spiritual, on a colossal scale. Throughout the course of our investigation we will be 
broaching the limits of such direct comparisons to the point where we are forced
acknowledge insurmountable differences. But as we shall see, it is precisely at these 
points that the most fruitful insights can be gleaned, and these points will help us consider
ways that we might begin to articulate ourselves after the Shoah. 
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Let us first compare the circumstances in which the Jews found themselves in 
each instance. The events of the Book of Esther probably take place a few generations
after the Jews are exiled from the Kingdom of Judah at the hands of the Babylonians. 
While the historicity of the events, and even their exact historical placement, is disputed, 
what is clear is that Esther presents the Jews as subject to the will and the mercy of the 
Persian king and scattered in communities throughout the Persian Empire. 
Yoram Hazony compares the situation of Esther and the other virgins in chapter 
two of the Book of Esther to that of the Jews generally. The Jew, Hazony writes, “has 
been stripped of his own nation and capital city, and has lost his own king and any 
capacity to wield power in his own defense… The Jews, like the virgins, have been 
forced to give up everything of independent value to them and are, it seems, powerless 
before the will of the state and its ruler.”103
Given the intervening time since then it may be difficult for readers today to 
appreciate the extent of the crisis. Up until the period we are discussing Jews had not 
experienced such complete political displacement since Egypt. The only previous 
example of such a condition in the recent past was the dispersal of the Kingdom of Israel 
by the Assyrians probably over a century before, which led to the disappearance of these 
tribes through assimilation or other means. Jewish existence was truly at stake in Persia.
The Jews in the period leading up to the Shoah, especially after the 
Enlightenment, found themselves in a rather different existential place. After almost two 
millennia of diasporic survival, the continued viability of Jewish existence without 
autonomy or sovereignty went for the most part unquestioned, Jews having weathered 
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various forms of persecution from the Inquisition to the pogroms. And as Enlightenment 
universalism began to transform European values Jews saw a place for themselves within 
a larger societal fabric. 
As things appeared to be improving, the Jews enjoyed the luxury of certain 
redemptive expectations. There seemed to be every reason to hitch one’s hopes to the 
wagon of Western civilization and progress, to assume that as the Western world 
marched ever closer to a humanly constructed utopia, a corresponding Jewish redemption 
would arise.
It is no coincidence that this period marked the birth of modern Zionism, that it 
was conceived along the lines of a European nation-state, and that it expected success to 
come through European acquiescence and support.104 The goals of Zionism represented a 
messianic and redemptive fulfillment for the Jewish people, and hopes were expressed in 
concrete political terms that utilized the vocabulary of the Western nation-state. Here we 
must acknowledge a significant difference between European post-Enlightenment Jewry 
and ancient Persian Jewry in terms of their relation to the categories of hope and despair, 
or where they stand along a psychological trajectory of redemption. But it is for this 
reason that the Book of Esther is all the more relevant in the post-Shoah context.
At the same time, the complacency and comfort of the European Jews at the start 
of the twentieth century speaks to another, more subtle threat which they shared with 
their ancient Persian counterparts: the threat of assimilation.105 Hazony explains that 
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Persia in Esther’s time is a cosmopolitan world-empire, which offers success and 
wealth to those among the Jewish exiles who will give up on the past and play by 
its rules. In Persia, as elsewhere, the Jews begin to disappear into the fabric of the 
empire, some of them changing their names and their dress, and arguing with 
self-confidence against the possibility and desirability of a continuation to Jewish 
history.106
Along with the obvious concern this presents for those with a stake in the continuation of 
Jewish history, the trend described here also represents precariousness for the very lives 
of Jews. For it is within such a culturally hegemonic context that distinction becomes 
more apparent and therefore more threatening. It is this predicament that lends force to 
Haman’s argument for Jewish destruction: “There is a certain people, scattered and 
dispersed among the other peoples in all the provinces of your realm…” [Esther 3.8].107
It is with similar sentiment that Richard L. Rubenstein tells us that “radical anti-
Semites, including Hitler, were far more troubled by assimilated Jews and intermarriage 
than by the more obviously alien, separatist Orthodox Jews.” Rubenstein writes of the 
threatening nature of an “alternative perspective” that Jews brought to “political, social, 
cultural, and economic issues,” but points out that the full extent of the threat, in 
distinction to, say, that of a Buddhist living in Germany, “came from the absence of 
clearly perceptible differences.”108 The threat of the Jew is not simply that he is different, 
but that he retains a difference even as he seeks equality.
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With this parallel we start to see anti-Semitism as another bridge between these 
two events. The term itself is vague, suggesting at best an approximation of the sentiment 
to which it refers. Hazony describes the inadequacy of the term “anti-Semitism,” and our 
understanding of the concept:
It still takes no more effort to explain that one “hates Jews” than it does to ascribe 
“anti-Semitism” to him; and the Jews, of course, were never actually hated for 
being Semitic, that is, an eastern people. But the failure to have found a more 
meaningful name for the disease only reflects on how little we comprehend it. 
For what term can one devise to express a condition which has sought out a tiny 
race and hunted it out over the entire globe, generation after generation, for 
thousands of years, in turn seeking to abolish, expel, shame, rape, convert, 
torture, confine and exterminate it – and all to no apparent end other than to 
increase the desire to see the project through the next time around?109
Of course any attempt to definitively explain the phenomenon of anti-Semitism would be 
inadequate. But this should not dissuade us from attempting to better understand the very 
real conflict that the term represents. 
ળ
To follow one avenue of investigation that should prove helpful for our concerns, 
we turn to a critical moment in the narrative of Esther. After Haman is elevated by the 
king, Ahashverosh, to a position higher than all of the other officials and starts parading 
through the palace gate in Susa, the capital, Mordechai refuses to kneel or bow to him as 
do all the others. We are told that when the king’s courtiers ask Mordechai why he does 
not bow as all the others had Mordechai responds by explaining to them that he was a 
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Jew. Upon hearing this, Haman becomes so enraged that he resolves to not only exact 
revenge upon Mordechai the individual, but upon the whole Jewish people.
We are presented with two related questions. First, what prompts Mordechai to 
act as he does and provide such an explanation for his actions; what is the connection he 
suggests between act and explanation? Second, what is it about Mordechai’s posturing 
that incites such a seemingly irrational, disproportionate revenge? We shall see that the 
answer to the second question becomes clearer as we investigate the first. 
We might reflexively assume that there is some clear prohibition in Judaism 
against bowing before a figure such as Haman, but this perspective quickly breaks down. 
Hazony tells us that “nothing in Jewish law or custom forbids a Jew to bow before a 
ruler, and there is every reason to presume that when in the presence of Ahashverosh in 
earlier years, Mordechai had indeed bowed to him, as had everyone else in the 
empire.”110 Mordechai and Esther are also by no means strict halachic practitioners, so it 
seems likely that they would put themselves at risk over such an issue. In fact, Esther will 
later instruct the Jewish community to fast on her behalf from the 13th to the 15th of the 
Hebrew month Nisan (Esther 4.16), which means that in that year they did not celebrate 
the first night of the feast of Pesach, in violation of another commandment.111 Even 
further, Mordechai had actually hidden his Jewish identity up until this point, and he had 
advised Esther to do the same.
So the question remains, why does Mordechai make this connection, and more 
specifically, what was it about this moment, as opposed to so many possible other 
moments, that prompted his actions? Indeed what was it he was responding to with such 




opposition – an opposition that he nonetheless labeled Jewish? The rabbis have 
acknowledged the lack of clarity in Mordechai’s actions, and they have offered several 
explanations. They have characterized the situation as an issue of idolatry, explaining that 
Haman had fastened an idolatrous image to his breast and that therefore bowing to 
Haman would be akin to bowing before an idol (Esther Rabba 6.2), or alternately that 
Haman had simply “‘made himself an object of worship’” (Megilla 19a).112
Other explanations have focused on Haman’s association with the Mosaic villain 
Amalek. “On introducing Haman to the narrative,” Marvin Sweeney tells us, 
Esth 3:1 identifies him as the son of Hammedatha the Agagite, which of course 
reprises the character of Agag the Amalekite king from 1 Samuel 15. Exodus 
17:8-15 and Deut 25:17-19 identify the Amalekites as a people who are cursed 
because they attacked Israel from the rear in the wilderness when they were faint 
and weary. Later Jewish tradition identifies Amalek as the quintessential enemy 
who will stop at nothing to destroy Israel and which must itself be destroyed 
before it succeeds in Israel’s destruction.113
Haman is identified from his very first mention with Amalek, the perpetual enemy of the 
Jewish people, distinguished by unmerciful cruelty in warfare.  Whether this is true in 
any historical sense is irrelevant in terms of our consideration of the narrative. The 
antipathy between Mordechai the Jew and Haman the Agagite, for our purposes, extends 
well beyond the time of their personal conflict. Hazony connects these two explanations 
for Mordechai’s actions by describing the position that Amalek represents as a sort of 
idolatry – an elevated, more dangerous idolatry. He points to biblical descriptions of the 
Amalekites as having no fear of God, in other words, having no moral limits. Though we 
are never told in any biblical text whether Amalek ever worshipped a physical idol, “what 
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we do know is that whatever deities may have belonged to Amalek, it was a people which 
did not fear any moral boundaries established by them. Unlike the most depraved of the 
idolaters of Canaan, they respected no limits to the desire of their own spirit to control all 
as it found fit.”114 The figure of Amalek becomes, then, an archetype of domination.
And this position, symbolized by Amalek, is insidious in its pervasiveness and in 
the difficulty, for all human beings, of overcoming it, of truly living in fear of God. 
Hazony points out the “ominous warning” that rejoins the Deuteronomic commandment 
to blot out Amalek from the world, consisting of a further command to not forget to do 
so. And he points out the irony “that God’s promise to annihilate the memory of Amalek 
from the earth is to no small degree undermined by his promise to war against Amalek 
for untold generations.”115 Thus we find that the sinister form of idolatry that Amalek 
represents is not confined merely to a person or a people. Haman’s blood association with 
Agag and Amalek loses all relevancy now that we might understand his character as the 
incarnation of an ethos. But now we are prompted to ask more thoroughly what the nature 
is of the mentality and its oppositional relationship to Judaism. Why does it warrant 
Haman’s repeated epithet, the enemy of the Jews?
As the idea of Amalek threatens Judaism, physically in some instances and more 
subtly in others, so the idea of the Jew threatens Amalek. We have already seen that 
being a distinctive people dispersed throughout a region threatens the obeisance that a 
ruler craves, but we find that the Jew in particular threatens what Hazony calls the 
“original sin of the political world,” the desire to bring to fruition the “totalist fantasy,” 
that is, the vision of complete control without care for the by-products along the way. 
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And Hazony reminds us that “there is no such thing as a small threat to the fantasy of 
perfect control.” If fantasies of domination are accepted wholeheartedly and without 
compunction, they require absolute control and cannot abide a single instance of 
disobedience.
The Jew, seemingly small, powerless, and insignificant, becomes a terrifying 
enemy to this vision. Through “his perennial reservations, his ceaseless chafing against 
the will of the state, his conditions, refusals and disobediences,” in other words, the Jew’s 
insistence on rupture and his constant critique of totalist persepctives, threatens 
totalitarian authorities because through these disruptions she “always places the control 
of the ruler in doubt, necessarily offends his spirit, necessarily makes mockery of his 
pretensions to power.”116 Let us note that Judaism has often been swayed by similar 
desires. I do not mean to present Judaism as an ideal alternative to structures of power. I 
mean to say only that in the face of such totalist forces at least some Jews are liable to 
reflexively fight against these tendencies, explaining themselves by way of their identity 
as Jews. In this light we begin to find Mordechai’s action and explanation at least 
somewhat intelligible.
Those who aspire to absolute rule and a completeness that erases distinction 
perpetuate the legacy of Amalek, relearning anti-Semitism in every age through their 
encounter with the Jew. The Book of Esther emphasized something in the character of 
Haman that we would later find in anti-Semites of every age. And we shall see that such 
desires are in no way confined to the ruling elite, that Amalekite thinking is persistent and 
widespread. But how exactly do these totalist fantasies play out, and what is their 
relationship to Jewish thought? To investigate how this is done – how Judaism, which is 
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so many things, transforms itself into an agitating force that questions totalist fantasies –
we turn to Emmanuel Levinas’s study of Talmudic texts that deal with messianic 
redemption. We will not attempt to completely unravel the intricacies of Levinas’s
thought, we will merely skim its surface to see what we can learn from his insights into 
Talmudic argument. The continuity and transformation we find here will serve to further 
illuminate our questions regarding the Judaism of Mordechai, its corresponding anti-
Semitic reaction, and ways that it might survive the Shoah.
ળ
In his opening remarks to his essay “Messianic Texts,” Levinas discusses verses 
in the final chapter of Tractate Sanhedrin. He distinguishes what he intends by the term 
messianism from what he calls “the popular concept of the Messiah.” “One has failed to 
say anything about the Messiah,” he writes, “if one represents him as a person who 
comes to put a miraculous end to the violence in the world, the injustice and 
contradictions which destroy humanity but have their source in the nature of humanity, 
and simply in Nature.”117 The distinction suggests a guiding principle for what is to 
follow. For Levinas, as with the Mithnagdim and others we have discussed, messianism 
is not concerned with miraculous ends and it is not about overcoming contradiction. 
Rather, it starts at a place that acknowledges contradiction and incompleteness, even 
violence and injustice, as endemic to humanity and Nature itself. 118
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In this understanding we have a significantly different starting point for 
exploration than that which leads to Hazony’s notion of totalist fantasy. The 
understanding of redemption that Levinas finds in these verses defies totalist 
simplifications by way of argument, uncertainty, and perpetual commentary. Levinas 
begins by recognizing and accepting a lack of certainty and wholeness in the very 
enterprise of Talmudic redemptive thought. This approach tempers the excesses of 
heroism and the desire for control by tempering expectations of justification in history. 
But it does not despair in powerlessness. It looks to something deeper through rigorously 
and persistently refusing to rest in the comfort of any one position.
In Levinas’s discussion of Sanhedrin 99a we are introduced to the somewhat 
opposing views of Rabbi Johanan and Samuel. What first appears to be a simple debate 
about whether the Messiah will bring an end to political violence and foreign servitude,
or if the messianic period will also mark an end to wider social injustice, reveals itself as 
a much more subtle discussion of the nature of redemption. “Rabbi Johanan in some way 
believes in the ideal of a disincarnated spirit, of total grace and harmony, an ideal exempt 
from any drama; while Samuel, on the other hand, feels the permanent effort of renewal 
demanded by this spiritual life.”119 Levinas is highlighting an argument that approximates 
the categories of redemption we have discussed. In the case of Johanan and Samuel we 
might term it a debate about what ways we can consider redemption to supersede worldly 
conflict and confusion, and what ways it must continue to reflect these realities. 
But Levinas admonishes us to avoid oversimplification, pronouncing ideas 
“correct” and “incorrect,” and ascribing Jewish essentialness to just one position. The 
back and forth of Johanan and Samuel forms our very answer, the contemplating of the 
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equally valid positions in dialogue being our unending task. Because it is so skillfully 
written, and because its content is so integral to our investigation, we will consider the 
full text of his cautionary reminder:
Let us note – for it is characteristic of the way in which the Talmud broaches 
questions – that the opposing positions of Rabbi Johanan and Samuel, like every 
position taken up by the Doctors, reflects two positions between which thought 
somehow oscillates eternally. Does the spirit indicate a quasi-divine life that is 
free of the limitations of the human condition, or does the human condition, with 
its limits and its drama, express the very life of the spirit? It is important to 
emphasize that these two conceptions come within the area of Jewish thought, for 
these two conceptions express man. It is also important to be on one’s guard 
against the simplistic use of antitheses indulged in by thinkers anxious to sum up 
the apparent options within Jewish thought.120
Both the “disincarnated and gracious spirit”121 and the limitedness of humanly 
conditioned redemption express legitimate options in our thinking. So we must look to 
the very oscillation between them, but even here we must be wary of assuming we have 
exhausted the options, of resting in any particular place or places. There are aspects of 
truth in each, and the two coexist together within a more encompassing idea of 
redemption, just as they do within human beings. There is a place for something 
approaching a totalist mentality, and we find glimmers of this in Rabbi Johanan. And 
there is also a place for Samuel’s insistence that the messianic era must take place within 
history, and that injustice, the poor man as perpetual Other in Levinasian terms, will not 
become a historical accident.122
While we have only dealt with a mere fraction of Levinas’s study of these texts it 
should be enough to begin to compare these ideas with the thinking of Haman, Hitler, and 
other Amalekites. Amalek represents an affinity for wholeness and triumphal finality 





with a corresponding aversion to historical particulars that, as irreconcilable remainders, 
produce unsatisfying outcomes. And the Jew symbolizes in this context the perpetual 
renewal of the oscillation between redemption-as-completeness and irreconcilability of 
particulars in the face of Amalekite rigidity. It is the nagging reminder that, in Hazony’s 
words, “no man may claim for himself the authority to dictate truth, to elevate his 
perspective into the absolute.”123
In a discussion of Levinas’s take on the Talmudic text, Oona Eisenstadt writes 
that “salvation, [Levinas] tells us, is not on the table, for the rabbis place such matters 
under the rubric of the World to Come, which ‘the eye has not seen.’ In distinction, 
discussions of the Messianic Era deal with politics.” Eisenstadt explains that “Judaism as 
a whole is characterized by a reluctance to speculate about salvation and a corresponding 
interest in concrete political possibilities.” So it is not that Judaism rejects, or is incapable 
of acknowledging culminating redemption that transforms the world. Rather, that certain 
Jewish trends, which we have been highlighting, refocus one’s attention back toward the 
world, to truths that, in Levinas’s words “‘concern the good of the community and public 
order.’”124
Jewish thought can, and does, accept eschatological comprehensiveness within a 
larger conversation even as it suppresses the potency of its effects. But Amalek cannot 
abide such nuance, especially when his desires manifest in fantasies of totalist control.
But what happens after moments like Mordechai’s refusal, when the two modes come 
into open conflict? The Jewish position becomes so menacing to the Amalekite, 
regardless of the actual force that Jews represent, as to warrant all of the seemingly 
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irrational anti-Semitic reactions described by Hazony, up to and including attempted 
Jewish annihilation. It is in this light that we come to understand Haman’s inordinate 
response.
Along with the physical destruction that actions based on totalist fantasies have
entailed, there has been a psychological, or perhaps a spiritual, component to the 
destruction that grows greater for the victims as the event itself fades into their collective 
memory. After anti-Semitic attacks Jews have historically had to reconstruct a sense of 
redemption, digesting these new traumatic experiences and understanding their purpose 
within a greater historical perspective. 
It is with regard to such experiences – and other instances of suffering, large and 
small – that we find some of the most fascinating discussions of theodicy, most explicitly 
in Job, Ecclesiastes and other wisdom literature. But Esther is particularly prescient when 
considering the most extreme instances of Jewish suffering, when the oppressing force is 
in conflict with Jewishness itself, and when Jewish survival is on the line. During such 
circumstances questions of divine justice are unavoidable. In this respect Esther seems 
well ahead of its time, prefiguring in some ways the problems in the aftermath of the 
Shoah.
Marvin Sweeney writes of Esther’s special relevance to the Shoah, specifically its 
position as one of two biblical texts that do not mention God by name (the other being the 
Song of Solomon). He sees the absence as a key element in the narrative. “As is so often 
the case in the Shoah and other atrocities or disasters in human experience, the presence 
of G-d is difficult or impossible to discern,” he writes. “On such occasions, human beings 
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must take the responsibility to act in the face of evil.”125 We find the notion of human 
responsibility, of men and women accepting responsibility, writ large in Esther. Hazony, 
arguing against the popular conception that salvation in Esther comes through luck and 
coincidence, God, understood in a rather simplistic and totalizing manifestation, tells us 
that the events leading to salvation are in fact “planned by Mordechai and Esther, and 
come to succeed by virtue of their shrewd understanding of the principles of politics, 
their courage and their faith in the face of an apparently Godless world.”126
It is clear from the text of Esther that a kind of faith remains. Esther’s and 
Mordechai’s notion of the hidden or absent God is not compatible with the Amalekite 
notion. In contrast, their faith remains and it becomes, somewhat paradoxically, a faith in 
an absent God and a conviction that there remains an imperative to act righteously as 
though God were present. The key passages in the text come when Mordechai responds 
to Esther’s worries that she will not be received by the king if she goes to him to plead 
the case of the Jews. “‘Do not imagine that you, of all the Jews, will escape with your life 
by being in the king’s palace. On the contrary, if you keep silent in this crisis, relief and 
deliverance will come to the Jews from another quarter, while you and your father’s 
house will perish. And who knows, perhaps you have attained to royal position for just 
such a crisis” (Esther 4.13-14).127
There are several ways to interpret this, the most obvious but also the most 
unlikely being that Esther will be found out as a Jew and killed alongside her fellows. 
The opposite is much more probable – that her best chance of survival lies in remaining 
silent about her Jewishness. Another interpretation, which lends insight to our discussion, 
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is that Mordechai is, in effect, challenging her courage and sense of responsibility as a 
Jew. Now is her opportunity to use her position for the benefit of the Jews. To not act 
would be to abdicate the presumption that she has attained her position for the benefit of 
others. She would have chosen ruthless desire and the Amalekite idea that action, or 
inaction, can be justified by its end result, regardless of the collateral damage. She would 
have succumbed not just to the belief that God is absent but that even an absent God is 
not to be feared. She and her father’s house would truly perish, as she would have 
separated herself from something essential to the Judaism of her ancestors.128
And the vanguard against such thinking is Mordechai’s central claim, that 
salvation is inevitable regardless of whether or not she participates, that for her it is a 
question of her own salvation and not that of others. Mordechai’s position is, in a way, 
vindicated twice. He is correct in his belief that salvation will come, and it comes in large 
part as a result of the persuasiveness of this very argument. But there is a foreboding that 
emerges within the salvation itself. In chapter 9 Mordechai organizes a militarily and 
psychologically successful counterattack against the genocidal wheels which Haman had 
already set in motion, slaughtering over 75,000 people. He then establishes the festival of 
Purim as a remembrance. And chapter 10 brings the narrative to a close by succinctly
remarking that Mordechai maintained his favor with the king and continued to seek the 
welfare of the Jews. 
Hazony argues that these chapters may be overlooked in certain settings due to 
discomfort with the violence perpetrated by the Jews.129 While such a reaction is an 
understandable and valid rejection of seemingly inordinate violence, we must confront 
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the problems that arise from the episode. The Jewish counterattack, incited by a righteous 
purpose, nonetheless perpetrates horrific, arguably genocidal, atrocities of its own. It 
would be reasonable, then, to suggest that we can connect such actions with a causal 
relationship to the overall narrative of salvation in Esther. In such instances the difference 
between the Jew and Amalek becomes difficult to discern. Mordechai’s refusal to give up 
his belief in salvation, arguably the lynchpin of the entire narrative, becomes suspect.
And along with this very serious problem there is perhaps another aspect of the
closing remarks that does not sit well. Mordechai’s ongoing concern with establishing the 
best possible situation for the Jewish community, and the fact that danger did not subside 
with the defeat of Haman and his advisors, betrays the peril with which the Jews remain 
fraught. There is not, in fact, a culmination. Even in triumph Mordechai is preparing for 
the next chapter of Jewish suffering. This development undercuts the certainty of 
salvation, puts the absence of God in even sharper focus, and points to the continued 
persistence of rupture even in Jewish victory and dominance. While the story is itself one 
of triumph the anxiety it permits prefigures the Shoah, with which this narrative cannot 
now escape critical comparison.
We have reached what may very well be the most significant point of divergence 
between Esther and the Shoah. Where Mordechai was vindicated in faith and in action 
the Shoah allowed for neither possibility. This time there was no Mordechai and no 
Esther, and one wonders how their presence could have possibly made a difference. 
There was no bumbling Ahashverosh to be wielded and manipulated as an instrument, 
only belligerent ideologues and bureaucratic cogs in power. Social propaganda and 
technological ability were such that the public acquiescence and the bureaucratic 
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efficiency with which the crimes were committed remain unparalleled. As a result the 
sheer magnitude of the crime is incomprehensible in any comparable sense. Never before 
was there been such a directed effort to devastate the very soul of the Jew or any human 
being, to strip away all humanity, to blur the distinction between living and dead. 
Mordechai and Esther successfully affirmed their faith in the hidden God through 
their actions and courage. Not only could there have been no success during the Shoah, 
but there could not even have been a meaningful principled stand. Between what could 
one choose? The anti-Semitic sensitivity, which we have found represented by Amalek as 
a basic human condition, had reached such a cacophonous expression that even in 
survival the implications of the experience continue to put Jewishness in jeopardy. It 
remains to be seen whether even the most radical expressions of a hidden or an absent 
God retain their pertinence, whether one can continue to speak of redemption of any kind, 
and whether the aftermath marks a more ultimate triumph of the Nazis and Amalekite 
thinking.
ળ
The Messiah Who Mourns
We now return to Levinas’s “Messianic Texts” in order to more fully understand 
the intricacies of Talmudic notions of redemption, how they might speak to and beyond 
the Shoah, and what troubles the Shoah continues to pose. Levinas plunges us into the 
minefield of redemptive discourse with the second part of his study, entitled Is the 
Coming of the Messianic Era Conditional or Unconditional? It is a study of pages 97b 
and 98a of Tractate Sanhedrin. Samuel, ever skeptical of any disentangled external grace, 
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returns, but here he is arguing with Rab instead of Rabbi Johanan. Rab’s opening position 
seems relatively clear but Samuel’s is less straightforward.
Rab said: All the predestined dates [for redemption] have passed, and the matter 
[now] depends only on repentance and good deeds. But Samuel maintained: It is 
sufficient for a mourner to keep his [period of] mourning.130 [clarifying notes 
appear in Levinas’s text]
Rab’s thesis contains two significant parts. It represents a form of totalist thinking in that 
it speaks of an outside pronunciation upon history, and it also occupies itself with human 
agency and responsibility, placing the burden of redemption on human beings. It 
resonates with the faith of Mordechai in that it affirms the certainty of salvation just as it 
seeks salvation through human responsibility. 
It is much less obvious from the outset what to make of Samuel’s retort. Levinas 
begins by presenting three opinions as to who Samuel is alluding to as being in mourning. 
The first is that God is in mourning as a result of the reality of suffering within history. It 
is sufficient, therefore, that God simply keep the period of mourning because “the 
objective order of things cannot remain eternally in check: it cannot remain eternally in a 
state of disorder; things will work out, and they will do so objectively.” This sets up an 
opposition to Rab’s emphasis on human efficacy. In this perspective “one does not need 
to wait for the individual effort,” which, Levinas reminds us, “is virtually negligible and 
gets drowned in the magnificent and reasonable course of historic events.”131
Levinas then presents us with a second opinion as to who is mourning. The
opinion softens the opposition between Rab and Samuel, leaving space for a compromise 
of sorts. Here it is Israel who is suffering and Israel who is in mourning. Redemption 
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remains objective, external, but is sparked by a moral concern for human suffering. It 
does not require repentance, that is, it does not require full human awareness and 
conscious action, but it still provides a place in the process for human experience. While 
it reconciles the stricter antagonism of the positions with which we began, it becomes 
problematic in its seeming justification of suffering. If the human being who suffers 
inaugurates with her suffering the process of her own deliverance, it compromises “the 
dignity of the victim who, without having deserved it, suffers absurdly the repercussions 
of historical necessities.”132 To put the problem explicitly, such a conception would place 
the events of the Shoah, and the suffering of its victims, in a central redemptive role. The 
Shoah then becomes a Holocaust, that is, a sacrifice completely consumed by fire, a 
religious offering.
Levinas then brings us to a third opinion that deals directly with the problem of 
suffering as a moral category of redemption. It is the position of the seventeenth-century 
commentator Maharsha, who, Levinas speculates, “is probably shocked by the idea of a 
redemption which is obtained by the sole effect of suffering and without any positive 
virtue being required, something that reeks of Christianity.”133 For Maharsha, suffering 
plays a role but only because it incites one to repentance. There is a “special place” for 
suffering within a redemptive scheme: “it is not yet moral initiative, but it is through 
suffering that a freedom may be aroused.” Suffering thus reconciles external salvation 
with human agency through moral freedom. Here we seem to rest in a temporary solution 
– salvation is dependent on God and it is also dependent on human beings, and the 




relationship is established through suffering as part of a process. Both aspects are valid, 
both are necessary, but even now a problem remains. 
Levinas offers a fourth option. In his own interpretation, it is the Messiah who is 
in mourning, the Messiah who suffers. We will discuss the specifics of this soon, but 
first, let us consider more closely the underlying debate in the three opinions presented 
above.
After the above exegeses we are still left with a basic difference: “Either morality 
– that is to say, the efforts made by men who are masters of their intentions and acts –
will save the world, or else what is needed is an objective event that surpasses morality 
and the individual’s good intentions.”134 The problem of the Shoah puts these positions in 
contrast with one another, and it also points to the inadequacy of Maharsha’s 
reconciliation. The Shoah demands each of these positions just as it will not be contained 
by either, and it will certainly not be sufficiently explained away through suffering and 
repentance as a process by which the world is redeemed. 
The debate over repentance as the instigator of redemption is continued, 
surprisingly, in the past. Levinas explains that the text presents the discussion between 
Samuel and Rab as a reprisal of an earlier debate between two Tannaim, Rabbi Eliezer 
and Rabbi Joshua. Here the discussion now turns explicitly to repentance and redemption. 
While both see repentance as the predecessor of salvation, Rabbi Eliezer stresses human 
choice – “If Israel repent, they will be redeemed; if not, they will not be redeemed” –
while Rabbi Joshua emphasizes the extent that worldly events can spark repentance –
“But the Holy One, blessed be He, will set up a king over them, whose decrees shall be as 
cruel as Haman’s whereby Israel shall engage in repentance, and he will thus bring them 
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back to the right path.”135 From our perspective we can see the possible placement of the 
Shoah within a redemptive process as being at stake. Rabbi Joshua rejects what Levinas 
calls “free deliverance,” the idea that God will sit idly by as human beings amble toward
the Messiah. But the alternative that he proposes is one in which “the phenomenon of 
Haman (or Hitler) is placed in the perspective of messianism.” While repentance through 
human decision remains the decisive factor, God will incite it through the worldly means 
of cruelty and suffering. This position is thoroughly untenable when it comes to the 
Shoah because it places the event within a redemptive narrative. It portrays the Shoah as 
part of the divine plan, a repulsive thought that insults the memory of the victims and 
transforms redemption into a demonic parody of itself.
What follows appears to be an almost irrelevant exchange of biblical verses. The 
Tannaim seemingly trade verses like blows, dredging up more and more scriptural 
quotations to support their position. Rabbi Eliezer asks, for example, “is it not written, 
Return unto me, and I will return unto you (Malachi 3:7),” emphasizing “return” as the 
operative principle. And Rabbi Joshua punctuates the objective aspect of salvation, 
which, Levinas notes, belongs in a category of “violence,” with “I am the master over 
you: and I will take you out of a city, and two of a family, and I will bring you to Zion
(Jeremiah 3:14)”136
This continues for a time until, ostensibly out of nowhere, the debate comes to a 
close after Rabbi Joshua quotes Daniel 12.7, which contains a concrete timetable, an 
appeal to God’s promise, and an anticipation that “all things shall be finished,” which, 




according to Levinas, amounts to an “announcement of unconditional deliverance.” And 
here, shockingly, Rabbi Eliezer remains silent. 
Why does Rabbi Eliezer not respond? Surely he could have continued forever 
quoting verses that emphasized “return” and so many others that support his thesis, but 
instead he keeps silent. In order to understand the real issues that have been playing out 
in the exchange “we must first neglect the points that initially seem to carry the force of 
the summarized argument,” Levinas tells us in classic Talmudic fashion, “and we must 
neglect less the verses themselves to which the interlocutors have recourse.”137 In the 
apparently stagnant back and forth of the exchange of verses there has been a definite 
progression through which a nuanced conversation has been taking place under the 
surface. 
In Rabbi Eliezer’s first argument – “Return, ye backsliding children, and I will 
heal your backslidings (Jeremiah 3:22)” – Levinas tells us that “the essential words are ‘I 
will heal.’138 The language is medical. If the backsliding – illness, or corruption of evil –
is such that it requires medication it must also require an initial act on the part of the sick. 
The first overture resides in the decision of the human being; salvation requires enough 
self-awareness in the sick person to seek the doctor. Levinas calls this sentiment “the 
opposite of the logic of grace” and finds in it “the eternal requirement of a thought that 
regards sin as breaking with the eternal order, a free being in selfish isolation.”139
But the requirement that Rabbi Joshua invokes in his response is “no less eternal.” 
He responds with the language of finance, quoting Isaiah 53.3, “ye have sold yourselves 





for nought; and ye shall be redeemed without money.”140 In this view sin is essentially 
idolatry, a prostitution of sorts, the selling of oneself. Levinas labels it a “lapse,” in that, 
for Rabbi Joshua, it is indifference to what is right, an offence that demands a pardon, 
rather than a sickness. Sin can be construed here even as a form of ignorance, lack of 
education, stemming from “intellectual and doctrinal” flaws. The sinful person sells 
herself “for nought;” she has been suckered into a raw deal. If this is the case, must we 
not be forgiven our debt; must it not be “redeemed from the outside”?141
Rabbi Eliezer’s response – “Return unto me, and I will return unto you” (Malachi 
3.7) – invokes once again “the eternal requirement of morality: the total reciprocity 
between free people, the equality found between freedoms,” that is, the claim that if sin 
can only be overcome in a world where moral choice truly exists, the first move must be 
internal. And Rabbi Joshua’s further insistence on unconditional salvation prompts 
Levinas, and us, to consider whether freedom does not “rest on a preliminary 
commitment,” whether the relationship between human beings and God is not closer to a 
conjugal union which continues to shape us no matter what, even in our possible rejection 
of God.142
Rabbi Eliezer – “In returning and rest ye shall be saved” (Isaiah 30.15) – then 
reminds us that human existence does not consist of being acted upon. It is “the 
possibility of suspending the hold things have on us,” the “leisure of being aware, the 
freedom of thought,” which provides us with a possibility of return that is consistent with 
our agency as free beings. Rabbi Joshua’s reply evokes “him whom man despiseth” 
(Isaiah 49.7), servants, workers, and variously underdeveloped people who do not enjoy 





the luxury of leisure and self-awareness. Surely some external action must take place, if 
only to provide for the initial impetus.143
It would be easy here to get lost in the scholarly struggle and fail to notice the 
momentous turn that is about to raise the stakes dramatically. Rabbi Eliezer builds upon 
the case he has been making about freedom but he adds a striking twist: “If thou wilt 
return, O Israel, saith the Lord, return unto me? (Jeremiah 4:1).” The verse presents the 
same outlook about free morality and human agency that we have heard before, but the 
particle “if” tells us that we are entering a realm of uncertainty. This “if” represents the 
anxiety that God will not redeem, and that neither will Israel return. It speaks to the 
precarious distinction between Mordechai and Amalek: If God is hidden for both Amalek 
and Mordechai, the only difference is Mordechai’s continued faith even in God’s 
absence. If Mordechai does not return, then the Amalekite position triumphs. 
Redemption, in any form, is no longer inevitable, ethics is irrelevant, and there exists the 
possibility that justice will never emerge at all.
The high stakes are made clearer by Rabbi Eliezer’s choice of tone in presenting 
the statement in the form of a question. “To require absolute morality is to require 
absolute freedom,” Levinas explains, and this is the only possible consequence of 
absolute freedom: “the possibility of immorality.” If human beings are truly free to 
choose then they are free not to return to God. “The possibility of an immoral world is 
therefore included in the conditions for morality.”144 This is a Godlessness with which 
Mordechai and Esther seemingly never confronted. It is a Godlessness that excludes the 




possibility of salvation and ensures the triumph of evil. It is a Godlessness that confirms 
the most reprehensible aspects of the Nazi proposition.
It is within this context that we can better understand Levinas’s suggestion that 
the Messiah is the mourner in Samuel’s response to Rab. “The Messiah,” Levinas tells us,
“is ready to come this very day, but everything depends on man. And the suffering of the 
Messiah and, consequently, the suffering of humanity which suffers in the Messiah and 
the suffering of humanity for whom the Messiah suffers, are not enough to save 
humanity.”145 Levinas’s thesis is difficult to swallow, but it is just as difficult to 
circumvent. It is especially hard after the Shoah, which revealed a new depth to which 
humanity is capable of sinking. Even so, if we go back to Samuel’s statement, we can ask 
this question: If it is indeed the Messiah who is in mourning, and if this is due to 
humanity’s inability to redeem itself, is it still sufficient for the mourner to keep his 
period of mourning?
It is Rabbi Eliezer’s problematic verse, and its implications, that prompt Rabbi 
Joshua’s definitive, unconditional response. And they also prompt Rabbi Eliezer’s own 
silence. Levinas explains that any argument now would be tantamount to the denial of 
God, “that is to say, the absolute certainty of the defeat of Evil.” This is God in “His 
purest essence… the very principal of the triumph of good.” To not believe that the 
Messiah will come, that good will triumph over Evil, is to not believe in God. Levinas 
explains that the notion that the Messiah will come when the world is completely sinful is 
itself a sort of response to this problem. For the promise of redemption to necessarily be 
fulfilled, there must be a certainty that it will happen no matter what. This is “the extreme 
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consequence of an obvious proposition: even if the world is absolutely plunged in sin, the 
Messiah will come.”146
Rabbi Joshua has, ostensibly, won the argument. He has called Rabbi Eliezer’s 
bluff, as it were; Rabbi Eliezer would not go so far as to deny God. But as readers of the
exchange we do well to remind ourselves that the conclusions are not as straightforward 
as that – they never are with Talmud. Rabbi Eliezer is silenced for the moment, but his 
objection is not withdrawn. There is a reason that the Talmudic discussion does not begin 
and end with the final statement by Rabbi Joshua. As Levinas explains, the resuscitation 
of the argument in the time of Rab and Samuel is an indicator of the eternal character of 
the debate.147 Rabbi Eliezer’s argument remains alive, and it maintains its place within 
Judaism, perennially disrupting our hopes for salvation. The Shoah once again arouses 
this old dilemma in frightening forms, and it forces us to ask the awful question: should 
Rabbi Eliezer have spoken?
ળ
Leonard Cohen: Poet of Persistence
The ideas in the above Talmudic exchanges are not meant to reside exclusively in 
the minds and the language of scholars. These are concerns for all Jews, and transposed 
to different terminology, for all human beings, they are relevant to all. The Shoah did not 
differentiate between the Talmudic scholar and the ordinary Jew, and neither is the 
trauma experienced by each of a fundamentally different kind. The difference, if there is 
one, lies in the realm of expression. The playful way that Rabbis Joshua and Eliezer 
command scriptural excerpts to make their case testifies against a rigid formality. And 




Levinas explains that the liberty with which they translate passages, and even their 
seeming forgetfulness at certain points, is “an indication that the argument is less formal 
than it appears.”148 For these reasons we will follow the direction of the Rabbis and turn 
to a somewhat unconventional source as we begin to explore the ditch that we have just 
dug for ourselves: the contemporary poet, singer, and songwriter Leonard Cohen.
While Leonard Cohen quite openly dabbles in other traditions – employing 
symbols of Christianity and Zen Buddhism in his work – the tone and the content of his 
songs and poetry have an unquestionable Jewish character. His grasp of the underlying 
emotions that characterize the confusion we have so far discussed in other, more 
academic terms, is remarkable. And he is able to express these emotions through poetry 
and song in a way that is inaccessible to the academic, providing us with opportunities to 
explore these issues with new eyes, and perhaps to reach new understandings, if only by 
way of example, of how Judaism might proceed. It would be wrong to assume that the 
interpretations we will find as we look through his work are authoritative, or that they are 
the only possible interpretations, but the relevance of Cohen to our purposes remains, 
nonetheless, undeniable.
Cohen, who was born Montreal in 1934, did not have a direct experience of the 
Shoah. This places him to some extent outside of the trauma experienced by survivors, 
but it does not preclude him from his position as one of the more prominent Jews who 
has admirably concerned himself, in various ways, with the reality of Judaism in the 
aftermath of the Shoah. He is an important voice among the post-Shoah generations of 
Jews who must acknowledge, and in some way incorporate, the trauma into their 
understanding of redemption and the world. His music, while it rarely overpowers the 
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force of the words, adds another level to his work and allows Cohen to tap into something 
even deeper.
His works sometimes find their foundation in a sense of betrayal and of naïveté 
readjusted by historical circumstance. In his song “The Old Revolution,” from the album 
Songs from a Room, we find the ominous chorus: “Into this furnace I ask you now to 
venture, / you whom I cannot betray.” It is difficult not to hear this as the voice of God,
or of redemptive hope more generally, reassuringly addressing imminent victims of the 
crematoria. But in this instance, as is often the case in similar moments in Cohen’s work, 
it is difficult not to cringe with knowledge that these victims were indeed betrayed. The 
song continues: “I fought in the old revolution / on the side of the ghost and the king. / Of 
course I was very young / and I thought we were winning; / I can’t pretend I still feel 
very much like singing / as they carry the bodies away.”149
There are several important ideas being expressed in these lines. They begin with 
an acknowledgment of having fought for something, but the language itself is pejorative, 
regretful. What is an old revolution but a failed revolution? It implies a cause steeped in 
tradition, but one perhaps no longer clearly relevant. The ghost suggests both death and 
vacuousness, and the king seems to represent an antiquated notion of power. Youth is 
equated with an immature triumphal attitude, and the final two lines counter these ideals 
with horror and depression. We are left to contemplate the contrasting imagery of bodies 
being carried away and a singer who feels he must sing but cannot even pretend to do so 
with feeling.
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The next song on the same album finds Cohen in a more actively confrontational 
mode, as if he had finished contemplating the betrayal and had begun to consider its
implications. In the aptly named “The Butcher,” Cohen comes right to the fore with his 
verbal assault on God: “I came upon a butcher, / he was slaughtering a lamb, / I accused 
him there / with his tortured lamb.” It might be tempting to understand the butcher here 
as any unspecified murderer, were it not for the subsequent lines: “He said, ‘Listen to me, 
child, / I am what I am / and you, you are my only son’.” “I am what I am” seems like a 
reference to the common English translation of the name of God in Exodus 3.14, “I am 
that I am” (ehyeh asher ehyeh in Hebrew), but we must also read the line as a response to 
Cohen’s accusation of the butcher. Biblically, this line represents a pinnacle moment in 
the formation of the prototypical redemptive narrative of liberation from Egypt, in which 
the promise of God’s eternal presence is affirmed, but in Cohen’s incarnation the
presence becomes demonic. 
God’s response here is a guilty acknowledgment of complicity, coupled with a 
reminder of our own entanglement with God, our being the only hope for redemption as 
the “only son.” But Cohen cuts to the core of a related issue with the lines, “I saw some 
flowers growing up / where that lamb fell down; / was I supposed to praise my Lord, / 
make some kind of joyful sound?”150 What are we supposed to do, how are we supposed 
to act in the aftermath of the Shoah? Even the most beautiful things seem somehow 
tainted after the knowledge that the world has also produced atrocities like Auschwitz. 
How much more awful is it then to think that our only option if redemption is to take 
place, that is, if we continue to have faith in God, is to accept the Shoah’s role in that 
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scheme, to be joyful as the flowers grow out of the carcass of the lamb? And yet, the 
existence of Cohen’s music and poetry is a commentary on this in itself.
One of the richest examples of Cohen’s dealing with such themes, and going even 
further, is the song “The Night Comes On,” from the album Various Positions. The song 
features a similarly tragic father figure to “The Butcher,” but here we have a motherly 
voice as well. After Cohen’s admission of fear of “the thunder and the lightning,” and the 
worry that “I’ll never come through this alone,” we are told of the mother, “She said, ‘I’ll 
be with you, / my shawl wrapped around you, / my hand on your head when you go’.” 
This is the eternal promise of the Shekhina, the feminine aspect of God that shares in 
Israel’s suffering and exile. It is the promise of God’s perpetual presence. But the 
experience of the father presents a more troubling image: 
We were fighting in Egypt / when they signed this agreement / that nobody else 
had to die. / There was this terrible sound, / and my father went down, / with a 
terrible wound in his side. / He said, “Try to go on, / take my books, take my gun, 
/ remember, my son, how they lied.”151
There is much to unpack in these lines. The reference to fighting in Egypt 
suggests several interpretations. One way to view this is simply as a reference to the 
battles that took place in Egypt during World War Two. Perhaps the significance of this 
particular front, however, is the fact that Egypt was the Nazi gateway to British Palestine, 
where, if they had succeeded, they would have subjected the Jews there to the same fate 
Jews were meeting in Europe. So Egypt perhaps represents the only barrier to an even 
more total destruction of Jewry. 
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But “Egypt” contains meaning far beyond the military events of World War Two. 
It is the birthplace of the nation of Israel, the pressure cooker in which the Jewish people 
were formed, in which redemptive understanding was formed. And of course it was not 
only through physical strife, but also strong theological and spiritual conflict, that Israel 
was fashioned into a distinctive people and led to their exodus. Could this lend another 
layer of meaning to the notion of “fighting in Egypt”? 
But then “they signed the agreement / that nobody else had to die.” For our World 
War Two explanation this seems like excellent news, but we find these lines juxtaposed 
with the father’s death and a repetition of the word “terrible” – “There was this terrible 
sound, / and my father went down / with a terrible wound in his side.”152 Perhaps the 
news came too late, perhaps the chain of command was faulty in some way, or perhaps 
there was some kind of accident. After all, we are not directly told, “my father was shot,” 
or something comparably explicit. The death here is reminiscent of “The Captain,” 
another song from Various Positions, in which we are told, “Now the Captain he was 
dying, / but the Captain wasn’t hurt.”153
Is it possible that the deaths in these two instances, apparently without cause, are 
in fact a result of the “agreement”? If we can entertain the notion there seem to be at least 
two possible explanations. One is that the end of fighting allowed for a moment to take 
stock of the casualties and the theodical impediments that the Shoah presents, and that 
this kills the father, who might represent God, Jewish tradition, or both. Another is that 
the father is somehow killed by the end of the fighting itself, the totalizing resolution of 
competing views with an agreement that “nobody else had to die,” that is, the false belief 
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that we have somehow transcended the archaic past through reasonable agreements, 
treaties, and universal humanism. This echoes the sentiment that Cohen expresses in 
another song, “There is a War,” from the album, New Skin for the Old Ceremony, where 
he tells us that “there is a war between the ones who say there is a war / and the ones who 
say there isn’t.”154 And this second thesis appears vindicated in the father’s final 
directive: “Remember, my son, how they lied.”
But in the instruction a task emerges as we are told, “try to go on, / take my 
books, take my gun.” Cohen is echoing the Jewish imperative after the Shoah, we must 
try to go on but we must simultaneously “remember how they lied,” we must accept the 
lessons to be learned from the experience, no matter how blasphemous it seems to 
consider these lessons; we must rejoice in the flowers that grow from the tortured lamb. 
Going forward we have our fathers’ books – our textual tradition – and their guns – the 
various weapons with which they have fought, or acted within history. 
The inclusion of guns along with books is interesting for other reasons. It is 
another clue that the fight has not truly concluded with the signing of the agreement, for 
what is the use of guns if nobody else has to die? It could also be a reference to the 
political and military power that Jews established for themselves in the aftermath of the 
Shoah with the State of Israel. This development is, of course, the most obvious, and 
therefore the most explicitly problematic example of flowers emerging from the 
murdered lamb.
The desire to avoid making the choice between accepting a totalizing redemption 
that incorporates the Shoah and its lessons, on the one hand, and refusing to allow for the 
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possibility of meaning in the Shoah, thus denying belief in God as the promise of 
redemption, on the other, is understandable. It is expressed in Cohen’s commentary on 
the father’s dying words. “I’d like to pretend that my father was wrong,” he sings, “But 
you don’t want to lie, not to the young.”155 It seems important to be cognizant of the 
repetition of the word “lie.” In the first instance the father is telling us to remember how 
“they lied,” but now we are being cautioned – “you don’t want to lie” – particularly about 
what we say to children. 
There is a connection between these two lies. They are of a kind in that they both 
deceive the young and naïve, and that the deception is quite alluring. There is a reflexive 
desire to whitewash much of the gruesome reality of the Shoah when speaking about it to 
the young, and there are very good reasons for this sort of tact. How dare we rob them of 
their innocence, their chance to “think they are winning” like the protagonist of “The Old 
Revolution?” But our children will eventually be the inheritors of the tradition, of our 
fathers’ books and guns, and they will shape the Jewish tradition after we are gone. They 
must not be lied to, or else they too will be taken in by the lie of those who “signed the 
agreement” and say that there is no war.
Cohen’s warning against lying to the young does not in any way solve the 
contradictions above, but it makes an important, related point about how we must 
approach the subject. Cohen sings of an overwhelming urge to recede into a calmness
that he equates with the figure of a woman, be it a mother or a lover. The solace he finds 
in the feminine embrace allows him to temporarily forget the troubles which he has 
connected with his father, to lose himself in a feeling of distance and otherworldliness. 
This urge appears several times throughout the song, and there is usually some sort of 
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counterbalancing rebuke that follows. Often, these sentiments begin with the lines “And 
the night comes on, / It’s very calm.” In the first instance he continues, “I wanted the 
night to go on and on,” but the mother figure admonishes him: “But she said, ‘Go back to 
the world.’”156 It is the recurring emphasis on returning to the world that seems closest to 
any definitive conclusion in the song. The first two lines repeat again, just before the line 
about wanting to believe that the father was wrong – denial, another evasive possibility. 
The theme of returning to the world reemerges as a response to his admission of 
guilt about wanting a way out: “I needed so much / to have nothing to touch, / I’ve 
always been greedy that way.” But here the response comes from children: “But my son 
and my daughter / climbed out of the water, / crying ‘Papa, you promised to play!’ / And 
they lead me away, / to the great surprise, / it’s ‘Papa, don’t peek, / Papa, cover your 
eyes!’ / And they hide, they hide in the world.” There is a certain contrast with Cohen’s 
earlier concern for the young. We are reminded that, while we have responsibilities as to 
how we teach children about history, there is also a playful obliviousness to suffering that 
has its own merit, and that children teach us something important about how we might 
overcome the gravity of certain issues, at least for a time. Like Cohen the children are 
hiding, but rather than in some transcendent elsewhere they hide in the world. It is 
Cohen’s obligations to his children that force him to overcome his need “to have nothing 
to touch.” 
While Cohen certainly does not provide answers, he stands as an unequivocal 
advocate of persistence, of returning to the world. And on this point we can return to 
where we began and find the Book of Esther in agreement. Though, as we have seen, the 
experiences are comparable only to a point, Esther and Mordechai, along with Cohen, are 
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struggling to maintain a semblance of their tradition in dire circumstances. They are 
desperately attempting to preserve the remnants of their faith, to pass along their Judaism 
to the next generation. 
If we view the Book of Esther as a kind response to the aftermath of a catastrophe 
– the destruction of Judah and dispersal of the Jews – perhaps new layers of meaning will 
open up for us. Maybe the case is not that Mordechai expresses his Godless faith with 
youthful naïveté, but that he does so with full realization of how perilous his situation is, 
and with a stubborn refusal to embrace a lofty emptiness and give up on the world. In this 
scenario the salvation of the Jews and defeat of Haman and his cohorts is not an ultimate 
redemption but one of many skirmishes along an uncertain path. His faith exists and 
becomes all the more relevant in the face of danger, but it does not constitute an appeal to 
comprehensive redemptive modes that ignore the facts on the ground. It remains fully in 
the world, and it consists of striving with all of his being to protect what he can. Together 
with Cohen he might sing:
Through the days of shame that are coming, / through the nights of wild distress;
/  Though your promise count for nothing, / you must keep it nonetheless. / You 
must keep it for the captain / whose ship has not been built, / for the mother in 
confusion, / her cradle still unfilled.157
ળ
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Gold and Glass:
Ethical Rupture in Mystical Union?
When I maintain an ethical relation I refuse to recognize the role I would play in 
a drama of which I would not be the author or whose outcome another would 
know before me; I refuse to figure in a drama of salvation or of damnation that 
would be enacted in spite of me and that would make game of me.
– Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity. 79
Dissonance-Reduction and Rubenstein’s Problem
In his book, After Auschwitz, Richard L. Rubenstein offers a fascinating critique 
of Western thought with the Shoah as his point of departure. He finds in Christianity an 
overwhelming urge for “wholeness,”158 for what we have elsewhere called totalizing
thinking (not to be confused with Yoram Hazony’s “totalist fantasy), or what Emmanuel 
Levinas calls totality. The urge pushes one to employ “dissonance-reduction,” a term 
Rubenstein borrows from psychology. Dissonance-reduction is the attempt to smooth 
over difference in order to maintain the structural integrity of overarching narratives or 
explanations. Rubenstein places anti-Semitism within this framework, understanding the 
Jews’ special relationship to Christianity – that is, the uniqueness of the Jewish threat to 
the Western world –different from ordinary xenophobia in that it speaks from the inside. 
Judaism speaks from within Western culture, utilizes its terms and symbols, and 
comes not only from a shared mythical past but one in which the Jews seem to retain a 
secret disconfirming knowledge. “Thus,” Rubenstein tells us, “by virtue of (a) the radical 
asymmetry between the Christian claim that Jesus is the Savior of humanity and the 
Jewish insistence on his fallible humanity and (b) the dissonance-reducing strategies 
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employed by Christianity,” the Jews find themselves constantly under threat from a more 
powerful rival.159
Rubenstein finds this equally in classical Christendom as in the post-
Enlightenment Western world, if not more so in the case of the latter. The emancipation 
of European Jewry, for Rubenstein, was itself an exercise in totality that “did away with 
official recognition of very real differences in tradition, culture, and function.” This 
coincided with the rise of the Hegelian “civil society,” in which “a condition of universal 
otherhood displaced a society with some measure of brotherhood, however tenuous 
[emphasis mine].” Here the groundwork is laid for a more comprehensive totalizing 
process, and perhaps the flux and uncertainty that resulted from the transition even served 
to increase the urge to eliminate the threat of difference. The move from “brotherhood” to 
“otherhood” also marked a significant shift in societal structure. The Jew could now 
become a neighbor precisely because society had become a neighborhood of strangers.160
Whereas difference was once relatively tolerated, and violence against Jews was 
more or less confined to the brutish minority, absolute totality had now acquired a 
rational grounding in the structure of society itself. The change that allowed for the 
Shoah, then, was a move from the emotional anti-Semitism of the pogrom to the rational 
anti-Semitism of Hitler and others in the modern age.161 With this in mind, along with 
reference to other realities of the modern world, Rubenstein seems to answer his own 
question: if “total, physical elimination of the most significant source of potential 
disconfirmation has been a perennial temptation in Christendom…. why [did] that 





temptation […] not become official policy until the infamous Wannsee Conference of 
January 20, 1942”?162
Rubenstein concludes that the Shoah was an inevitable result of the direction of 
Western civilization, and that the progress that has been made in the past few centuries –
technological advancement along with political, social, and economic restructuring – only
served to foster a more widely sanctioned and devastatingly effective form of dissonance-
reduction. It is in this context that we can begin to understand Rubenstein’s provocative 
thesis:
…the relative silence on the subject [of genocide] stems from the inability of 
scholars, religious leaders, and the general public to face the fact that, far from 
being a relapse into barbarism or an atypical “episode,” genocide is an intrinsic 
expression of modern civilization as we know it. Put differently, the genocidal 
destructiveness of our era can best be understood as an expression of some of its 
“most significant political, moral, religious and demographic tendencies.”163
But while it may be cathartic to continue in this vein, to thoroughly chart the flaws and 
hypocrisies of Western civilization, it will serve our purposes well enough to simply 
acknowledge the problem that Rubenstein presents. As Jews living in the aftermath of the 
Shoah, we cannot extricate ourselves from the depths of our trauma by simply 
cataloguing the reasons and analyzing the rationale of the perpetrators. The above 
arguments would cause us little concern if they did not continue to threaten us personally, 
if they did not continue to exercise their grasp upon the viability of a Jewish future. They 
would not be so problematic if we did not also find something of ourselves in them.
In his study of these Western tendencies Rubenstein makes reference to the fact 
that the urge underlying totality is experienced in the Jewish tradition as well. “In fairness 
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to the Church,” he writes, “it must be stated that the Synagogue has an analogous 
goal.”164 And he follows the line of thought through when he tells us that “faith in a 
transcendent God is… rendered problematic by the promise of redemption itself.”165 Is 
not the thinking behind a belief in a God who redeems, of a world which will become 
complete, at the center of the genocidal project of which the Jews were victim? If 
Judaism is to survive the Shoah, must it not instead emphasize the notions of ruptured 
redemption that the Nazis found so threatening, or else become complicit in the Shoah 
itself by perpetuating totality? For Rubenstein, the continuation of Jewish existence in 
light of this dilemma requires a rejection of so-called normative Judaism, traditional 
theodicy, the God of History, and the ideas of covenant and election. 
Zachary Braiterman, in (God) After Auschwitz, restates Rubenstein’s argument 
succinctly: “To posit a just and omnipotent God covenanted to Israel and active in its 
affairs could only mean that God justly willed the murder of six million Jewish 
people.”166 Rubenstein responded to this problem by variously embracing Buddhism, 
what he termed “Greek” or “pagan” thought, and Gershom Scholem’s interpretation of a 
fundamentally antinomian Lurianic Kabbalah. While Rubenstein’s contributions to the 
study of post-Shoah theology through his radically anti-theodical stance should not be 
minimized, Braiterman reminds us that many of his conclusions rest on his misreading of 
much of the Jewish textual tradition, that he “bought his radicalism at the price of 
ignoring antitheodicy from the canon.”167
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What Rubenstein is describing by the term dissonance-reduction, and what 
Braiterman means by theodicy, share something in common with the phenomena that we 
have labeled triumphal, dominating, totalizing, progressive, or culminating modes of 
redemptive thought. These are all modes of bypassing the obligation that stems from an 
awareness of suffering in the other, thereby jeopardizing the precarious foundation that 
ethical encounter must be based upon. What Rubenstein has rightly highlighted is that the 
Shoah required such narratives to not only justify crimes in retrospect but, more 
significantly, to justify crimes before they were committed by appealing to something 
outside of the relationship of encounter. Therefore, it places all sources from which such 
thinking springs under suspicion. 
Where Braiterman criticizes Rubenstein, and here I would agree, is in his 
conclusion that there are no alternative modes of redemptive thought in Judaism itself. In 
chapters two and three of this study we discussed some of the examples that, although not 
necessarily obviously so, contain critiques similar to Rubenstein’s own within Jewish 
understandings of redemption. These critiques include what Braiterman calls antitheodicy 
as well as that which Rubenstein has searched for in other traditions, or in “antinomian” 
Judaism.
If we consider some of the instances of Jewish thought we have discussed, the 
Korach narrative, Tractate Sanhedrin, and the Mithnagdic movement, for example, we 
can argue, as Zachary Braiterman has, that Rubenstein too rashly reaches the conclusion 
that Judaism is untenable.168 While we agree that Rubenstein was an important player in 
the re-visioning of Jewish tradition after the Shoah, we are not required to accept the 
premise that the existence of theodicy in the Jewish tradition spells the end of Judaism’s 
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relevance. At the same time we can understand and sympathize with his intolerance “of 
the men and women… who could not or would not understand the difficulties involved in 
affirming the traditional God of covenant and election after Auschwitz,”169 and his 
attempts to “disorient modern Judaism.”170 But though we do not necessarily reject 
Rubenstein’s interpretations as being without value, we must acknowledge that his 
presentation does an injustice to the richness and complexity of the tradition that he 
deplores. 
I maintain that Jewish tradition, which includes so many facets, does in fact 
contain the necessary conditions for us to address the problems posed by the Shoah, and 
that much of the most important work that has been done in articulating the Jewish 
position after the Shoah is influenced by certain trends from within that tradition. To 
consider this argument we must look at material from both before the Shoah and after. In 
this chapter, then, we will be comparing the work of post-Shoah Jewish philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas to certain strains of kabbalistic thought. We will discuss the 
significance of Levinas’s focus on the problems of totality and the relevance of the 
kabbalistic trends he chooses to emphasize for Jewish thought after the Shoah.
ળ
The Violence of Union: Levinas’s Critique of Mysticism
Comparing Levinas’s thought with that of medieval kabbalists seems at first 
glance to be a misguided task given Levinas’s stated antipathy toward “mysticism.” But 
Oona Eisenstadt, in Driven Back to the Text, explains that if we consider the nature of 
Levinas’s objection to mysticism, and if we carefully parse some of the different strains 
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of Jewish mysticism, there are some significant affinities between Levinasian concerns 
and those of certain mystics and mystical schools. Levinas’s criticism of mysticism is 
itself quite pertinent to our larger discussion, and it will in fact become a launching pad 
for our exploration of kabbalistic motifs in Levinas’s thought. Eisenstadt finds in Levinas 
two related concerns regarding mysticism and mystical union in particular. The first is 
that “such a desire cannot ground an ethics for it takes the mystic away from her fellows 
in an attempt at lone ascent.”171 For Levinas transcendence cannot include annihilation, 
that is, complete union with God, because it would lose its “as-for-me,” its capacity to 
live out the experience as a being in distinction and relation to others. A mysticism that 
removes one from her community, cutting off the possibility of a dialogical ethics, then, 
seems antithetical to a Levinasian perspective. This discussion is reminiscent of Leonard 
Cohen’s desire for “the night to go on and on.” Here we would find Levinas in agreement 
with the injunction to “go back to the world.”
Levinas’s second concern is broader, but it speaks even more to the problems with 
transcendence that we found with Rubenstein. Eisenstadt explains the criticism: 
The desire for mystical union is a desire for violence, an attempt to make a 
totality encompassing God or to throw oneself into a totality made by God…. [it] 
implies an understanding disposed or habituated to totalization; the mystic will 
focus always on what is common or participatory and ignore difference.172
Such a union is violent in that it willfully ignores difference in favor of totality, be it a 
human projection that contains God or a simple acquiescence to cosmic oneness. 
Rubenstein would have certainly labeled this as a form of dissonance-reduction. Not only 
                                                          
171 Eisenstadt, Oona. Driven Back to the Text: The Premodern Sources of Levinas’s Postmodernism. 140
Pittsburgh, Pa. : Duquesne University Press, c2001
172 Ibid. 141
119
does it remove one from all communal and relational space, but it actively embraces a 
wholeness that cannot allow for particularity. Thus, the desire for mystical union appears 
as a sort of reversal of Levinasian ethics in a two-step movement. It precludes the 
possibility of encounter just as it implies a sort of domination of the differentiated Other.
Modern Kabbalah scholarship has engaged with this problem, and it has more or 
less followed the conclusions of Gershom Scholem, who maintained that Jewish 
mysticism differed from other forms of mysticism in that it was overwhelmingly in 
opposition to the sort of union described above, ascribing to it instead a uniquely 
intellectual flavor. If this were the case, Levinas’s criticism would be a moot point.
Oona Eisenstadt presents us with a somewhat different picture, however, 
explaining that the debate on the issue of union “revolves around the meaning of two 
words: devekut (usually translated ‘cleaving’) and yichud (usually translated ‘identity’ or 
‘union’).” Devekut, the more common of the two, seems distinct in meaning from yichud, 
more prevalent in Hasidic texts, where it does indeed seem to suggest annihilation of the 
self. And she reminds us that “the existence of two words implies the existence of a
distinction.”173 The existence of a distinction means furthermore, for Eisenstadt, that at 
least in terms of pre-Hasidic mysticism there is a sense of unity that maintains a 
distinction between God and the human being. This allows, in the words of Edward 
Caird, for a “vivid consciousness of moral obligation as involved in the worship of 
God.”174
In drawing this conclusion Eisenstadt draws upon the analysis of Moshe Idel, who 
argues that descriptions of union occur just as frequently in kabbalistic literature as in 




non-Jewish mystical sources,175 but that even as the mystic interlocks herself with 
divinity she maintains a basic distinction. He points to a mystical source that equates the 
‘cleaving’ of devekut with the joining together of two palm dates in an interlocking 
fashion. He concludes that “cleaving is a closer kind of contact than ‘attaching,’ as 
exemplified by the contact of a bracelet with a woman’s arm,”176 but not that it is 
annihilating. Elsewhere, he tells us, devekut is compared to a sexual union.177 With these 
examples he presents a picture of cleaving that is in fact a rather intimate unitive 
experience, but which does not allow for one to lose herself entirely in this union. 
As Eisenstadt shows us, such distinction allows for the possibility of affinities 
between kabbalistic union and Levinasian ethics. These affinitive possibilities comes into 
even sharper focus as we consider the unitive aspects of Levinas’s own dialogical notions 
of ethical relation. Eisenstadt explains that in the same section of Levinas’s Totality and 
Infinity where we found examples of his concern for the ‘as-for-me,’ “Levinas is 
overwhelmingly concerned to establish separation as the ground of relation,” and that he 
uses language in this section that “is bent to the support of autonomy even to the point of 
atheism.” 
But, Eisenstadt explains, we find later in Totality and Infinity, and throughout the 
subsequent Otherwise Than Being that this autonomy “is a good thing only if it exists as 
the ground for relation with others, atheism a good thing as the ground for relation with 
illeity, and, most pertinently, ‘as-for-me’ a good thing only as the ground for hineni.”178
Hineni, Moses’ response during his encounter with the burning bush in Exodus 3, usually 
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translated as “here I am,” is for Levinas an “‘I am you’ that retains within it a prior as-
for-me,” as in Paul Celan’s “I am you if I am I.”179
So Levinas and the kabbalists are both concerned with a kind of union, but in 
Levinas there is a wariness of the totalizing annihilation of a certain type of union. He is 
also wary of the misuse of his terms for totalizing purposes. Eisenstadt says that his 
criticism of Kabbalah and mysticism can be explained by this wariness, and she suggests 
that it may be the result of Mithnagdic influences.180 “There are reasons for the fact that 
the Kabbalah is an esoteric tradition,” Eisenstadt proposes, explaining that “these reasons 
guide Levinas to occult the kabbalistic images in his own text and to protect them under a 
layer of antimystical argument.”181
The assertion that “Levinasian relation is precisely parallel with mystical union,” 
however, is still not so easily defensible. What remains to be seen is whether there are 
ways of thinking in Jewish mysticism that also incorporate the wariness of complete 
union that exists in Levinas’s thought. Eisenstadt lays out the three criteria that mystical 
union would have to meet in order to be satisfactory to a Levinasian. First, “in its 
epiphany it must provide access not to an ultimate coherence but to an ultimate 
incoherence [emphasis mine].” The revelatory moment that comes with any unitive 
experience must not smooth over difference with sameness. Instead, it must “exist as an 
anarchy destroying all categories or samenesses.” 
Second, the anarchy “must be understood not as arbitrary but as ethical.”182 Here 
Moshe Idel may be able to assuage our concerns somewhat, at least as to the point about 






ethics. He tells us that “although devekut is a preeminently personal experience,” in some 
instances “it serves [...] as an opening toward an other-oriented action.”183 While 
complete mystical union remains the individualistic, private affair that Levinas deplores, 
in certain cases union can serve as a sort of conduit which leads the mystic back to her 
community. 
Eisenstadt calls her third criterion “an aontological conception in which mystical 
images refer not to other places or times but to human experience in relation.” She 
explains that this means that “the ‘vertical’ must be understood as happening in the 
world, in the ‘horizontal’, in the face or the speech of the other.” The mystical experience 
cannot point us outside of relation, the horizontal that is experience right in front of us, in 
the person of the Other. 
If all of these criteria are met, Eisenstadt tells us, “then we are closer to being able 
to claim that Levinas has absorbed the insights of these texts.”184 We will then be closer 
to our own task, which is to map out a conceptual continuity between kabbalistic relation 
to God and the Other, which for us represents one possible type of Jewish experience 
before the Shoah, and the Levinasian relation, which represents a glimmer of Jewish 
possibility that emerges after Auschwitz. Our first point of inquiry will be with Abraham 
Abulafia,185 the thirteenth century mystic, who Eisenstadt calls “the first great kabbalist 
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of rupture,” explaining that “it is Abulafia, more than any other mystic, who holds that 
the route to God is the breaking of the divine name rather than its reconstitution.”186
It should come as little surprise that the acts of rupture we will discuss take place
within text and speech. In chapter two, for example in the Cain and Abel narrative, we 
discussed the power contained by speech. And throughout this study we have focused 
almost exclusively on texts – biblical, Talmudic, and otherwise. In at least one example, 
that of Leonard Cohen, a significant aspect of expression was the spoken or sung word, 
and we have briefly discussed the importance of the “oral Torah” in the rabbinic 
additions of midrash and Talmudic commentaries. “Word,” in the Jewish understanding, 
is connected with action and power in both text and speech, containing within it the 
creative and destructive possibility. It is perhaps the most basic expression of power, 
from which all others spring. In this chapter we will find text and speech representing 
God, the world, and moral obligation. That the thinkers discussed here express their ideas 
in terms of various approaches to the oral and written word, between which we will soon 
discuss an important distinction, is therefore no coincidence.
ળ
Abraham Abulafia and the Breaking of the Names
We will be employing many of the arguments that Eisenstadt makes in the third 
chapter of Driven Back to the Text, “The Kabbalah and Deconstruction,” the first half of 
which is primarily a comparison between Levinas and Abulafia. The second half 
compares Levinas with concepts associated with Isaac Luria (1534-1572 AD), who seems 
to have much in common with Levinas, particularly in his concern for ethics, and 
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arguably represents a much more “mainstream” trend in Jewish mysticism. For our own 
investigation, however, it will be more beneficial to use Isaac Luria as a point of contrast 
with Abulafia, and we will not explore Lurianic ideas with the thoroughness they 
deserve. Instead, we will move from Abraham Abulafia (1240-1291 AD) to another 
mystic, Bachya Ben Asher (c.1250-1340 AD). 
Eisenstadt finds easily in Abulafia two of her criteria, or “marks,” for an affinity 
with Levinas. They are the first and third as we discussed them above: union as rupture, 
and the transcendent “vertical” existing on the “horizontal,” respectively. The second 
“mark,” however, is more problematic. This is the concern for ethics, the necessity that 
rupture be understood as having ethical implications. We will return to the problem of 
ethics, but we will begin by laying out the relative commonalities between Levinas and 
Abulafia not only to better understand the import of their positions and what they might 
tell us about the Jewish future, but also to equip ourselves to move toward the 
complicated question of ethics in Abulafia.
The most obvious place to begin is with Abulafia’s letter combinations, or 
breaking down of the Name. Idel tells us that “this technique of breaking-down or 
atomizing the Name is the most distinctive characteristic of Abulafia’s technique.”187
This is a practice whereby Abulafia takes the letters of a name of God, usually the 
seventy-letter name or the Tetragrammaton and combines them, through writing and 
pronunciation, in various permutations with other letters of the alphabet and with every 
possible vowel. 
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In Or ha-Sekel, for example, he lays out the practice with the Tetragrammaton. 
Thus, he begins with letters Aleph (  )א and Yud (י), the first letter of the alphabet and the 
first letter of the Tetragrammaton, respectively. Using tables he pairs them together and 
adds different combinations of vowels, so that the first line of permutations, for example, 
would sound like “oyo, oya, oyei, oyee, oyu” and the next corresponding line, with the 
letters switched, would sound like “yo’o, yo’a, yo’ei, yo’ee, yo’u,” etcetera.188
In order to make sense of this strange practice we must look at the understanding 
which underlies it. We must comprehend Abulafia’s vision of the world in which his 
combinations are being performed. Idel explains that the Kabbalah of Abulafia was
representative of the ecstatic school, distinguished from the so-called theosophical-
theurgic school of Jewish mystics in Catalan and Castile, which were characterized by an 
emphasis on the theurgical aspect of mitzvot (performance of commandments), 
speculation about the En Sof (Infinite; without-end) and the ten sefirot (the revealed 
aspects of the Infinite), exegesis which focused on symbolism, and an emphasis on
community.189
In contrast, Abulafia’s system, which he called prophetic Kabbalah or the 
Kabbalah of Names, ignores traditional ideas about mitzvot, halachah, and the theurgical 
notion that the Kabbalist can and should positively alter the world of the sefirot. He 
advocates, as an alternative sort of mitzvah practice, his techniques of letter combination, 
pronunciation of the Divine Names, breathing, singing, and head movements.190 Abulafia 
deplored sefirotic speculation, accusing some of his most prominent rivals of heresy, and 
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of “being worse than Christians” by dividing God into ten rather than three.191 And 
Abulafia’s stance toward community could not be more divergent. Idel writes that 
“Abulafia, more than any other Kabbalist who preceded him, stressed the need for 
isolation in order to achieve prophetic ecstasy.”192
Eisenstadt, in a discussion of Isaac Luria, reminds us of the kabbalistic dictum 
that “there are two kinds of evils: the separation of what should have been joined and the 
joining of what should have been separate.” She describes the former as the nature of 
ordinary crime – murder, theft, etc. – and the latter as the more severe, “the crime of 
magic,” of Levinasian totalities that link things together, “blending them and imposing a 
false order onto them.” 193
One culprit of the second crime, for Levinas, and for Abuliafia too, would be 
those trends that find their widest audience in modern Hasidic interpretations of Lurianic 
symbols that “strive for the annihilation of alterity and autonomy in the oneness of 
everything with God.” In fairness to Luria, his own case and that of his more immediate 
followers is more complex. Even so, Eisenstadt finds something suspect in Luria in that 
his “analysis of wholeness… involves the idea of ordered differentiation as the human 
good,” as opposed to Levinas’s contention that “the idea of rupture” represents the human 
good, and she accuses Luria of possibly “harbouring a nostalgia for wholeness.”194
This disdain for certain kabbalists, or kabbalistic ideas, is one that Levinas seems 
to share with Abulafia, and it may help us to better understand Abulafia’s criticisms of 
other kabbalists of his time. What he seems to be rebelling against is the striving for 
                                                          
191 Idel, Moshe. The Mystical Experience in Abraham Abulafia. 8
192 Ibid. 9
193 Eisenstadt, Oona. Driven Back to the Text: The Premodern Sources of Levinas’s Postmodernism. 180
194 Ibid. 190
127
wholeness, for magic, and he presents an alternative to this in his rejection of symbolism, 
community, and sefirotic speculation, opting instead for an emphasis on rupture. “In 
Abulafia’s exercise,” Eisenstadt tells us, “the unbroken form of the name exists as a 
vessel for the broken name within it, a vessel that is unable to contain that powerful 
anarchy and is ruptured by it again and again.”195
Prophetic Kabbalah, or the Kabbalah of Names, then, encourages the mystic to 
tap into this anarchy, to cleave not to wholeness but to rupture and alterity, to affirm the
basic anarchy and un-contain-ability of the divine. For Abulafia as for Levinas, “the 
powerful form of the name is the broken form… the unbroken name pushes toward or 
conveys this brokenness; the unbroken name inscribes a momentum toward its own 
rupture.” Linguistic and textual deconstruction is therefore a participation in the divine 
process, perhaps more fundamentally, or on a higher level, than construction. 
ળ
To return for a moment to Eisenstadt’s marks of Levinasian affinity, we now see 
that Abulafia shares Levinas’s contempt for wholeness and upholds a similar principle of 
rupture, but what of the “vertical” and the “horizontal?” Is there in Abulafia a “vertical”
transcendence that is not subsumed within the realm of relation? It might appear so, given 
Abulafia’s insistence on solitariness, his skeptical attitude toward community, and his 
rejection of normative understandings of mitzvot, which traditionally speak to issues of 
social relation. But we will see, in fact, that not only does the Abulafian technique 
transform the vertical axis onto the horizontal, but that in doing so it lays the groundwork 
for an indication of a complicated, somewhat counterintuitive ethics.
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Let us consider a passage from Abulafia’s Sefer Hayyei ha-Olam ha-Ba, in which 
he instructs us with regard to the preparation for his technique:
And when thou feelest that thy heart is already warm and when thou seest that by 
combinations of letters thou canst grasp new things which by human tradition or 
by thyself thou wouldst not be able to know and when thou art thus prepared to 
receive the influx of divine power which flows into thee, then turn all thy true 
thought to imagine His name and His exalted angels in thy heart as if they were 
human beings sitting or standing about thee.196
The two requirements here are a warm heart and an understanding that one will be able to 
access knowledge that cannot be conveyed or deduced by humans. The first requirement 
suggests that one must approach the experience with a certain level of openness to 
communion. The second acknowledges that what is to follow is in fact transcendence, a 
seeming departure along the vertical axis. Together these make for a readiness for 
communion that is safeguarded from inappropriate blending through solitude and 
distinction.
The preparation is ultimately not simply for a journey along the vertical axis 
because, immediately after the mystics receives the “influx of divine power which flows 
into thee” she is directed to return to the horizontal. The technique concludes by guiding
her back to her worldly surroundings, now, presumably, with the ability to imagine the 
divine name and other celestial powers as “human beings sitting or standing about thee.” 
The Abulafian technique, then, appears to use textual and oral deconstruction to direct
one’s receptiveness to the divine power of rupture back into the world of the horizontal, 
perhaps as a sort of practice round for ethical behavior.
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We can rightly protest, of course, that there is an important distinction between an 
ethically oriented imagination and any sort of real action. Abulafia is certainly not 
forthcoming in how the distinction is meant to be bridged, if indeed it is. But for him it is 
clear that this imaginative step is a necessary prerequisite. It is the initial vertical step that 
allows for the possibility of an ethically and spiritually sound human interaction on the 
horizontal plane that does not commit the crime of magic.
Later in the same work, as Abulafia is describing the final stages of his 
technique, he writes, “Thy whole body will be seized by an extremely strong trembling, 
so that thou wilt think that surely thou art about to die, because thy soul, overjoyed with 
its knowledge, will leave thy body.” What seems devoid of ethics, though, becomes more 
intricate as we are then told to “consciously choose death,” that is, complete separation 
from the mundane, “and then thou shalt know that thou hast come far enough to receive 
the influx.”197 Again we find the two-step process, this time expressed in even clearer 
terms. In order to receive the influx of divine power one must first “choose death.” This 
points to how, for Abulafia, one might act ethically or theurgically in a way that is not 
profane, and it parallels another important affinity between Abulafia and Levinas.
Just as Levinas is “overwhelmingly concerned to establish separation as the 
ground of creation,” with his “as-for-me” as the first step in a process,198 so Abulafia 
seems to suggest a multi-step process for a more cautious sort of ethical behavior. Both 
Levinasian and Abulafian mystical practice, especially when translated into any sort of 
constructive action, follows what Eisenstadt refers to as a “threefold exercise,” in which, 
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subsequent to the initial rupture of totality, “they reassert the coherence of the unbroken 
form, allowing totality, in a sense, to triumph.”199
This is the case in that both Levinas and Abulafia ultimately present us with 
documents of relative coherence. These coherencies persist, in a necessary nod to the 
claims of social justice. They follow, then, a pattern of “text/ deconstruction
/reconstruction” or “totality/infinity/totality.”200 “But the important point,” Eisenstadt 
explains, “is that both retain, even in their reconstruction, the desire to stop in 
deconstruction,” that is, to enourage the instinct to either stop in rupture or to continually 
disrupt and question even those most compulsory totalistic constructions. This is what 
Levinas means when he reminds us that, as the messianic moment is inaugurated, God 
will hold his loins as though in labor “because in the just act there is still a violence that 
causes suffering. Even when the act is reasonable, when the act is just, it entails 
violence.”201 There is no point, for either Levinas or Abulafia, at which rupture is 
divorced from triumph.
Of course, there is no way to overcome the totalizing nature of any philosophical 
coherence. Eisenstadt explains that “one cannot come up with a new nonphilosophical 
philosophy; this would merely be a new coherence.”202 The only way to try to counter 
these constructions is to reluctantly reconstruct them from a position of rupture, to persist 
in a constant skepticism from a standpoint of “fertile social alienation.” The tentative 
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action “can only do its job because it arises from the incoherence of the deconstruction of 
the divine name and language in general.”203
Let us briefly note one more avenue that points to a possible Abulafian ethics –
his understanding of his practice as Kabbalah Nevu’it, or Prophetic Kabbalah. It is 
undeniable that Abulafia understood his practice as inherited from the prophetic tradition, 
and moreover that he understood himself and other practitioners as prophets. Abulafian 
prophecy, Eisenstadt tells us, “must involve a relation with one’s fellows.”204 Even so, 
with Levinas the connection between rupture and ethics is much more readily apparent 
than with Abulafia, and this will not be the last word on whether Abulafian theory or 
practice involves a non-ethical, vertical ascent. It remains difficult to disagree with both 
Idel and Eisenstadt that “Abulafia’s overwhelming concern is an ‘escapist’ groping for 
personal illumination… a concern that comes at the cost of reflection on the halachah
and brings about a ‘retreat from collective worship as the central and highest form of 
religious experience.’”205
ળ
Bachya Ben Asher: A Stream of Thoughts and Quiet Resting Places
We will now turn to R. Bachya ben Asher, who may be able to provide us with an 
alternative, or perhaps a complement, to what we find lacking or in need of clarification 
in Abulafia. Given the concerns that we have already laid out, R. Bachya will seem to fall 
disappointingly short on many of the counts where Abulafia shined as a radically 
deconstructive force. On the other hand, the ethics that we found somewhat lacking in 





Abulafia are much more obvious in R. Bachya, and we will even find in R. Bachya a 
clearer move from rupture to ethics. 
R. Bachya comes from the same theosophical-theurgic school of Castile and 
Catalan that we spoke of earlier, which maintained a very contentious relationship with 
Abulafia. In fact, it was R. Bachya’s teacher, Solomon ibn Adret (1235-1310 AD), “the 
major halachic figure of his generation,” who spoke out against Abulafia and 
excommunicated him from Barcelona.206 Idel speculates that this action suppressed 
Abulafia’s status and influence at least until the seventeenth century.207
But, as Idel also explains, R. Bachya’s Spain, Castile especially, was a “meeting 
point for all major trends within Kabbalah” at the end of the thirteenth century, and “such 
a massive encounter was unprecedented.”208 Idel suggests that this encounter must have 
influenced kabbalists’ perceptions of the nature of Kabbalah, engendering a noteworthy 
amount of creativity and innovation in contrast to the conservative tendencies of previous 
generations. It is no surprise, then, that R. Bachya inherited a kabbalistic hermeneutic 
similar in nature to the deconstructions of Abulafia, albeit not quite as radical. 
Bachya ben Asher’s deconstructive hermeneutic does not involve the complete 
breaking of the divine name through letter combination like that of Abulafia. Rather, his 
focus is on the Torah and his deconstruction keeps the words intact, emphasizing instead
the variability of the vowels and pronunciation therein. In his kabbalistic commentary on 
the Torah he writes:
The Scroll of the Torah is [written] without vowels, in order to enable man to 
interpret it however he wishes – as the consonants without the vowels bear 
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several interpretations and [may be] divided into several sparks. This is the 
reason why we do not write the vowels of the scroll of the Torah, for the 
significance of each word is in accordance with its vocalization, but when it is 
vocalized it has but one single significance; but without vowels man may 
interpret it [extrapolating from it] several [different] things, many, marvelous and 
sublime. 209 [clarifying notes appear in Idel’s text]
There are several clues here to R. Bachya’s conception of the world. Obviously he shares 
with Abulafia and Levinas the view that linguistic deconstruction leads to deeper 
understandings of scripture. But does it necessarily follow that he shares their outlook 
and understands divinity and the universe in terms of rupture? 
Perhaps his use of the imagery of sparks will help us to understand where his 
sentiments lie. Idel notes that the term “spark” is elsewhere used to refer to different 
aspects of the soul. What is particularly interesting here, though, is that in many 
kabbalistic motifs the division of sparks, which are divine emanations, corresponds to the 
origins of evil and suffering.210 Here the division of sparks is desirable and the practice 
that R. Bachya advocates is a sort of replication of this division. It seems, then, that just 
as in Abulafia, rupture is inherent in R. Bachya’s universe, that it is to be sought and 
imitated, and that the technique is presented as a part of the divine process. 
Furthermore, like Abulafia, R. Bachya seems concerned with the idea that the 
pronunciation of a word somehow falsely contains it, fixes it in place artificially. He 
seems aware of the totalizing nature of such a project. Just as with Abulafia’s 
understanding of the broken and unbroken names, R. Bachya sees the wonder of scripture 
in its flexibility, its multiple possibilities in contrast to the rigidity of a vocalized 
utterance. We might also guess that in his technique there will also be a similar three-
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stage process of totality/infinity/totality, in which, after breaking down the word through 
its possible meanings, the speaker, if she is to speak at all, must eventually choose a 
certain vocalization and thereby limit herself within a given totality. R. Bachya seems 
aware of this inevitability when he reminds us that “when it is vocalized it has but one 
single significance.”
Where R. Bachya’s technique begins to diverge from Abulafia is in the degree of 
coherent interpretation that remains possible. Whereas Abulafia destroys the structural 
integrity of the word by rearranging on the level of individual letters, R. Bachya 
maintains the basic integrity, allowing for variation in meaning only to a certain extent. 
Perhaps, like Luria, he may be guilty of “nostalgia for wholeness” by way of an “ordered 
differentiation.” But if R. Bachya does not go as far as Abulafia, and perhaps Levinas, 
would like, there is something to be said for the coherency he allows within his multiple 
meanings. 
Another important distinction in Bachya ben Asher is that while Abulafia focuses 
on the divine name, R. Bachya uses the entire Torah as the medium of his practice. The 
significance of this cannot be understated, for it is the distinction that allows for the 
possibility of a more flourishing and upfront ethical dimension in R. Bachya. The Torah, 
the basis of halachah, contains the 613 mitzvot, the ethical foundations of Judaism, which 
may in some cases differ slightly in precise meaning as various vowel choices are made, 
but still they remain relatively intact. R. Bachya can be seen in a certain light, then, as 
presenting an unlikely compromise between two rivals: the radical deconstructionist 
Abulafia and the halachic proponent Solomon ibn Adret. 
ળ
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Nowhere is the ethical dimension in R. Bachya’s thought more obvious than in his 
discourses for the masses, most notably those collected in his Kad ha-Kemah. In it we 
find discussed such themes as submissiveness, repentance, humility, peace, and explicit 
elaborations on mitzvot. Although R. Bachya is perhaps most well known for his 
kabbalistic commentary on the Torah, the discussions of the bible in Kad ha-Kemah are 
striking in their lack of kabbalistic concepts.211 This distinction in his works, the former 
for the “initiated” and the latter for the masses, speaks to his caution about discussing 
certain ideas openly. 
Charles B. Chavel tells us that R. Bachya was also a preacher, and that he began 
his career preaching in synagogues in Saragossa and possibly Barcelona. There, in 
seeming evidence of his character, he remained neutral to the struggle between the pro-
Maimonists and anti-Maimonists that raged around him.212 His capacity for tact and 
appropriateness, what Chavel calls his “awareness of the level of the audience he was 
addressing,” is certainly evident in the themes he chooses to leave out of his Kad ha-
Kemah, his discourses on the bible.213 R. Bachya himself spoke of this sort of discretion 
as stemming from Moses in his teachings about the Sabbath. R. Bachya writes:
The subject of the Sabbath contains esoteric matters which the Supreme One 
commanded Moses to reveal to individuals in Israel. Thus, Scripture begins [the 
subject of the Sabbath], And thou [Moses], speak unto the children of Israel, i.e., 
inform them of the overt and mystical aspects of the Sabbath. However, Moses 
made no mention of the mystical higher allusions of the Sabbath, for he spoke to 
all the men and women of the entire congregation of Israel. Therefore, he 
concealed the esoteric aspects of the Sabbath and spoke only briefly of its overt 
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matters. From here we have clear proof that one should not reveal and expound 
mystical matters in public.214 [clarifying notes appear in Chavel’s text]
It seems that in Kad ha-Kemah, R. Bachya takes this responsibility to heart, and 
he does not overtly discuss mystical matters in his discourses to “the children of Israel.” 
But one might hope that these discourses would still reflect R. Bachya’s outlook as it is 
expressed in his more esoteric commentaries, if in somewhat occulted forms. For this 
reason some of the statements we find in Kad ha-Kemah appear highly problematic. For 
example, in a discussion of the unity of God, we find statements with a blatantly
totalizing tone. “In the Messianic era,” R. Bachya writes, “many of the kingdoms will be 
abolished and all creeds will turn to the One Faith. The world will exist in perfection 
under the Kingdom of G-d…”215
Given what we know about R. Bachya, or admittedly what we perhaps wish to 
project onto him, it is difficult to forgive such proclamations or to excuse them on the 
grounds of appropriateness and tact. Perhaps we can understand this as R. Bachya’s 
attempt at constructing the second totality in the totality/infinity/totality movement, but 
we cannot easily overcome the criticisms that he presents the totality too strongly, that he 
does not articulate enough of the desire to stop within rupture or to continue to critique 
the totality with rupture. Neither does it seem satisfactory that R. Bachya tells us he is 
seeking to provide a generation “who are tired of the exile and grief” with “a stream of 
thoughts / and quiet resting places [Isaiah 32.18]” that are, Chavel explains, “a source of 
learning and comfort.”216
                                                          





Still, Kad he-Kemah is not without interesting and subtle attempts to convey a 
universe and an ethics grounded in rupture, and some of these attempts are fascinating 
and noteworthy. One such instance takes place within a discussion of the Song of Songs. 
R. Bachya quotes Song of Songs 2.9: “My beloved is like a gazelle or a young hart; 
behold, this One standeth behind our wall, He looketh in through the windows, He 
peereth though the lattice.”217 With this verse R. Bachya affirms both divine alienation 
and divine involvement. He points out the use of the third person to refer to God at first: 
Note that Solomon began the verse in the third person, saying My beloved is like, 
not “You are like,” but he continued in the second person, saying this One 
standeth,218 not ‘He standeth.’ This teaches us that while G-d, Who is compared 
to the beloved, can be found [by him that seeks Him] and is near to the heart, He 
is nevertheless remote from [mortal] perception, as the poet219 expressed it, “He 
is extremely far from the heaven of heavens and yet extremely near to me.”220
[clarifying notes appear in Chavel’s text]
Earlier we discussed Eisenstadt’s conception of the movement totality/infinity/totality as 
the Levinasian expression of rupture, which we might also term immanence/
separation/immanence with regard to the specific issue of divine propinquity. But here, if 
we apply R. Bachya’s grammatical eye to the verse we seem to have a case of 
separation/immanence/separation in accordance with “my beloved”/ “this One standeth” / 
“He looketh… He peereth.”
But this becomes even more complex as R. Bachya proceeds beyond grammar to 
discuss other aspects of the text. He begins with the phrase “this One standeth behind our 
wall.” “Were it not for this intervening wall,” he says, “we could say, Behold, this is our 
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G-d [Isaiah 25.9], and as Scripture explicitly states, But your iniquities have separated 
between you and your G-d [Isaiah 59.2]. Solomon is teaching us that the wall 
notwithstanding, G-d still watches from the windows of the heavens and peereth through 
the lattice of the Throne of Glory.”221
R. Bachya explains that the verse refutes the notion that God’s separation is due 
to sin, that the rupture is somehow unnatural. Rather, the existence of a wall implies that 
such rupture is precisely the nature of our relationship with God. Furthermore, the fact 
that God looketh through the windows and peereth through the lattice precludes the 
suggestion that God is unconcerned with the “lower world.” R. Bachya understands this 
“double expression” as an allusion to personal and general providence.222
If we turn again to the separation/immanence/separation outline and apply this 
new aspect of R. Bachya’s commentary it seems that we have something closer to a 
separation/separation-in-immanence/immanence-in-separation-(twice), which in 
Levinasian terms would look like infinity/infinity-in-totality/totality-in-infinity-(twice). 
This is before we consider other possible layers such as the significance of the terms 
“beloved,” “gazelle,” “young hart,” and “behold.” Moreover, if we were to apply R. 
Bachya’s vocalization techniques we might find even more complex layers of meaning. 
For example, through vowel manipulation we might be able to play with the temporal 
tenses, creating combinations of past, present, future, and progressive. 
ળ
Of course R. Bachya only lays the foundation here for this kind of exegesis, but 
this is perhaps what is meant when he says he is concerned with providing us with “a 




stream of thoughts.” While the extent of R. Bachya’s desire to stop in rupture is perhaps 
still suspect, it seems clear at the very least that even in his discourses for the masses he 
is not content to stop in totality. This is also reflected in the fact that he, like Abulafia, 
does not take action lightly. 
In a discourse in Kad ha-Kemah on purity of heart, R. Bachya explains the 
comparisons of the Torah to both gold and glass. The Torah is compared thusly, he tells 
us, “because like gold, its words are difficult to attain and like glass, it is easily lost 
[Chavel: if not constantly guarded against forgetfulness].” As we have seen, exegesis is 
rarely a straightforward, simple, or easy process. R. Bachya is here reminding us of the 
difficulty in fully understanding Torah, or of retaining what we have understood. If Torah 
is to inform our ethical actions, must we not act with extreme caution and tentativeness if 
the meanings of Torah are so elusive?
R. Bachya then quotes R. Akiba: “‘The words of the Torah are compared to glass 
to teach you that just as glass is transparent, so a scholar should reveal in his speech 
whatever is in his heart.” It is here that R. Bachya begins to make the ethical connection 
between the rupture of mystical experience and ethical action that was so difficult in 
Abulafia. Along with the prudence of humility described above, positive actions must 
make the mystical experience – in this case, of studying Torah – as transparent as glass, 
there should be no obscurity between these two aspects. 
R. Bachya then applies the metaphor of gold to make a similar point: “Similarly, 
it is written of the Ark of the Covenant, And thou shalt overlay it with pure gold, within 
and without shalt thou overlay it [Exodus 25.11].”223 If one is to simply cultivate the 
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solitary mystical experience – that is, to overlay one’s insides with gold – but not do the 
same for outward interactions, then one has not fulfilled the covenant.
And R. Bachya has other advice in this regard. Citing Deuteronomy 23.10, “And 
thou shalt keep thee from every evil thing,” he tells us to be on guard against “sinful 
thoughts during the day in order to avoid impurity at night.” In other words, if we are 
exceedingly careful when we are conscious of our actions, the cultivation of such 
heedfulness will extend to those moments when we are less vigilant. He quotes R. 
Pinchas ben Ya’ir in this vein: “Heedfulness leads to alertness, alertness leads to 
cleanliness, cleanliness leads to restraint, restraint leads to purity, purity leads to holiness, 
holiness leads to fear of sin, fear of sin leads to humility, humility leads to saintliness, 
saintliness leads to the gift of the Holy Spirit, as it is said, Then Thou spokest in vision to 
Thy saintly ones [Psalms 89.20].”224 R. Bachya explains that the first five characteristics 
are “spiritual,” that is, they are cultivated in relative isolation, and he implies that the 
second five are physically oriented in that they correspond to ethical action. The 
culmination of these perfections – to be one of God’s “saintly ones” to whom God speaks 
in visions – corresponds with Abulafian prophecy.
We can even find in the discourse hints of a Levinasian relation to the Other. 
Elaborating on the insight of R. Pinchas, R. Bachya quotes Tractate Yebamoth: “Sanctify 
yourself with that which is permissible to you [Yebamoth 20 a],” that is, abstain even 
from things to which you are allowed. Such a “fear of sin,” which, as we have been told, 
leads to humility, will cause one to “not only avoid speaking about others, but [to] refrain 
from retorting even if others speak evil of him.” The cultivation of such humble 
tendencies will in turn lead to saintliness, wherein one “will also tend to overlook his 
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precise rights in his dealings with other people and will act liberally beyond strict legal 
requirement.”225 R. Bachya is advocating something quite similar to Levinasian ethics in 
which one must relate to the Other with an understanding of an inherent imbalance which 
favors the Other as the fundamental characteristic of ethical relation.
ળ
Conclusion: Philosophy and the Shadow of Skepticism
It would be disingenuous to conclude by upholding Abraham Abulafia, Bachya 
ben Asher, Solomon ibn Adret, or Isaac Luria as the definitive exemplar of the Judaism 
we require as we attempt to articulate a Jewish future. The fact is that each of these 
figures was speaking from within, and to, his generation. And while there are certainly 
similarities in their experiences and our own, their concerns are ultimately not strictly 
congruent with ours. Instead, what we must do is be more discerning and analyze their 
positions and the reasons behind them, applying these lessons to our own concerns. We 
can learn from both their insights and their shortsightedness.
It is certainly not my intention to suggest that the problems we face after the 
Shoah have been neatly resolved centuries previously. One thing that we can learn from 
the experiences of Abulafia, R. Bachya, and countless others, is that none of these 
problems has definite or easy solutions, and that the myth of Jewish uniformity was as 
false in their time as it is today. Eisenstadt reminded us that every attempt to break down 
totality inevitably constructs a totality in its place. By this score even someone like 
Emmanuel Levinas, arguably one of the most insightful and intellectually rigorous of the 
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major contributors to such thought in modern times, fails before he begins. But there are 
two conflicting concerns in this regard, each of them valid. 
We can chastise Bachya ben Asher for so unabashedly reconstructing the word 
and contributing to totalizing processes, but we must also understand why he made the
decision and we must applaud his creativity in laying the seeds for rupture even as he 
constructed totalities. At the same time we can rebuke Abraham Abulafia’s disdain for 
the community and his hazy ethics, but we must commend his profound desire to reject 
any and all totalities. We must construct totalities just as we severely criticize them, but, 
Eisenstadt reminds us, we cannot “descend into gibberish or silence.”226 This is our 
dilemma, our anxiety. Levinas, in Otherwise Than Being, equates these two concerns 
with the skeptic, on the one hand, and the philosopher, on the other. The philosopher is 
forever concerned with constructing consistencies and coherences – totalities by other 
names. And the skeptic “states the rupture, failure, impotence or impossibility of 
disclosure.” The two trends are inherently interconnected and irresolvable. Levinas 
writes:
Philosophy is not separable from skepticism, which follows it like a shadow it 
drives off by refuting it again at once on its footsteps. Does not the last word 
belong to philosophy? Yes, in a certain sense, since for Western philosophy the 
saying is exhausted in things said. But skepticism in fact makes a difference, and 
puts an interval between saying and the said. Skepticism is refutable, but it 
returns.227
ળ
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Our Impossible Victory
Sabbath morning. A crowded synagogue – more crowded than usual. I 
stood on the bimah before the open scrolls and read. That Shabbat we read the 
commandment to celebrate our holidays in joy. I had hardly finished the sentence
when the doors were pushed open. The mob took over. The killers were laughing. 
I remember their laughter as I remember their shiny swords. Minutes later, it was 
all over. Not one Jew cried out; we didn’t have the time. As I heard the echo of 
my own words: “And you shall celebrate your holidays in joy” – I found myself 
without a community. I was still standing; I stood throughout the slaughter. 
Standing before the open parchments. Why was I spared? Is it possible that they 
failed to see me because I was standing? I saw blood, only blood. I felt swept by 
madness. I whispered over and over again: “And you shall celebrate your 
holidays in joy, in joy, in joy.” And I backed out and left.228
- Mendel, in Elie Wiesel’s The Trial of God
The Artist Usurps the Actuality
The Destruction of the European Jews, by Raul Hilberg, is the most thorough and 
meticulous account of the machinations of the Shoah. Hilberg has provided the world 
with an unparalleled analysis of the intricacies of the horrific event. But while the tone of 
his text is rather dry and factual, perhaps reflective of his source material, Hilberg 
understands this undertaking as an artistic endeavor. In his memoir, The Politics of 
Memory, he refers to his work as an art, and he describes some of the lessons he has 
learned from the work of artists in other fields. He compares his writing technique to the 
compositions of Beethoven, who “had to work, to build his music like an edifice, draft 
after draft, slowly, painfully,” as opposed to those of Mozart, the child prodigy. “The 
Schubert Quintet in C,” he writes, “gave me the insight that power is not dependent on 
simple mass or even loudness, but on escalations and contrasts.”229
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Hilberg is also conscious of the weighty responsibility of the artist, particularly 
given the nature of his art. He credits filmmaker Claude Lanzmann with the insight that 
“to recreate this event… one must be a consummate artist, for recreation is an act of 
creation in and of itself.” And when the art is so intimately connected to such a 
momentous and terrible historical event these concerns become even more crucial. 
Because “the artist usurps the actuality, substituting a text for a reality that is fast fading,” 
Hilberg is aware that his account of the Shoah replaces the historical event in a 
very important sense. “The words that are thus written take the place of the past,” he 
writes. “These words, rather than the events themselves, will be remembered.”230 That the
process is unavoidable is its only justification. And such a problematic and 
unprecedented subject requires the utmost earnestness because “to slip or fall in this 
effort would have been tantamount to failing tremendously.”231
The process of recreation that Hilberg is describing shares concerns with Saul 
Friedlander in his distinction between “common memory” and “deep memory.” Both 
Hilberg and Friedlander are anxious about what it might take to preserve those aspects of 
the Shoah that are less describable and threaten to be erased with the loss of the firsthand 
account. According to James E. Young, Friedlander’s “common memory” is similar to 
Richard L. Rubenstein’s “dissonance-reduction” in that it articulates an event within a 
consistent framework – it “‘tends to restore or establish coherence, closure and possibly a 
redemptive stance.’” “Deep memory,” in contrast, is “that which remains essentially 
inarticulable and unrepresentable, that which continues to exist as unresolved trauma just
beyond the reach of meaning.” And when deep memory is fully present the relationship 




between the two prohibits uninterrupted coherency or systematization. Like Emmanuel 
Levinas’s “philosophy,” or “totality,” as it relates to “skepticism,” or “infinity,” “every 
common memory of the Holocaust is haunted by that which it necessarily leaves 
unstated, its coherence a necessary but ultimately misleading evasion.” 232
If we are to take seriously Hilberg’s point that artistic responses to the Shoah 
become synonymous in hindsight with the events themselves, and if we also maintain, as 
I have argued using different terminology, that deep memory is a requisite focal point for 
the preservation of a Judaism that remains both relevant and conceptually continuous, it 
follows that deep memory must remain central to a Jewish understanding of the Shoah. 
For this reason we must confront the concern shared by James E. Young and Saul 
Friedlander that as the generations with a direct or even indirect experience of the Shoah 
fade into history there is the very real danger of losing deep memory along with them. 
Young writes of Friedlander:
[He] wonders, profoundly I think, what will become of this deep memory after 
the survivors are gone. “The question remains,” he says, “whether at the 
collective level… an event such as the Shoah may, after all the survivors have 
disappeared, leave traces of a deep memory beyond individual recall, which will 
defy any attempts to give it meaning.” The implication is that, beyond the second 
generation’s artistic and literary representations of it, such deep memory may be 
lost to history altogether.
With the continuity of common memory much more certain and inevitable than 
deep memory, we risk systematizing the Shoah within a closed redemptive system. This 
would be an injustice to the victims, the survivors, and, most importantly, to future 
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generations. It threatens to distort the nature of the Shoah, impeding us from taking stock 
of the very real problems it presents. 
Not surprisingly these systematizing processes often take place along the lines of 
specific agendas, and themes of historical recreation can be discovered in somewhat 
predictable patterns. Raul Hilberg describes his experiences of struggle with key elements 
of the Jewish community as a conflict as to the ways historical memory should be 
incorporated into Jewish thinking: “It has taken me some time,” he writes, “to absorb 
what I should have always known, that in my whole approach to the study of the 
destruction of the Jews I was pitting myself against the main current of Jewish thought… 
that in my research and writing I was pursuing not merely another direction but one 
which was the exact opposite of a signal that pulsated endlessly through the Jewish 
community.”233
Hilberg saw three major elements in the pulsating signal against which he had 
pitted himself. The first is the claim that valid remembering should involve a resolute 
focus on the victims up to the point of ignoring the perpetrators. He witnessed examples 
of how the process takes place through his involvement with the creation of the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington. While Hilberg suggested, for 
example, that the museum should obtain a German railroad car that transported Jews to 
death camps, “a large product of German manufacture,” a ramp was built through the 
open door to allow visitors to peer into the car and imagine the Jews locked inside. 
In another instance Hilberg’s suggestion of a single can of Zyklon gas upon a 
pedestal in a room with no other objects, “as the epitome of Adolf Hitler’s Germany,” 
became “a whole pile of gas cans… heaped in the middle of the floor to be stumbled on 
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and noticed with a downward glance,” more a memorial to the victims of the gas. Finally, 
what the planner’s jokingly called the “Hilberg wall,” a suggested exhibit of photographs 
of known and unknown perpetrators representing “the civil service, the military, industry, 
and the party,” became an exhibit of the war crimes trials. “Some of the perpetrators are 
still there,” Hilberg explains, “but in the role of defendant.”234 The victims are there too, 
of course, but now they are in the role of punisher, doling out retribution.
While he does not seem to be suggesting that such exhibits are entirely without 
merit, Hilberg understands these instances as part of a larger pattern. “The fadeout of the 
perpetrator is no accident,” Hilberg asserts. He compares it to the drowning out of the 
name of Haman during the festival of Purim, and the Deuteronomic commandment to 
blot out the memory of Amalek. He recounts hearing the Orthodox rabbi Seymour Siegel 
mentioning Adolf Eichmann and adding the ritualistic words “May his name be erased.” 
Hilberg admits that there is certainly reason to worry about giving the perpetrators 
human faces, although he has taken it upon himself to do just that: “I insist on delving 
into forbidden territory and presenting Amalek with all his features as an aggregate of 
German functionaries.”235 Obviously, he considers his task to be of worth. For our 
project, however, we should be concerned about the processes that fade out the 
perpetrator because understanding the societal mechanisms that produced this horror has 
been of great importance for trying to understand some of the reasons behind it, what we 
are up against, and ways to combat these tendencies. Hilberg may have other reasons for 
his position, though they also may coincide with ours to some extent.




While Hilberg does not discount the criticisms of his work, he sees in his critics a 
different, albeit related desire that is expressed in their criticisms. He points out that those 
who chastise him for not focusing on the victims seem to be themselves concerned 
primarily with one subset of victims. Rather than consider more difficult aspects of the 
Jewish response to the Shoah such as the actions of Jewish councils and “the desperate 
adjustment strategies pursued by the communities in the wake of strangling German 
measures,” proponents of Jewish sources have emphasized the oral reports of survivors. 
The prominence of survivors as primary sources, a corollary to the fadeout of the 
perpetrator, is the second element of Hilberg’s pulsating signal. This approach, Hilberg 
explains, has certain built-in limitations. To begin with, as David Pablo Boder has noted, 
one cannot interview the dead. What emerges from this practice, then, is not a “random 
sample of the extinct communities,” but a very particular, self-selected sample. The only 
fact that can be completely revealed by the survivors, Hilberg tells us, “is the self-portrait 
of the survivors, their psychological makeup, and what it took to survive.”236
Hilberg gives us an outline of what these accounts often sound like. They leave 
out specifics of setting and positions of people they encountered, along with “mundane 
information about their financial circumstances or their health.” Stories of ghetto life and 
early labor camps are relatively ignored in favor of the more thrilling accounts of 
“deportations, concentration camps, death camps, escapes, hiding, and partisan fighting.” 
Furthermore, stories of humiliation and embarrassment are often glossed over, and when 
issues of “hunger, thirst, pain, and fear” are spoken of, they are accompanied, implicitly 
or explicitly, with the dictum that “no one who was not there can imagine what it was 
like.” This presents obvious problems if we are concerned for the preservation of deep 
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memory. The effect of the central role of the survivor in the retelling of the Shoah, for 
Hilberg, also serves the third and perhaps most significant element of the requirement of 
the “main current of Jewish thought”: “The Jewish victims must be seen as heroic.”237
Such a stance necessitates a great amount of revisionism, and an inflation of the 
magnitude and frequency of acts of resistance. One way this has been done is by playing 
with the definition of “resistance” itself. Arno Lustiger, Hilberg tells us, includes the 
Jewish soldiers in the Allied forces in his roster of resisters, along with “those Jews who 
joined the international brigades in the Spanish Civil War” before World War Two even 
began. Hilberg explains that the term “resistance” is also redefined to include activities 
such as “feeding or hospitalizing people in ghettos,” even if these acts had been permitted 
or encouraged by the Germans. He also points to Martin Gilbert’s book, The Holocaust, 
which states that “‘even passivity was a form of resistance…. To die with dignity was a 
form of resistance…. Simply to survive was a victory of the human spirit.”238
And of course, Hilberg explains, though such instances were relatively spare, 
“active, armed acts of self-defense within the destructive arena have nevertheless 
remained the centerpiece of a historiography and celebration.”239 As of this writing the 
most recent example of this sort of celebration is the film Defiance, directed by Edward 
Zwick, based on the book of the same name by Nechama Tec, about the Bielski partisans 
in what is now Belarus. Defiance glorifies a single atypical instance when Jews were 
willing to fend off German forces and were capable of doing so. 
In an article by Edward Zwick that coincided with the film’s theatrical release, he 
writes how, as a boy, his impression of the “passivity and victimization [of Jews] 





became… not only a morbid obsession but also a source of shame,” and that he was 
drawn to the project because it was “a story about Jewish heroes. Like the Maccabees, 
only better.”240 Certainly this story is a true one, and there is nothing inherently wrong 
with presenting it, but when it is submitted to the consciousness and takes a central place 
within the collective memory, it distorts our understanding of the nature of the Shoah.
Hilberg understands why resistance revisionism can be such a reflexive response: 
“The image of a resister with gun in hand is comforting. Something that is uplifting can 
be salvaged from catastrophe.” But in Friedlander’s terminology this is the agenda of 
common memory. Hilberg maintains his objections to such a “campaign of exaltation,” 
explaining that “when relatively isolated or episodic acts of resistance are represented as 
typical, a basic characteristic of the German measures is obscured. The destruction of the 
Jews can no longer be visualized as a process.”241
Furthermore, the argument that the Jews were resisters, that is, legitimate 
enemies, was precisely the German argument that justified the mass killings. The “drastic 
actuality of a relentless killing of men, women, and children,” Hilberg explains, “is 
mentally transformed into a more familiar picture of a struggle – however unequal –
between combatants.”242 Expansion of the definition of resistance, and presenting 
atypical episodes of resistance as typical, serves to undercut the accomplishments of 
those who did resist in significant ways, and blurs the very real distinctions between the 
choices they made and those of the larger communities. As Bronia Klibanski pointed out 
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to Hilberg, such revisions preclude the possibility of analysis of the complexities of the 
Jewish response and limit our ability to understand why things happened as they did.243
We should also critique the “campaign of exaltation” from a related but slightly 
different viewpoint. In light of Friedlander’s concern for the preservation of a sense of 
deep memory, and the issues of totalization we have discussed throughout this study, we 
should find the campaign disturbing in that it seeks to impose a comprehensive, satisfying 
coherence on what is fundamentally incomprehensible and intrinsically unsatisfying. It 
glosses over the most troubling aspects of the Shoah, creating sanitized accounts 
designed to provide comfort and complacency. It ignores precisely those moments of 
rupture that are so critical to deep memory. The Shoah is thus presented as just another 
example of an ongoing historical drama – there is nothing distinctive about it that allows 
for any new degree of self-reflection. Judaism can move forward as if nothing ever 
happened. This, as mentioned before, would not only dishonor the victims and survivors
of the Shoah, but it would do a disservice to future generations who would be closed off 
from the possibility of grappling with the Shoah.
Like Hilberg, we can understand and sympathize with the urge to find comfort 
within the horror, to salvage something uplifting from the catastrophe. But we cannot 
abide such historical modification if it comes at the expense of preserving the 
inarticulable and unrepresentable aspects of the Shoah. Hilberg’s own unflinchingly 
technical work presents an important counter-perspective in its very cataloguing of the 
mechanisms of the atrocities and its refusal to succumb to cliché and pleasantry, and it 
has laid the groundwork for much further analysis, most notably that of Hannah Arendt. 
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Other works of Shoah historiography, meanwhile, have gone in different directions as 
they attempt to address the problem of deep memory. 
ળ
Art Spiegelman: Masking and Unmasking the Shoah
One measure by which to judge such historical recreations is Saul Friedlander’s 
conception of the “integrated historian.” Friedlander’s proposal, as James E. Young 
explains, is “not so much a specific form but a way of thinking about historical narrative 
that makes room for a historiography integrating deep and common memory.” Like 
Talmudic exegesis, such historiography must preserve and proliferate self-conscious 
ruptures of the narrative. Friedlander calls this a form of commentary, and writes that it 
“‘should disrupt the facile linear progression of the narration, introduce alternative 
interpretations, question any partial conclusion, [and] withstand the need for closure.’” 
Young explains that such interruptions serve as reminders that we are dealing the 
problem of reproducing the memories of individuals in specific settings, and that the 
narrative “would simultaneously gesture both to the existence of deep, inarticulable 
memory and to its own incapacity to deliver that memory.” 244 We find in Friedlander’s 
notion of integrated historiography resonances of the totality/infinity/totality scheme we 
discussed with regard to Levinas and our kabbalists. Just as we must construct totalities
yet strive to preserve aspects of rupture within them, integrated historiography must 
create a somewhat coherent narrative that preserves within it the critique of that 
coherence.
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Friedlander finds an example of integrated historiography in the last panel of Art 
Spiegelman’s “comic book,” Maus: A Survivor’s Tale, where the dying father, Vladek, 
addresses Artie, an avatar of the author, by the name of his brother who died in the 
Shoah. Young, in his book, At Memory’s Edge, provides us with a more in-depth 
analysis of the complexities of Spiegelman’s work, which includes Maus: A Survivor’s 
Tale: My Father Bleeds History, its sequel, Maus II: A Survivor’s Tale: And Here My 
Troubles Began, and Breakdowns, an anthology of strips that include ones from the 
period in which the Maus books were written. 
Spiegelman distances himself from the word “comics,” preferring the term 
“commix,” meaning “to mix together,” with reference to the words and pictures.245 Like 
the combinations of Abraham Abulafia or the textual flexibility of Bachya ben Asher, 
Maus contains traces of what Young calls “antinarrative,” it creates a sort of template that 
defies any specific interpretation until it enters the reader’s consciousness. At the time 
that Spiegelman began his first Maus narrative, Young tells us, “the artist’s overriding 
question became: How to tell the story of narrative’s breakdown in broken-down 
narrative?” 
In Breakdowns particularly, Spiegelman provides the reader with boxes of images 
and text, but few clues as to how the boxes should be read in relation to each other, 
leaving to the reader the task of constructing a sequential narrative. Young tells us that in 
his introductory panels to Breakdowns, “Spiegelman even rejects the notion of narrative 
as story, preferring to redefine story as the ‘“complete horizontal division of a 
building…. [From Medieval Latin HISTORIA… a row of windows with pictures on 
them.].’”” 
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As far as the Shoah is concerned, however, Spiegelman has no intention of 
“descending into gibberish,” to use Oona Eisenstadt’s term. A complete lack of 
coherence would have nothing significant to say about the Shoah. Spiegelman is certainly 
aware that, however much he layers the narrative with various sorts of commentary, there 
must be at least a basic coherence at its core. Once again, this mirrors the issue we found 
in Levinas and elsewhere: we are forced to construct totalities in order to speak, but if we 
are to represent the Shoah – and to articulate Judaism after the Shoah – we must find 
ways to manipulate the totalities to preserve the ruptures. In Maus, Young explains, 
Spiegelman presents us with a story that “includes not just ‘what happened’ but how what 
happened is made sense of by father and son in telling… it highlight’s both the 
inseparability of his father’s story from its effect on Artie and the story’s own necessarily 
contingent coming into being.”246
Maus also directs the reader to consider those aspects of the story that cannot be 
told, that are lost forever. At the end of Maus I, Spiegelman depicts a confrontation with 
his father in which he learns that Vladek had burned Artie’s dead mother’s memoirs 
without remembering what she had written, except that she had hoped her son would be 
interested in them. Artie reacts to the news with a menacing glare and an overpowering 
stance toward his father, yelling “God damn you!” and calling him a murderer. Here 
Artie represents every subsequent generation that wants to know what cannot be known, 
to understand what cannot be understood, and his anger is palpable. Even after Vladek 
calms him down, explaining his own confusion and how depressed he had been when he 
destroyed the memoirs, Artie leaves his father’s house muttering “…murderer.” 
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Spiegelman is representing the awful, but very real, anxiety that in every moment 
in which we allow part of the story to be lost there is a sense of complicity in the crimes. 
But Spiegelman makes no attempt to recreate his mother’s narrative. Acting on the desire 
to grasp what is beyond our reach is an even worse offense. Instead, the tragic enormity 
of the mother’s tale is conveyed through its absence. Young considers this a “void at the 
heart of Maus,” he tells us that  “the mother’s lost story may be Maus’s negative center of 
gravity, the invisible planet around which both the father’s telling and Spiegelman’s
recovery of it revolve.”247
The broken narrative with which we are presented is also layered with other self-
referential commentaries. We are told that “when Spiegelman is asked, ‘Why mice?’” in 
reference to his choice to depict Jews as mice (and Germans as cats, Frenchmen as frogs, 
Poles as pigs, etc.), “he answers, ‘I need to show the events and memory of the Holocaust 
without showing them. I want to show the masking of these events in their 
representation.” Adam Gopnik offers that it is not only that Spiegelman wants to present 
the story masked, but that it is “‘too horrible to be presented unmasked.’” With the 
unfathomable magnitude of the Shoah there must be unending reference to the 
impossibility of the telling within the telling itself. The audacity to portray what is 
simultaneously impossible and necessary to portray must be repeatedly, self-consciously 
acknowledged. 
Yet another layer is added by the fact that, in many panels, we can see certain 
characters not so much as mice, but as humans wearing mouse masks. Gopnik compares 
Spiegelman’s choice here to the thirteenth-century Ashkenazi Bird’s Head Haggadah, in 
which human beings are portrayed with birds’ heads, but he points out that whereas “‘the 
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medieval artist had a subject too holy to be depicted; the modern artist has a subject too 
horrible to be depicted.’”248
Against Hope
Perhaps the most difficult problem we encounter in portraying the Shoah is the 
issue of meaning. The urge to find meaning in the Shoah – relevant lessons for our lives 
that fit into categories of redemption – is unavoidable. My entire project is, despite itself, 
partly the result of this urge. The totalizing coherencies to which we are drawn hold their 
sway in part for this reason. Events are given value; they are assigned a place within a 
scheme. As we have seen with the Shoah itself, human beings are prone to lash out 
violently in the face of the irreconcilable. 
Spiegelman’s depiction of his avatar lashing out at his father is a not-so-subtle 
reminder that the victimized group is in no way insulated from the phenomenon. In fact, 
faced with the existential threat of non-coherence on such a deeper level, a victim can
respond to future confrontation in a totalizing fashion with even more zeal. The Shoah, if 
allowed to resist totality, becomes an ugly blot upon the dramas that we construct for 
ourselves through narratives of logic, redemption, and theodicy. It requires a radical 
restructuring of these categories, pushing to the margins what were once central themes 
and emphasizing other historically fringe elements.
Zachary Braiterman writes of Richard Rubenstein’s work, “I wonder if he 
suspected that the radicalism of his thought had less to do with theological propositions 
per se than with his recoding the contents of an entire religious culture.” In other words, 
in his attempt to construct a drastically “antitheodic” Judaism, Rubenstein was tapping 
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into what Umberto Eco calls “‘the unlimited discovery of contrasts and oppositions that 
keep multiplying with every look.’” 
In accordance with Eco’s notions of “open work” and “unexpected freedoms,” 
Braiterman explains that “Judaism consists of signs (texts, beliefs, social institutions, 
literary figures, and ritual observances) that form into a semiotic web of interlinking 
pieces.” Under the category of “signs” Braiterman also includes “affective states of 
consciousness brought about by ecstatic experience and catastrophic event,” which brings 
us back to the distinction made by Gopnik between Maus and the Bird’s Head Haggadah 
in an interesting way. The changes to Judaism that take place by way of post-Shoah 
thought – for Braiterman this means the trends inaugurated primarily by Emil 
Fackenheim, Richard Rubenstein, and Eliezer Berkovitz – is evidence that “the cultural 
nexus that constitutes ‘Judaism’ in any given period is itself built upon detachable parts. 
Its units can be moved between the center and margins of the community’s attention to 
reveal new meanings at different historical moments.”249
Braiterman tracks the change in the thinking of the post-Shoah theologians as a 
shift in antitheodic expression from the margins to the center. “This shift,” he writes, 
“speaks to the changed face of catastrophe in the modern era. Antitheodicy (the refusal to 
justify, accept, and value suffering) proves especially compelling in an age of 
extermination camps and nuclear weaponry.”250 But this is no guarantee that antitheodicy 
can, in itself, provide an avenue of living that is not fraught with the Scylla of reactionary 
totalities and the Charybdis of antitheodical despair. James Young asks, astutely, of 
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Shoah narratives, “Can we keep such stories separate or do they seep into the rest of our 
lives, and how corrosive are they?” 
Antitheodicy can only be understood in relation to theodicy, and there is no 
“stepping outside” of these ideas, whatever one might rationally propose about the 
existence or non-existence of God, for example. And antitheodicy, which tries to reject 
redemptive lessons, is itself a kind of lesson imbued with its own didactic meaning. 
Young cites the essayist Jonathan Rosen, who offers some related questions that cut to 
the core of these anxieties:
Why should we assume there are positive lessons to be learned from [the 
Holocaust]… What if some history does not have anything to teach us? What if 
studying radical evil does not make us better? What if, walking though the 
haunted halls of the Holocaust Museum, looking at evidence of the destruction of 
European Jewry, visitors do not emerge with a greater belief that all men are 
created equal but with a belief that man is by nature evil?251
Young answers these questions as a devil’s advocate, accentuating our fears: 
[In that case] the Holocaust was an irredeemably terrible experience then, had a 
terrible effect on many survivors’ lives, and endows its victims with no great 
moral authority now. Categories like good and evil remain, but they are now 
stripped of their idealized certainties. Neither art nor narrative redeems the 
Holocaust with meaning – didactic, moral, or otherwise. In fact, to the extent that 
remembering events seems to find any meaning in them, such memory also 
betrays events by blinding us with our own need for redemptory closure.252
With these words Young appears to have resigned us to the most pessimistic, Mithnagdic 
perspective of the human trajectory. There is nothing to look forward to, no great lessons 
learned, only more despair. The repetition of the word “terrible” here is reminiscent of 
Leonard Cohen’s “The Night Comes On,” suggesting another possible understanding of
                                                          




the lyrics, “There was this terrible sound, / and my father went down / with a terrible 
wound in his side.” There is no victory, not even at the end of war. The agreement that 
nobody else has to die is illusory, naïve at best and deadly at its worst. Have we then lost 
all possibility of any sort of redemption? Is this the sound of Rabbi Eliezer’s absent 
response to Rabbi Joshua, the disconfirmation of God, of Levinas’s principle of the 
triumph of Good? 
ળ
There are obviously profound consequences to these problems as one considers 
issues of both individual and political action. Is there even the possibility of any sort of 
persuasive ethics when there is absolutely no hope? The preceding discussion, after all, 
coalesces into a devastating critique of hope, or what Oona Eisenstadt calls “a Meaning 
of History… the consolations of a providence or a progress guiding the world toward 
salvation or perfection.”253  Eisenstadt writes:
We do not need to think of the Jews murdered at Auschwitz to understand that 
hope is illusory, nor do we need to think of the Nazis engaged in their murder to 
understand that hope is dangerous. It is likely, though, that in the wake of 
Auschwitz these ideas are easiest to grasp – and indeed they are grasped by 
several thinkers, for instance Theodor Adorno, who writes that after Auschwitz 
‘even to think hope forsakes hope and works against it.’”254
It is difficult to walk away from a sober engagement with most Shoah literature 
and art without such a sense of the futility, or even the danger, of hope. Such is certainly 
the case with Elie Wiesel’s The Trial of God. Wiesel, most famous for Night, his account 
of his personal experience at Auschwitz and Buchenwald, was inspired to write a play in 
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which several Jews hold a mock trial for God. Though the play takes place in the fictional 
Eastern European village of Shamgorod in 1649, it was inspired by an event that Wiesel 
witnessed in Auschwitz: “Inside the kingdom of night,” Wiesel tells us, “I witnessed a 
strange trial. Three rabbis – all erudite and pious men – decided one winter evening to 
indict God for allowing his children to be massacred.”255
The play takes place on the night of Purim, the festival inaugurated by Mordechai 
in the Book of Esther. Three travelling Purimshpielers (minstrels; actors) arrive at an inn 
to put on a festive Purim show, as is customary. Not realizing exactly where they are, 
they soon learn that they have arrived in Shamgorod, a village which has suffered a 
pogrom, leaving behind only two Jews: Berish, the innkeeper, and Hannah, his 
traumatized daughter. 
Berish and Hannah are a sort of anti-Mordechai and anti-Esther, or they are what 
Mordechai and Esther might have become had their plan not succeeded and somehow 
they alone survived. Berish convinces the erstwhile Purimshpielers to help him stage a 
trial with himself as accuser, the minstrels as judges, and God as defendant. After several 
interruptions, including the entrance of a Stranger who offers his services as an attorney 
for the defense and the local Priest who warns the Jews of another imminent pogrom, the 
trial begins. 
The ending is rather cliché. After dredging up responses reminiscent of Job’s 
“friends” – “who are you to criticize God’s plan?”, etc. – and invoking the doctrine of a 
God who suffers with the victims, the Stranger fails to assuage Berish’s anger but 
manages to convince the judges that as God’s sole defender he must be a saint, prophet, 
miracle maker, or something similar. As the angry mob descends upon the inn the judges 
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plead with the Stranger for some kind of miraculous intervention, at which point the 
Stranger puts on his “Purim” mask, revealing himself to be Satan and cackling “If only 
you knew, if only you knew…”256
There is no resolution, no grand epiphany. The ending was something we knew, 
in a sense, before the play began. Wiesel even includes this addition to the scene 
description at the start of the play: “Hate has won; death has triumphed.”257 Unsatisfying 
though the ending may be, and however trite of a literary device it employs, one can
understand why Wiesel might feel he could not end the play in any other way. It is 
required, in a way, if we are to find relevance in it after Auschwitz. Anything else would 
have been beside the point; it would have precluded the possibility of meditation on the 
problems presented.
Much more intriguing than the ending, I believe, are some of the discussions that 
take place throughout. Three aspects of the play are of particular interest to me. The first 
is Berish’s and Mendel’s exchange with the Priest upon hearing of the impending 
pogrom. Mendel is the elder, wiser, more aloof member of the Purimshpielers. He 
defends Berish’s decision to reject the Priest’s offer of protection in exchange for 
conversion, as well as the decision to remain in the inn and stage the trial despite the 
danger of the pogrom.
Berish, as he prepares to stage a trial against God, refuses the Priest’s offer just as 
he refuses to flee. He rebuffs the Priest’s claim that God no longer loves the Jews even as 
he prepares to accuse God of more or less the same crime. Mendel responds to the 
Priest’s confused question, “Why this sudden loyalty to your God?” by telling him, “Our 




relations with God are our business – ours alone.” He continues, “there is the people of 
Israel and there is the God of Israel: Let no one interfere in their affairs.”258
The second matter of interest is the play’s use of the festival of Purim as a literary 
motif. As already mentioned, Purim is characterized by shows, masks, and other frivolity. 
Roles become reversed, up becomes down, and, as Berish notes, “on Purim, everything 
goes.” Purim becomes a sort of ethos for the entire play, which is itself a demonic 
reversal of the giddiness of a Purimshpiel, a traditional Purim play. Berish dismisses the 
story of Esther, however, as the story of “a Jewish beauty who went to bed with an old 
king,” and scoffs at Mendel’s question, “And God in all this?” Mendel responds, “Do not 
make fun of God – even if He is making fun of you.”259
A little bit later Berish declares that the judges are all crazy and that “Purim is 
over. For good.” Mendel responds, “So what! Only madmen know how to pay tribute to 
Purim! Purim is for madmen!”260 And yet Berish’s justification for the trial is that it is 
taking place on Purim, when “everything goes,” and that therefore they are free to “utter 
words no one has ever uttered before… ask questions no one has ever dared ask before… 
give answers no one has ever had the courage to articulate before… and to accuse the 
real accused.” Mendel responds, saying “Tonight we will be free to say everything. To 
command, to imagine everything – even our impossible victory.”261 Later, Mendel sums 
up the scene to the Priest thusly: “Outside, Haman’s mob is getting ready, while inside, 
the Jews went on with their prayers; that was their idea of theater.”262







The third matter is a discussion between Berish and Mendel that is taken up at 
various points throughout the play. Early on, in response to a remark by Mendel about his 
having “learned the art of waiting,” Berish says, “I knew how to wait once… I waited and 
waited for redemption, and who do you think came? The redeemer? No: the killers.” 
Mendel responds, “But is that an answer? If so, it means there is an answer. I am not sure 
there is…” Soon afterward Berish asks Mendel if he shares his anger. Mendel replies, “I 
do not. But I like it anyway. It implies a question –.”263 Later on, when the mob is 
approaching and Mendel asks him if he still refuses to forgive God, Berish proclaims: “I 
lived as a Jew, and it is as a Jew that I shall die – and it is as a Jew that, with my last 
breath, I shall shout my protest to God! And because the end is near, I shall shout louder! 
Because the end is near, I’ll tell Him that He’s more guilty than ever!”264
These three related components of the play are significant because together they 
flesh out a commentary on our earlier concerns about hope and hopelessness. We would 
do well to keep the ending as part of our considerations, and we should stress that these 
components do not present us with a hope against hope, a hope against all odds, a silver 
lining to a cloud of despair, or anything of the sort. There is no rejection of hopelessness, 
of the futility of action. As with the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, it remains, in 
Eisenstadt’s words, “a thought without hope.”265
Wiesel, through Berish and Mendel, seems to agree with Levinas that all positive 
projects, such as pleasing others or “mending the world,” even if they enjoy a limited 
success, inevitably fail. The rejection of hope remains in each instance; there is no 
likelihood, or even possibility, that any initiative will fully succeed, no matter how 
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righteously motivated or skillfully executed. And furthermore, even when a justice is 
successfully achieved, it is never without an aspect of injustice. But, as Eisenstadt 
explains of Levinas, and I believe it applies to Wiesel’s characters as well, “he replaces 
[hope] with something more enduring, something that, in addition, is perhaps more 
Jewish: in a word, stubbornness.”266
Eisenstadt quotes an essay by Levinas entitled “Jewish Thought Today,” in which 
he writes that the modern Jewish rejection of “supernatural salvation,” for our purposes, 
hope, is not so much an “example of pigheadedness,” but “supreme lucidity” in which 
Jews have concluded that “their stiff necks were the most metaphysical part of their 
anatomy.” But, Eisenstadt notes, not only does the stiff neck become a “mark of healthy 
skepticism,” it also, interestingly, can become “the locus of action.” And through an 
exploration of this marriage of skepticism and action we can begin to understand why, for 
Levinas, it becomes necessary to so explicitly combine Abulafian rupture with the ethical 
emphasis of Bachya ben Asher, especially after the Shoah. 
In harmony with the conversations of Berish and Mendel, Levinas, inspired by a 
short story by Zvi Kolitz about the last remaining Jew in the Warsaw Ghetto,  writes that 
“‘to be a Jew means… to swim eternally against the filthy criminal tide of man.’” 
Eisenstadt adds that this means “to be aware that one will fail again and again; to be 
therefore a member of ‘the most unhappy people on earth’; but also, finally, to be happy 
[to be] unhappy”267 [clarifying notes in Eisenstadt’s text]. 
In this way hopelessness is not a nihilistic, inactive despair but the grounding for 
an ethics that is both precarious and powerful. “To slip from the rejection of hope into 




inactivity, either personal or social,” Eisenstadt writes, is effectively forbidden by 
Levinas’ss thought.” Inactivity remains a temptation, of course, when one is confronted 
with such conflicting aspects of the human condition, of Levinasian “infinite obligation” 
and “the inevitability of ethical failure.” But the very stubbornness that unendingly defies 
injustices on the individual level and structure and order on the political level, despite 
hopelessness or perhaps because of it, is what defines Judaism. Conversely, Eisenstadt 
defines the loss of this stubbornness, through despair but also through comfort or 
acquiescence, for example, to Hegelian historical necessity – read: salvation, progress, 
theodicy – as “assimilation.”268
The ethics that emerges here is, of course, characterized by an extreme 
tentativeness that would have pleased Abulafia and R. Bachya, and will remain, by 
definition, unfulfilled, unsatisfying, and all too aware of the unjust aspect of even the 
purest forms of justice. As Jews, we must struggle to reconcile such an ethics with the 
hopelessness that continues to emerge from the Shoah experience – and with our
unprecedented capacity for all forms of worldly praxis in the current age. 
ળ
Let us conclude by considering the poem, “With a Variable Key,” by Paul Celan:
With a variable key
you unlock the house in which
drifts the snow of that left unspoken.
Always what key you choose
depends on the blood that spurts
from your eye or your mouth or your ear.
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You vary the key, you vary the word
that is free to drift with the flakes.
What snowball will form round the word
depends on the wind that rebuffs you.269
I leave the exegesis to the reader.
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